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1. Introduction 
Recently, the straw man fallacy has been receiving new attention (Lewiński 2011). Most commonly 
described as a type of fallacy of reasoning wherein one misrepresents the argument of an opponent and 
thereby easily defends the weakened version and claims victory over the original, stronger argument” 
(Talisse & Aikin 2006, p. 87), it is recognised as a very commonly used argumentative strategy (Aikin & 
Casey 2011) that knows “clear textbook descriptions and theoretical accounts” (Lewiński 2011, p. 470). 
Recent studies demonstrate, however, that the prevailing picture of the straw ma n fallacy is greatly 
oversimplified: An analysis of textbook descriptions of the fallacy conducted by Talisse and Aikin 
shows that the picture is accurate in a general sense, but does not distinguish between the different 
forms in which it may occur. Furthermore, Lewiński notes how many actual instances of the straw man 
fallacy appear to be less obvious than the examples presented in textbooks on argumentation and logic. 
These examples only provide a “simple illustration of the mechanism of [the] fallacy” ( 2011, p. 470) 
but do not do any right to actual straw men used in real arguments. The standard definition of the 
straw man fallacy as ‘a type of fallacy of reasoning wherein one misrepresents the argument of an 
opponent’ then seems inadequate for an argumentation analyst having to deal with the intricacies of 
actual argumentative language use.  
 A case-by-case, argumentative analysis of discussion moves that involves representations of 
propositions may give more insight in the ways a straw man fallacy can be committed. Furthermore, it 
may help to understand what kind of conditions pertaining to the context in which the fallacy is 
committed create opportunities for the fallacy to be successful (van Eemeren 2011; Lewiński 2010). 
Pragma-dialectical argumentation theory, making use of the concept of ‘argumentative activity type’ in 
order to account for the fact that argumentative discourse takes place in concrete situations and under 
specific (contextual) conditions, offers useful tools for detecting these context-specific conditions. 
Building on Levinson (1979), who introduced the notion of ‘activity type’ to refer to “any culturally 
recognized activity, whether or not that activity is co-extensive with a period of speech or indeed 
whether any talk takes place in it at all”  (Ibid., p. 368), pragma-dialectics uses the concept 
argumentative activity type to denote types of communicative activity that have an argumentative 
dimension (van Eemeren 2011, p. 152). 1  By studying the characteristics of a particular type of 
argumentative activity, it can be established what restrictions on and opportunities for committing a 
(particular type of) fallacy are created by these very characteristics.   
 Using pragma-dialectics as a theoretical framework, Lewiński (2010) examines context-specific 
conditions for posing critical reactions in political discussion forums on the internet. On the basis of 
his findings, he identifies a number of restrictions on and opportunities for committing the straw man 
fallacy without it blatantly violating any norms or conventions pertaining to communication within 
this specific argumentative activity type. In addition, Lewiński formulates two general criteria for 
evaluating the reasonableness of reformulations in any argumentative context as well as a set of 
                                                                 
1 That is to say, van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2005) developed the notion of argumentative activity type in order 
to refer to communicative activity types “which are inherently or essentially argumentative” (van Eemeren 2011, 
p. 152). In analytic practice, however, the term is being used in a looser sense, referring indeed to all those types  
of communicative activity that know an argumentative dimension (Ibid.).  
4 
 
necessary and sufficient conditions for identifying the straw man fallacy. The latter are conditions an 
argumentative activity type should comply with in order to be apt for an analysis on t he straw man 
(rather than conditions for a straw man fallacy to be committed). Two of these identification conditions 
Lewiński considers to be necessary ones and require, among other things, for an argumentation analyst 
to only take into account those discussions in which arguers can respond to (and hence are able to 
refute) attacks that involve a misrepresentation of their own case. That is to say, according to Lewiński, 
a straw man fallacy can only be identified in situations in which a discussant has the ability to directly 
respond to it. This generally is the case, for instance, in spoken debates.  
 This thesis, however, departs from the assumption that representations of propositions that 
cannot be critically reacted upon directly can in fact be subject of a straw man fallacy analysis and 
evaluation. More specifically, it will be argued that the reasonableness of representations that are not 
critically reacted upon at all can be properly evaluated if clear norms and conventions can be found to 
pertain to communication within the argumentative activity type under consideration. This will be 
demonstrated by means of a case study of the scientific assessment report Climate Change 
Reconsidered (CCR) written by the Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change 
(NIPCC). This report, published in 2009, is, just like the Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) published 
two years earlier by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), meant to provide policy 
makers world-wide with an overview of the present-day state of knowledge in the field of climate 
science. A major difference between the two reports, now, is the fact that they draw opposite 
conclusions on both the cause of the current climate change as well as the impacts it would have on the 
earth’s environment. According to the IPCC, the current warming of the earth is due to human 
activities as these would be causing a rise in atmospheric CO2. This, in turn, would have negative 
consequences for the earth’s environment. The NIPCC on the other hand contends that the current 
change of climate is caused by natural forces that are by no means influenced by humans; also, the fact 
that the earth is currently warming would have beneficial effects on humans, plants and wildlife. 
Another difference between the reports of the IPCC and the NIPCC is the way in which they present 
their conclusions. In this thesis it will be shown how the NIPCC aims to reach its goal primarily by 
calling upon arguments put forward by the IPCC and trying to refute these, initiating, so to say, a 
discussion between the two.  
 In my thesis I adopt the hypothesis that the specific activity type of the NIPCC’s report and the 
wider context of the (international) debate on climate change provide an ideal situation for the NIPCC 
to not only commit the straw man fallacy but also to do so with most minimal consequences. More 
specifically, I expect the complexity of the scientific data used in the arguments, the audience that is 
expected or known to read the reports, their understanding of scientific communication and the fact 
that the reports are not interactive in the sense that discussants can point out “an attempted 
misrepresentation on-the-spot” (Lewiński 2011, p. 481) create opportunities for (unobtrusively) 
distorting the other party’s propositions. In analysing parts of the NIPCC’s scientific assessment report 
in which critical reactions are posed towards claims put forward by the IPCC, I aim to uncover 
whether these and other contextual factors may indeed contribute to the success of the straw man 
fallacy or the likelihood of it going unnoticed.  
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Furthermore, in the analysis of representations found in the NIPCC’s scientific assessment 
report this thesis aims to provide an insight in the specific manners in which the straw man fallacy is 
committed in actual argumentative discourse. More precisely, taking into account the fact that recent 
studies on the straw man fallacies theorize on how different variants of the straw man fallacy can be 
distinguished, it will be examined whether (some of) these variants can be found to occur indeed. The 
aim of this thesis, thus, is twofold: By examining representations in a particular argumentative activity 
type, it strives to contribute to a better understanding of what contextual factors may influence the 
success of the straw man fallacy; in addition, it seeks to answer the question whether the different 
forms of the fallacy as they are distinguished in the literature can be found to occur in actual 
argumentative discourse indeed.  
This thesis will start with a literature review on the straw man fallacy in Chapter 2. In this 
chapter, an overview is provided of how the straw man fallacy is reflected upon in the literature, 
bringing to the fore both theoretical and practical concerns regarding the analysis and evaluation of the 
fallacy. It will be discussed, among other things, what different categories of variants of the fallacy are 
distinguished in the literature and how these categories relate to one another.  Furthermore, it will be 
noted what solutions have been suggested to the often difficult task of deciding between (sound) 
reformulations of propositions on the one hand and misrepresentations – straw man fallacies – on the 
other hand.  
 As contextual information on the object of analysis, i.e. the scientific assessment report of the 
NIPCC, is crucial for an understanding of its argumentative activity type, Chapter 3 will give an 
illustration of the (historical) context of the international debate on climate change. In this chapter 
particular attention will be paid to the fact that this debate is located on the boundaries between the 
scientific and political domain. It will be explained, among other things, how the interwovenness of 
science and policy making in particular brings along two specific concerns hampering the 
implementation of international action on climate change: On the one hand, the question arises how 
one is to ensure that scientific knowledge is used to inform policy without being distorted or misused; 
on the other, one may ask how governments are to respond to this knowledge considering their own 
interests, perceptions and commitments (Boehmer-Christiansen 1994, p. 140). These questions are 
found to be reflected in the argumentation strategy put forward in the NIPCC’s scientific assessment 
report as well.   
 In Chapter 4, it will be explained in more detail how pragma-dialectical argumentation theory 
and its concept of argumentative activity type in particular may give more insight in the conditions and 
opportunities for committing a straw man fallacy in a given type of communicative activity. In this 
chapter a more general introduction will be given of the field of argumentation theory  as well, 
explaining how a combined normative and descriptive perspective on argumentation are of useful 
value for argumentation analysts interested in both the analysis and evaluation of (ordinary) 
argumentative discourse. 
 Chapter 5, then, provides an analysis of discussion moves in the NIPCC’s report Climate 
Change Reconsidered that involve representations of arguments and standpoints that are (said to be) 
put forward by the IPCC in its Fourth Assessment report. First, an overview will be given of the main 
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standpoints and the general lines of argumentation put forward by the NIPCC. Subsequently, two 
examples will be discussed in which the NIPCC explicitly refers to and represents standpoints and 
arguments put forward by the IPCC. These examples will be used to examine to what extent the 
different variants of the straw man fallacy elaborated upon in Chapter 2 of this thesis can be found to 
occur in the NIPCC’s report. A characterisation of the scientific assessment report of the NIPCC in 
terms of the pragma-dialectical notion of the argumentative activity type then is used to demonstrate 
what conditions are created for the straw man fallacy to be (successfully) committed.  
 Lastly, in Chapter 6 of this thesis the most important findings will be summarized. In this 
chapter, it will be reflected upon mostly how the results of the analysis on representations in the 
NIPCC’s scientific assessment report provide more insight in (1) what contextual factors may influence 
the success of the straw man fallacy and (2) the ways in which the straw man fallacy can be committed. 
In addition, suggestions will be given for further research on the fallacy as well as the methods for 
analysing it.  
On a last note, it is important to add that by examining (potential) fallacious argumentative 
moves committed by the NIPCC, this thesis by no means aims to draw any conclusions on the (overall) 
validity of its report nor will it be suggested that the IPCC’s claims – even if prone to a straw man 
attack – are ‘right’ indeed. Furthermore, as will be explained in more detail in subsequent  chapters of 
this thesis, the fact that the NIPCC’s scientific assessment report (rather than the IPCC’s report or both) 
is chosen as subject of analysis, is due to analytical restrictions only.  As the IPCC has not posed any 
reaction to the NIPCC’s report or the allegations in it, no critical reactions towards the NIPCC put 
forward by the IPCC can be analysed. If the IPCC will respond to specific arguments deployed by the 
NIPCC in the future, its reactions would form an interesting subject of analysis indeed.  
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2. Literature study  
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of how the straw man fallacy is reflected upon in the literature, 
bringing to the fore both theoretical and practical concerns regarding the analysis and evaluation of the 
fallacy. First, in section 2.2, it will be discussed how recent studies have found the prevailing picture of 
the straw man fallacy to be greatly oversimplified, most notably because variants of the fallacy can be 
recognized to which the standard definition does not apply to. As a result, textbooks on argumentation 
and logic would render the impression that the straw man fallacy is a very simple and easily 
recognizable fallacy whereas most actual instances of the fallacy would be considerably subtler and 
hard to detect. In subsections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 it will be discussed what different variants are being 
distinguished in the more recent literature, thereby demonstrating how some ways for committing the 
straw man fallacy are recognized by a number of authors whilst some are reflected upon in the 
literature only once. Subsection 2.2.3 will discuss how these renewed insights in the fallacy may 
contribute to a better understanding of the various ways in which the straw man fallacy may be 
committed indeed, but how no attention is paid to the question of how one is actually to decide when 
(a particular variant of) the fallacy is committed. This question is dealt with in more detail in section 
2.4. In section 2.4 it will be explained as well how pragma-dialectical theory offers a context-sensitive 
approach to the reconstruction of argumentative discourse that may function as a useful basis for the 
identification of the straw man fallacy. Section 2.5, then, describes how Lewiński (2011) uses this 
pragma-dialectical basis in order to formulate a number of specific criteria for the evaluation of the 
straw man fallacy. Attention will be paid to the fact that Lewiński stipulates necessary and sufficient 
conditions for straw man fallacy identification, thereby excluding particular contexts of argumentative 
discourse from being potential subjects of analysis. Lastly,  in section 2.6 an overview will be given of 
the main findings of this chapter.   
 
 
2.2 Different variants of the straw man fallacy  
Typically characterised as a fallacy of criticism or a dialectical fallacy, the straw man fallacy is generally 
explained to occur in the adversary context of two participants in dialogue, A and B, arguing with each 
other. When one arguer (say, A) challenges an argument or position of the other (B), and in doing this, 
distorts some important feature of B’s original argument or position so that it easier to refute and then 
proceeds to argue against the set-up version as though it were their opponent's, A commits a straw 
man fallacy (Johnson & Blair 1983, p. 71). This may be illustrated by the following:   
  
A:  The current rise of global temperature is partly caused by a rapid increase in the 
concentration of atmospheric CO2.   
B:  An increase in the concentration of atmospheric CO2 alone cannot account for the 
current rise of global temperature. 
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In this (constructed) example, A’s argument that the current rise of global temperature is partly caused 
by a rapid increase in the concentration of atmospheric CO2 is taken to mean by B that the current rise 
of global temperature is entirely caused by a rapid increase in the concentration of atmospheric CO2, 
which is indicated by the word ‘alone’ in B’s reaction to A. Here, it is demonstrated how a linguistic 
distortion of A’s argument results in a rebuttal that does not address the actual argument that was 
originally put forward, making B’s contribution to the discussion, in fact, irrelevant.  
 This irrelevance, however, is not always as clear as in the example given above (Tindale 2007; 
Lewiński 2011). Many actual instances of the straw man fallacy are considerably harder to detect, 
meaning that what suffices as an illustration of the mechanism of the straw man for textbook readers 
does not do full right to the argumentative practice of actual arguers (Lewiński 2011). Indeed, fallacies 
that are recognisable as such defeat their very goal of getting accepted as a reasonable contribution to a 
discussion, which makes deciding between a (sound) reformulation or a misrepresentation of a 
proposition a challenging task. Recent studies on the fallacy have responded to this in part by 
demonstrating how in fact different variants of the straw man fallacy can be distinguished, some of 
which do not involve any distortions at the linguistic level. Talisse and Aikin (2006) present themselves 
as the first to expand the conception of the fallacy beyond the form presented in the standard analysis. 
In their (2006) article, Talisse and Aikin make a distinction between two ways in which the straw man 
fallacy can be committed, to which Aikin and Casey (2011) add a third. As will be argued below, the 
three variants more or less match the various techniques for committing a straw man fallacies 
discussed by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992) albeit the latter do not (explicitly) distinguish the 
same (main) categories as Talisse and Aikin and Aikin and Casey do.  
 Before the different variants of the straw man fallacy as they are differentiated in the literature 
will be elaborated upon, it may be important to add that both van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992), 
Talisse and Aikin (2006) and Aikin and Casey (2011) discuss the different manners for committing a 
straw man fallacy in relation to the (persuasive) effects these may have on a third-party audience. 
Indeed, because a straw man fallacy does not attack a real standpoint but a distorted or fictitious 
version of it instead, it would be highly obstructive or counterproductive for the dialectical objective of 
dispute resolution or the objective of resolving a difference of opinion on the merits (Walton 1996, 
Van Laar 2008). Walton, quoting Vernon and Nissen (1986), explains how the straw man fallacy is in 
fact “very unwise from a purely pragmatic point of view” as 
 
“[t]he failure to engage with the real position of your opponent […] in a way, defeats the 
whole purpose of your argument. It is what Aristotle would classify as a failure of real 
refutation. From this perspective, the outcome is that your opponent's (real) position has not 
been challenged at all by your argument. It is a kind of failure of an argument to succeed in its 
real purpose of refuting or critically questioning the opposed point of view.” (1968, p. 160; as 
quoted by Walton 1996, p. 121) 
 
Discussants who do not principally aim for a resolution on the merits, however, may take advantage of 
the fact that they can be less prudent in representing the other party’s point of view. Indeed, as they do 
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not need the discussion to be actually resolved for their primary (rhetorical) goal to be obtained, they 
might as well try to alleviate their burden of proof by addressing weakened versions of the other party’s 
contributions instead of the actual ones. This distortion of another party’s standpoint or argument, 
now, is likely to have the most effect when being addressed to a third-party, onlooking audience such 
as readers of a written polemic. Indeed, particularly in case of less obvious distortions, a third party 
audience may not immediately observe a dissimilarity between what the one party meant and the other 
takes (or pretends to take) it to mean. As will be argued in subsequent chapters of this thesis, this is 
most probably the case not only when the audience is unfamiliar with the topic of discussion or 
unaware of the exact positions and arguments put forward in the debate, but also if the party under 
attack fails to refute the straw man fallacy by calling attention to the fact that a misrepresentation has 
occurred. This may apply, for instance, to discussion situations that do not allow for discussants to 
pose direct reactions to each other’s contributions (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992, pp. 125-26).2 
 Furthermore, as Aikin and Casey (2011) argue, many straw man fallacies can be found to have 
been designed intentionally to persuade an audience that already has strong preferences for a particular 
conclusion to be drawn, either because the audience already takes it to be true or because it strongly 
wishes for it to be true. Straw man fallacies, in cases like these, would “not [be] made with unbiased or 
indifferent audiences in mind, but rather […] as theater  for those with whom the speaker already 
agrees” (Ibid., p. 98). An audience that does not have a preference for a particular conclusion to be 
drawn, on the other hand, appears less easy to persuade as long as it is willing to carefully scrutinize 
each of the party’s contributions to the discussion (Bizer et al. 2009, p. 225). Of course, as Oswald and 
Lewiński (2013, p. 171) note too, whether a particular instance of the fallacy remains unnoticed 
depends on the specific way in which the fallacy is committed as well. In order to understand what 
specific means a discussant may use to make a straw man fallacy as discrete as possible even for a highly 
critical audience, we may now turn to the question which variants of the straw man are distinguished 
in the literature.  
 
 
2.2.1 The ‘standard’ straw man fallacy and its selectional counterpart  
As was already touched upon above, Talisse and Aikin (2006) present themselves as the first to broaden 
the conception of the straw man fallacy. More particularly, they argue that a distinction should be 
made between a ‘standard form’ (which they also refer to as the representational form of the straw man 
fallacy) and another, less-known variant which they call the ‘weak man’ (or the selectional form of the 
straw man fallacy). The definition of this standard variant, now, most resembles the definitions of the 
fallacy given in previous sections of this thesis. It involves (at least) two discussants, A and B, arguing 
about some position (p) by means of one or more arguments (x, y, or z). In attacking the opponent, A 
or B may try to caricature or distort the other party’s position, ascribing to the other party a position 
                                                                 
2 I.e. by reactions that are ‘direct’ I mean reactions in which there is no (cons iderable) time delay between the one 
arguer putting forward an argument and another arguer posing a reaction to it. If a discussion takes place in a  
written polemic in a newspaper, for example, a rebuttal of a straw man can be brought to the fore in the next 
issue of the newspaper, but readers who – for some reason or another – do not come across this next issue may 
wrongly take the (straw man) attack to be a real (or legitimate) and successful one. 
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that is easier to attack (p*). If, suppose, B does so, and then sets to criticize p*, concluding that p* and 
therefore A is wrong, the standard form of the straw man fallacy is committed (Aikin and Casey 2011, 
p. 89). This same principle may be applied to an opponent’s arguments rather than to his position: If B 
attacks A’s position by not addressing A’s original arguments (x, y or z) but caricatured (weaker) 
versions (x*, y* or z*) instead, he may, on the basis of the attack on these weaker representations, 
conclude that B’s position p is wrong (or, at least, weak) (Ibid.) In these examples of the standard 
variant or the representational form B’s attacks are irrelevant as they address either a position or 
arguments that have not been put forward by A, and hence, do not actually form an attack to A’s actual 
standpoint or arguments. 
 If misrepresenting a dialectical situation by addressing weaker arguments or positions than 
those that have originally been put forward is the central vice of the straw man, Talisse and Aikin argue, 
it admits of more forms than the one presupposed in the standard analysis. More specifically, they 
conclude that a discussant does not necessarily have to misrepresent the opponent’s argument or 
position for a straw man fallacy to be committed. Rather, a discussant may misrepresent a dialectical 
situation with respect to the variety and strength of the opponent’s argumentation as well (2006, p. 
346). For means of illustration, we may suppose there are two discussants again, A and B, A defending 
position p by putting forward arguments x, y and z. If B selects the weakest of these arguments, refutes 
only this weakest argument and subsequently argues to have refuted B’s overall case, some variant of 
the straw man fallacy is committed as the opponent’s case is represented weaker than it actually is.3 
Talisse and Aikin call this the selectional form of the straw man fallacy or the weak man.  
 Aikin and Casey (2011) point out how the selectional form of the straw man fallacy resembles 
the hasty generalization as one sample (i.e. one argument) is taken to stand for all (i.e. the arguer’s 
overall case). The specific straw man character, however, lies in the following: In selecting A’s weakest 
argument and attending only to this argument, Aikin and Casey argue, B implies that this argument is 
the best or most powerful argument that has been put forward. That  is to say: 
 
“if A is taking the time to respond to one of B’s arguments, then A must take argument x [the 
weakest argument] as providing some comparative measure of rational resistance to A’s 
preferred position.  If A passes the other arguments over with silence, A implicates that they are 
not worth responding to (or at least do not have the urgency that x has)”. (Ibid., p. 90)  
 
This very feature illustrates a resemblance as well as the difference between the selectional form of the 
straw man fallacy described above and its ‘standard’ (representational) counterpart. Both concern 
misrepresentations of an opponent’s case albeit on a different level: whereas the representational form 
applies to a distortion of an argument or standpoint put forward by an opponent, the selectional form 
concerns a distortion of the dialectical situation, i.e. a “more global failure to exercise charity in 
                                                                 
3 In this example, only one weakest argument is  addressed. The selectional form of the straw man fallacy can a lso 
be committed, however, if some  of the weakest arguments are addressed – i.e. as long as the stronger ones are 
ignored. (cf. Aikin & Casey 2011, p. 88) 
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selecting which of an opponent’s arguments to address selectional form of the straw man fallacy” (Ibid., 
p. 90).4 
 A somewhat different instance of the selectional variant may be committed in a larger context 
in which multiple arguers are involved. To illustrate this, we may suppose there are four arguers, A, B, 
C and D, three of which hold a different point of view than one of them. The latter, now, may choose 
to attack the arguments of the opponent who holds the weakest arguments against the arguer’s own 
view or, if the situation lends itself to it, the formulation of an argument that is shared by all but that is 
put forward by one in the least advantageous way: 
 
“Schematically, the distortion may be presented as follows. B, C, and D all hold that p, but they 
hold that p on the basis of a wide variety of arguments. B, perhaps, is sophisticated, and she 
holds that p on the basis of arguments x, y, and z, which, by the standards set by the state of the 
dialogue, are good arguments. C and D, however, are not quite up to snuff, and though they 
get B’s arguments, when they try to give them, they muck them up. C holds that p on the basis 
of distorted and more criticizable arguments x*, y*, and z*. And D just holds p on the basis of 
x*. A does not need to distort standing arguments for p, now, as those who argue for p have 
done that work for him—all he needs to do is find and pick on the members of the opposition 
that are more mistake-prone or less careful” (Ibid., p. 91) 
 
In the example given above, A, who holds a different point of view than B, C and D, chooses whose  
argument(s) he is going to refute on the basis of the strength of the arguments as they are put forward 
by the opponents. Again, this strategy is considered an instance of the selectional form of the straw 
man fallacy if A, by using this strategy, gives the impression that the other arguments that are left 
unaddressed are not worth responding to and are, in fact, weaker than the argument that has been (or 
the arguments that have been) addressed. 
 
In their standard work on fallacies van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992) make note of what Talisse 
and Aikin (2006) have coined the selectional variant of the straw man fallacy. Van Eemeren and 
                                                                 
4 According to Talisse and Aikin (2006) and Aikin and Casey (2011) to only those cases in which the weakest  
arguments have been addressed and the stronger ones have been neglected, the selectional form of the straw man 
fallacy applies. The basic justif ication given for this is that the authors adhere to the principle that the central vice 
of the straw man fallacy lies in addressing weaker arguments  or positions than the ones originally put forward by 
an opponent, making the opponent not only easier to  attack but also making his case look more vulnerable. One 
might argue, however, that in each case in which argum ents are left unaddressed, some sort of distortion of the 
other party’s case occurs, or indeed some rendering of the impression that the arguments not responded to are 
indeed not worth responding to. This, as a matter of fact, would include all cases in which arguments are being 
jumped over, be it the stronger or relatively weaker ones. If we reconsider the remark from Aikin and Casey 
(2011) mentioned above, i.e. that a discussant may misrepresent a dialectical situation with respect to both the 
variety and strength of the opponent’s argumentation, we may say that a misrepresentation of the strength of 
one’s case may occur if the full variety of arguments that have been put forward is not done justice to.  
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Grootendorst do not, however, discuss this variant in detail. More specifically, it is not included in 
either of the two main categories of the straw man fallacy they distinguish. Instead, it is discussed in the 
section on ‘complications regarding the representation of standpoints’ (1992, pp. 130-131). In this 
section it is argued that “attacking the opponent’s weak arguments while ignoring his strong 
arguments” and “attacking insignificant opponents while ignoring more powerful opponents” should 
be considered straw man attacks indeed as they both concern a representation of the opponent that 
does not do right to reality. In their discussion of these straw man techniques, van Eemeren and 
Grootendorst use the same theorizing as Aikin and Casey (2011) in order to draw the conclusion that 
the essence of the straw man fallacy, i.e. making the opponent appear weaker than he actually is, admits 
for different variants of the fallacy to be formulated (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992, pp. 1301-131). 
It is unclear, however, why this specific variant is mentioned only in a side note.  
 If we look in more detail at the two main categories van Eemeren and Grootendorst 
distinguish, we see that one of the two matches Talisse and Aikin’s (2006) and Aikin and Casey’s (2011) 
description of the standard form. Generally circumscribing it as ‘distorting the opponent’s standpoint’, 
van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992, p. 127-130) explain how an arguer can (subtly) twist the 
opponent’s words in such a way that the standpoint under attack is easier to refute whilst at the same 
time the impression is given that the original standpoint is being addressed. This can be done, as they 
note, by means of a number of linguistic devices, such as simplification, exaggeration, absolutisation, 
generalisation, omission of nuances and qualifications (Ibid., p. 128).  
In the same category van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992) discuss another technique of 
distorting the opponent’s standpoint, i.e. taking things out of context. This technique, used most 
notably in written discussions, concerns picking quotes selectively and omitting parts of the 
surrounding context by means of which words can be given a different meaning.  Returning to Talisse 
and Aikin’s (2006) or Aikin and Casey’s (2011) discussion of the standard form, it is not entirely clear 
whether they assume this to fall under their category of the standard form as well. Walton and 
Macagno (2010), however, who discuss the fallacy of ‘wrenching from context’ in relation to other 
fallacies (including the straw man), explicitly consider the technique of “[manipulating] the meaning 
of the other’s statement through devices such as the use of misquotations, selective quotations, and 
quoting out of context” (Ibid., p. 283) to not belong to the realm of the straw man fallacy. According to 
them, the straw man fallacy would include only those distortions of meaning by means of (incorrect) 
paraphrasing, whereas wrenching from context would be the fallacy that concerns the 
misrepresentation of direct quotations. Their reason for making a distinction between these two 
fallacies seems to be motivated by their finding that another difference would exist between the two. 
Walton and Macagno also note, namely, that the straw man fallacy always attacks another discussant’s 
point of view put forward in a discussion; wrenching from context, on the other hand, would also be 
applicable to another party’s point of view held outside a discussion. More specifically, wrenching from 
context could also be used to distort a point of view that has not been put forward within a discussion 
or that is held by a person or party that does not partake in it: 
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“Whereas straw-man is misrepresentation aimed at distorting the opponent’s viewpoint […] 
wrenching from context is a wider strategy of altering a position to support the speaker’s 
viewpoint. […] Wrenching from context can be a manipulation of the other party’s standpoint, 
but is not only that. Authorities’ claims, opponent’s past statements, a third party’s viewpoint 
can be taken out of context in order to support a position.” (Ibid., p. 296)  
 
In our discussion of yet another form of the straw man fallacy that is reflected upon in the literature, 
however, we will see how these features Walton and Macagno (2010) reserve for the fallacy of 
wrenching from the context are considered by others to be applicable to the straw man fallacy as well.   
 
 
2.2.2 The hollow man or the technique of imputing a fictitious standpoint  
Building on Talisse and Aikin (2006), Aikin and Casey (2011) note how particular instances of the 
straw man fallacy can be placed on a spectrum of accuracy of representation. In deciding whether a 
discussant’s words are accurately or fairly represented, they argue, one may find that some 
representations are more or less ‘honest’ (2011, p. 92). According to them, instances of the selectional 
form of the straw man are less dishonest than instances of the representational (standard) form as the 
former would not cause someone’s position to be actually altered – that is to say, “someone does, after 
all, hold the weak-manned position” (Ibid.). The representational form, on the other hand, would 
really concern a caricature of an actual view that is being ascribed to an opponent.5 If one is to take this 
one step further, Aikin and Casey (2011) say, this allows for another variant of the fallacy that does not 
involve a caricature but rather a complete fabrication. Aikin and Casey (2011) call this the ‘hollow man’ 
variant of the straw man fallacy, which can be committed in two different ways. On the one hand, one 
may ascribe to an opponent a view that is completely made-up and does not bear any resemblance to 
any standpoint or argument actually expressed by the opponent.  This technique is called the less 
extreme variety of the hollow man and may be committed if a discussant, in reacting critically to a 
standpoint or argument adhered to by another party, makes a reference to a standpoint or argument 
held by some (large, general) group of people like ‘Liberals’ or ‘climate sceptics’. In cases like these, a 
distortion of the dialectical situation is caused by the fact that the discussant is pictured as belonging to 
a group and, consequently, is taken to adhere to some (general) viewpoint this group could be taken to 
have. This viewpoint, then, is being addressed rather than an actual standpoint or argument put 
forward in the discussion. More specifically, as Aikin and Casey (2011) explain, a less extreme variant 
of the straw man fallacy is committed when  
 
                                                                 
5 In relation to this, Aikin and Casey also note how this caricatured representation of the opponent’s case “may 
be a distortion of the dialectical situation, but at least it is addressed to someone who at least can clarify the 
situation” (2011, p. 92). Again, one might argue how the discussion situation (d etermining whether discussants 
can pose direct reactions to each other’s arguments) also influences this – if  an arguer can only react in print, for  
example, readers  who for some reason or another  do not come across this reaction may wrongly take the (str aw 
man) attack to be a legitimate (and hence successful) argument.  
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“[...] A reviews arguments from B, C and D, whom A classifies as the Φ’s. B, C and D give 
arguments aggregative to x, y and z (and perhaps of varying quality, including x*, y*, and z* 
too). Despite the rich terrain of arguments to survey and to respond to, A speaks broadly of the 
Φ’s, and instead of responding to x, y or z (or even x*), A responds to an argument w* that has 
no relationship whatsoever to those given by any member of Φ.” (2011, p. 93) 
 
The extreme variety of the hollow man, on the other hand, concerns the fabrication of both an 
opponent and some alleged point of view this opponent should be taken to hold. This may occur, 
Aikin and Casey explain, when a vague phrase like ‘some say’ or ‘people think’ is used – in situations 
like these, it is often impossible to find someone to attribute a standpoint to. This variant seems to be 
most useful for providing support for one’s own view when no real opposition can be found:  
 
“A may have his view that not-p and there may or may not be some B who criticizes A’s view. 
A, however, need not address B, but instead may invokes a class U, representative of the 
standing opposition. A attributes an exceedingly bad argument (w*) either directly to B or to U, 
responds to w*, and then claims to have defended his view.” (Ibid., p. 93) 
 
The extreme variety of the hollow man thus seems to be somewhat different from the other variants of 
the fallacy as it is not a real discussant that is being attacked but an invented one instead.  
Aikin and Casey (2011) argue that the hollow man variety of the straw man fallacy has only 
been infrequently recognized in the literature. They note that Johnson and Blair’s (1983, p. 74) 
description of the hollow man “leaves open room for the possibility of hollow man”  (Aikin and Casey 
2011, p. 92) and that definitions of the straw man fallacy by van Eemeren, Gootendorst (1992) and van 
Eemeren, Grootendorst and Snoeck Henkemans (2002, p. 117) include descriptions of a technique for 
committing the fallacy that resembles Aikin and Casey’s definition of the hollow man variant (see also 
Copi et al. 2007, p. 445 and Rudinow & Barry 2008, p. 325). Other authors, however, can be found 
making note of the hollow man variety as well.6 In Walton’s (1996) article on the straw man fallacy and 
fallacies that are closely related to it, for instance, we see that the first example he gives to illustrate the 
gist of the straw man concerns the misrepresentation of a discussant’s position that can be categorised 
as a hollow man. In addition, Bizer et al. can be found to illustrate a ‘classic’ straw man argument by 
the following example in which George W. Bush, former president of the United States, discusses the 
war in Iraq: “There’s a lot of people in the world who don’t believe that people whose skin color may 
not be the same as ours can be free and self-govern. I reject that. I reject that strongly” (2009, p. 217, 
taken from Milbank 2004). By dissociating himself from the vague group of “a lot of people in the 
world […]”, Bush seems to be guilty of committing a hollow man variant in this example. Lastly, it 
appears that van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s (1992, pp. 126-127) description of the technique for 
committing the fallacy that resembles Aikin and Casey’s definition of the hollow man variant seem to 
be quite comprehensive. More specifically, van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s second main category of 
                                                                 
6 I.e. even though they may not consider it to form a subcategory or variant of the straw man fallacy, they include 
examples or descriptions of it in their account of the fallacy. 
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techniques for committing the straw man fallacy, ‘imputing a fictitious standpoint to the opponent’, 
for a large part matches Aikin and Casey’s (2011) classification of the hollow man.  
 Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992, pp. 126-127) discuss a number of ways in which one 
can ascribe a fictitious standpoint to an opponent. The first they make note of is referring to a party or 
grouping to which the opponent belongs and linking the opponent to a viewpoint this group is argued 
to held. This, indeed, seems to correspond to Aikin and Casey’s (2011) less extreme variety of the 
hollow man. Another technique van Eemeren and Grootendorst describe is considered to be an 
application of the former and concerns the creation of a fictitious standpoint, with no real opponent 
being attacked and an empty accusation being made. This, in turn, resembles Aikin and Casey’s (2011) 
extreme version of the hollow man.7 A third technique van Eemeren and Grootendorst include in the 
category of ascribing a fictitious standpoint to the opponent is the technique of putting forward the 
opposite standpoint with great emphasis: For it would only seem relevant to empathically put forward 
another standpoint if it is not shared by the other party, van Eemeren and Grootendorst note, the 
impression is generated that the opposing view can indeed be ascribed to that party.  Van Eemeren and 
Grootendorst (1992) also mention how this technique seems to have an even greater effect when the 
standpoint presented contains a negation. An utterance like “I do not think higher levels of 
atmospheric CO2 can cause or amplify an increase in global temperatures”, for instance, creates the 
impression that the opposing party thinks the opposite, whereas this party’s standpoint may be much 
more nuanced (Ibid., p. 126). It also raises the question, however, how one is to make a distinction 
between a distortion of an arguer’ position and the imputation of a standpoint that is altogether 
fictitious. Indeed, if a standpoint that is being imputed to another party resembles this party’s actual 
position (i.e. if explicitly put forward) one may ask where exactly a line can be drawn between the two.  
 Returning to Walton and Macagno’s (2010) claim that the straw man fallacy would be 
inherently different from the fallacy of wrenching from context as the latter could be used to refer to 
another (i.e. third) party’s point of view held outside a discussion, we now see how the extreme version 
of the hollow man or the technique of creating a fake opponent concerns, in fact, a reference to a non-
discussant, third party’s point of view as well. In other words, what Walton and Macagno consider a 
reason to make a distinction between two different fallacies only denotes a difference between different 
variants of the same fallacy by Aikin and Casey (2011) and van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992).  
 
 
2.2.3 Pinning down the straw man fallacy variants in actual argumentative discourse 
In the above we saw how a reconsideration of the central vice of the straw man fallacy leaves room for 
the recognition of different variants of the fallacy. It also appeared that the distinctions between 
different variants of the fallacy being made in the literature show considerable overlap as the different 
                                                                 
7Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992, pp. 126-127), however, add a caveat to this distinction by acknowledging 
that it is often diff icult to decide whether the fictitious opponent and the standpoint ascribed to this opponent 
actually exist or  whether they are the product of  the attacker’s imagination. Therefore, they argue, this technique 
is particularly likely to be successful if an audience is completely unacquainted with the subject of discussion. In 
other words, the particulars of a discussion situation might influence the success of the fallacy (or rather the 
likelihood of it going unnoticed) and, the other way around, the likelihood of it being committed as well. This  
will be further elaborated on in Chapters 3 and 5 of this thesis.  
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techniques for committing a straw man fallacy recognized by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992) 
for a large part match (or can be placed within) the three categories distinguished by Aikin and Casey 
(2011).8 Lastly, we saw how Walton and Macagno (2010) explained how a distinction should be made 
between the straw man fallacy on the one hand and the fallacy of wrenching from the context on the 
other, an explanation which would not be applicable to Aikin and Casey’s (2011) and van Eemeren and 
Grootendorst’s (1992) perception of the (extreme) variant of the hollow man.   
 The question may arise, however, what the various (sub)categorizations lend themselves to – 
i.e. transcending the purpose of categorizing for the sake of categorizing. What seems to be missing in 
all theoretical accounts described above indeed is a connection to actual argumentative discourse. That 
is to say, particularly Talisse and Aikin (2006) and Aikin and Casey (2011) have shown to remain 
mostly abstract in distinguishing different variants of the straw man fallacy, basing their 
categorizations on theorizing rather than on examples of the fallacy occurring in actual argumentative 
discourse. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992), on the other hand, do take into consideration the 
likelihood of a particular straw man variant to be committed in particular discussion situations and 
make use of some real-world examples to illustrate the various techniques that may be used, but little 
attention is paid still to the question why many actual instances of the straw man fallacy are difficult to 
detect. That is to say, in the above it was mentioned how the simplicity of definitions and examples of 
the fallacy do not do right to argumentative reality, in which it is often difficult to decide whether a 
representation is a misrepresentation indeed. It can be argued that the theoretical accounts aiming to 
give a more extensive explanation of the fallacy by distinguishing its different variants again principally 
illustrate the mechanism of the fallacy, or rather the different mechanisms that may govern a straw 
man fallacy.  
The problem of how one is exactly to establish a misrepresentation is reflected upon in the 
literature in relation to the standard variant of the straw man fallacy.  Most of what is addressed can be 
said to apply to any of the variants as it – for a large part – concerns the reconstruction of an arguer’s 
actual position or argument. It should be noted, however, that the variants of the straw man fallacy 
other than the standard one may involve other complexities on deciding between a fair representation 
and an unreasonable one. Considering the selectional form of the straw man, for instance, one may ask 
how this fallacious move can be successfully committed in actual argumentative discourse. As we sa w 
above, a crucial part of it is that the arguer committing the fallacy draws the conclusion that the 
opponent’s overall case has been refuted without having  addressed all (or the strongest) arguments. 
One might wonder how this may be done – after all, for this fallacious move to be successful, like all 
fallacies, it needs to go unnoticed. It could be argued that the drawing of the conclusion may be done 
implicitly – that is to say, in real arguments it could be that it is not explicitly stated but nevertheless 
made clear in one way or another by an arguer that he considers the debate settled after having 
addressed only a part or only the weakest argument(s) of an opponent’s case. In this way, an arguer 
would refrain from (directly) stating his exact conclusions and, in doing so, make it more difficult for 
his opponent to pose a critical reaction to this. Pinning down an argumentative move like this as an 
                                                                 
8 For the sake of clarity, in the remainder of this thesis Aikin and Casey’s (2011) terms will be used to refer to 
these categories (i.e. the standard variant or  representational form, the weak man variant or  the selectional form, 
and the extreme and less extreme versions of the hollow man variant). 
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instantiation of the selectional form of the straw man fallacy, now, may be more difficult than the 
general explanation on the variant may suggest. Further research on questions like these is needed to 
indicate whether (other) difficulties arise in establishing (actual instantiations of) any of the other 
variants. In the next section, it will be discussed how the literature accounts for the difficulties in 
establishing a misrepresentation from the perspective of the standard form.  
 
 
2.3 Difficulties in establishing a misrepresentation  
If one takes the central vice of the fallacy to lie in representing the arguer’s case as weaker than it 
actually is, the problem arises how one is to determine an arguer's actual position. Indeed, as Lewiński 
and Oswald point out, “since the very core of any straw man attack lies in an opponent’s 
misrepresentation of a proponents position, an analyst of argumentation needs to be able to draw the 
line between representation and misrepresentation” (2013, p. 166). This presupposes that there are 
criteria for deciding what a sound representation, or rather, interpretation, is.  
 According to Lewiński (2011, p. 485), there is a tendency in the literature on the straw man 
fallacy not to pay close attention to the reconstruction of both the original position of the protagonist 
and the antagonist’s critical reaction. Instead, most attention seems to be paid to the comparison of the 
different propositions put forward. Often, formal language is used as it  facilitates a precise comparison 
of propositions. Even though such an approach might be useful in showing the mechanism of the 
fallacy, Lewiński argues that in a way it “presupposes what is to be proven” (2011, p. 485). Indeed, it 
might be useful for categorizing the various possible relations between propositions, but it neglects the 
problem of reconstructing ordinary language use: “[the] abstract character [of logical analyses] leaves 
largely unaddressed the question of how to justifiably assign logical symbols to actual utterances of 
ordinary language users” (Ibid.).  
 Walton also signals this difficulty in establishing the straw man fallacy and proposes to 
consider an arguer's actual position as “the total commitment set of a participant in a dialogue” (1996, 
p. 116). This ‘commitment set’ consists of all propositions an arguer may be taken to have committed 
himself to on the basis of the utterances he made in the course of the debate. Walton does not discuss, 
however, how exactly one is to attain such a list of propositions. Instead, following Govier (1992) in 
this matter, he explains how one should take into account not only the position or argument that is 
being represented but also what has been said in the discussion before this was put forward. An 
arguer’s earlier argumentation, Walton explains, should provide enough evidence to reconstruct his 
stated and implied commitments, enabling one to compare the reconstructed position with the 
represented version of it. He then sets out to provide a more detailed study of some more specific cases 
that are problematic in this respect, such as arguments of which one does not have a record stating 
what is said in the past discourse (1996, p. 118). What is lacking, now, are more specific, hands-on 
criteria for determining stated and implied commitments and, more importantly, deciding exactly 
what an arguer can be held accountable for in a given situation. That is to say, Walton, stressing how 
one needs to take an arguer’s actual wording into account, does not explain what reconstructing actual 
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discourse amounts to given the fact that often a discrepancy can be noted between the literal meaning 
of an utterance and the underlying implications. In other words, it is not explained how pragmatic 
elements in actual argumentative discourse should be accounted for in one’s reconstruction of a 
discussion.  
 As Lewiński notes, determining what a discussant may be taken to have said strongly depends 
on an approach that does not only take semantic but also pragmatic aspects of argumentative language 
into account. Procedures for the reconstruction of pragmatic elements like these have been developed 
by, among others, Levinson (1983) and Morency et al. (2008), and are further refined for a specifically 
argumentative reconstruction within the field of pragma-dialectics (i.a. van Eemeren et al (1993) and 
van Rees (1992, 2001) (Lewiński 2011, p. 486). In the remainder of this section, the pragma-dialectical 
approach to the reconstruction of argumentative discourse will be discussed in more detail, including 
Lewiński’s application of this approach to the interpretation of the straw man fallacy.  
 In order to find out what a protagonist really may have taken to have said rather than what he 
has literally said, pragma-dialectics introduced the concept of ‘disagreement space’ (van Eemeren et al. 
1993, p. 95). This concept comprises “all the justifiably reconstructible commitments an arguer may be 
held accountable for on the basis of what they said in a given context”, including not only semantic but 
also pragmatic aspects of the argumentation such as conversational implicatures, presuppositions and 
felicity conditions (Lewiński 2011, p. 486; see Grice 1975 and Searle 1969). When trying to determine 
whether a critical reaction from a discussant addresses a standpoint or argument genuinely advanced 
by the opponent, one can thus resort to the disagreement space of the discussion:  Any critical reaction 
from an antagonist has to be directed against the protagonist’s commitments that are pragmatically 
plausible given what the protagonist has actually said; reactions that go beyond the boundaries of the 
disagreement space are considered straw man attacks.  
 Pragma-dialectics recognizes, however, how each utterance may have a variety of possible 
interpretations “all compatible with the information that is linguistically encoded” (Wilson 1944, p. 44, 
as cited by Lewiński 2011, p. 486). Indeed, as van Eemeren et al. point out, an “indefinitely large and 
complex set of beliefs, wants, and intentions that jointly compose the perspective of one’s partner” 
(1993, p. 95) can be inferred from an argumentative discourse and the context in which it is taking 
place. This means that in some cases, especially when contextual information is scarce, it is impossible 
to pin down only one interpretation of an utterance. Instead, there are a variety of plausible 
interpretations. Argumentation analysts therefore might recourse to the principle of charity when facing 
these less-than-obvious cases. Originally a concept from the philosophy of language proposed as a basis 
for a general semantic theory, this principle advocates that another speaker’s utterances are to be 
interpreted in such a way that no false beliefs are ascribed to that speaker (Honderich 1995, p. 744). 
Being applied to the study of argumentation in a number of ways, the pragma-dialectical formulation 
of the principle of charity states that one is to interpret an utterance in such a way that it “is most likely 
to be successfully defended by the arguer” (Snoeck Henkemans 1992, p. 104; italics in original; see also 
Lewiński 2011). Rather than a rule for argumentation which is to be followed in ordinary 
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argumentative discourse, it is designed to be “a meta-theoretical drive that guides the choice of the 
analysis carried out by an argumentation critic” (Lewiński 2011, p. 487).  
 In its pragma-dialectical application, the principle of charity comprises specific strategies for 
the reconstruction of argumentation: First, there is the strategy of maximally argumentative 
interpretation, which entails that speech acts are to be interpreted as argumentatively relevant when it is 
not entirely clear whether they are meant to be argumentative or not. Second, according to the 
maximally dialectic analysis, a (fragment of) discourse is to be reconstructed as a critical discussion if it 
is not clear whether it should be taken as one. Lastly, a maximally argumentative analysis leads an 
analyst to reconstruct an argumentation structure as multiple (rather than coordinative) in cases in 
which it is unclear how the arguments are to be related to each other (van Eemeren et al. 1992; 
Lewiński 2011, p. 487-488). Additionally, as Lewiński argues, analysts should make sure that premises 
that are left unexpressed are reconstructed in a ‘pragmatically optimal’ manner: an argumentation 
analyst must examine whether the incomplete argument can be completed in such a way that it 
becomes valid (cf. van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992, p. 61). 
 As mentioned above, the principle of charity as it is used in pragma-dialectics does not state 
that arguers involved in an actual discussion do or need to obey this principle. Pragma-dialectics 
recognizes the fact that when an arguer faces a variety of possible interpretations of an utterance made 
by another party, an arguer may follow “the strategy of the easiest objection” (Lewiński 2011, p. 488) 
by attacking those elements in the argumentation that seem to be easiest objectionable.9 Indeed, as 
Lewiński points out, trying to undermine the protagonist’s case in the most efficient way by attacking 
an uncharitable interpretation of the protagonist’s utterance is not inherently wrong from a dialectical 
point of view (Ibid., p. 480). In a way, he argues, this can be compared to trying to win a game of chess 
with the least amount of moves, as both are fair as long as no rules are harmed. Lewiński uses an 
example from Snoeck Henkemans (1992, p. 123–125) to clarify how an interpretation of ordinary 
language can be both dialectically reasonable and uncharitable: The interpretation of the standpoint 
‘Tom is a liar’ as ‘Tom is a habitual liar’ may be argued to be a plausible one considering ordinary 
conventions on language use. The most charitable interpretation, however, would be that ‘Tom is an 
incidental liar’. The burden of proof of the former is higher than the burden of proof of the latter, and, 
as Lewiński notes, it is a choice arguers can make whether they want to be “a […] confident arguer 
displaying chivalry” or “a coldly calculating opponent who considers lack of charity as possibly the 
only way to successfully (and still reasonably) refute the protagonist’s point” (2011, p. 490). In other 
words, arguers are free to choose whether they adopt a charitable or non-charitable interpretation of 
their opponent’s standpoint depending on the argumentative strategy they wish to employ. Charity 
and plausibility of interpretation, Lewiński argues, are two separate variables in reacting critically to 
another party’s utterances. 
 Returning to the question of how one is to determine whether a representation of another 
party’s point of view is ‘accurate’ or may be considered misleading for doing injustice to the strength of 
                                                                 
9 This is in line with the pragma-dialectica l idea that arguers try to maneuver strategica lly between dialectical 
reasonableness and rhetorical persuasiveness, which will be elaborated on in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
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the actual viewpoint expressed, this means that a line between the two may be even harder to draw 
than may have seemed from earlier accounts of the fallacy. How is one to decide between an 
uncharitable yet reasonable and uncharitable and unreasonable representation? In this case, pragma-
dialectics offers a solution by taking into account another aspect of a discussion’s context, namely the 
argumentative activity type which the discussion can be counted among.  
 Pragma-dialectics uses the notion of argumentative activity type to account for the fact that 
argumentation takes place in concrete situations and under specific (contextual) conditions. As many 
of these situations occur regularly and are socially identifiable, they can be considered types of 
communicative activity that can be recognized by certain norms or expectations (Lewiński 2010, p. 55). 
These norms and expectations, now, may be more or less institutionalized – that is to say, 
argumentative activity types such as a legal trial or a discussion in parliament are subject to formal, 
written rules, whereas a chat between friends or family members are “built up of informal, largely 
unwritten conventions without any explicit connection to the functioning of the state or corporate 
administration” (Ibid., p. 56). Furthermore, those activity types that are more institutionalised, often 
offer precise rules of interpretation of discourse (Lewiński 2011, p. 490). This is the case, for example, 
in legal trials or peer academic reviews, “where certain claims have to be established ‘beyond 
reasonable doubt’” (Ibid., p. 491). All parties participating in a legal trial, for example, are expected to 
state their standpoints and arguments explicitly and directly so that no question remains on what an 
utterance may be taken to mean. In less institutionalised activity types, on the other hand, elements of 
pragmatic meaning (e.g. conversational implicatures) may be taken into account in establishing the 
meaning of particular utterances.  
 As Lewiński (2010, 2011) notes, any evaluation of an alleged straw man fallacy should take into 
consideration such context-specific rules of interpretation. Analysts should, for instance, base their 
evaluation of a representation on the strict, or even literal, meaning of the protagonist’s utterances 
when analysing activity types such as legal trials or peer academic reviews. In less institutionalised, 
more informal activities, less of what is communicated is stated explicitly; accordingly, analysts have 
more freedom in interpreting the meaning of utterances. Based on the context, they may come to an 
interpretation that is most plausible. In other words, “[t]he plausibility of reconstructing what is said 
in a way departing from the explicit, overt meaning is thus decidedly limited by the requirements of 
precision” (2011, p. 491).  
   
 
2.4 From interpretation to evaluation  
In the previous section it was emphasized how one should take into account the context of a discussion 
(and, more specifically, specific rules of interpretation pertaining to the particular context) in order to 
be able to decide between a sound or fallacious representation. That is to say, in deciding on the 
fallaciousness of a discussion move one should not only take into consideration the surrounding text 
from which commitments and pragmatic aspects of the argumentation such as conversational 
implicatures, presuppositions and felicity conditions can be derived, but also the type of discourse in 
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which an argument takes place as presumptions or norms about reasonableness of a  certain form of 
argument (and the formulation of it) are dependent on the context in which the argumentation takes 
place. In pragma-dialectics this idea is captured in the notion of argumentative activity type.  
 Even though pragma-dialectics provides a useful basis for the evaluation of the straw man 
fallacy, practical, workable tools for doing so are still lacking (Lewiński 2011, p. 480). In order to fill 
this gap, Lewiński introduces a set of criteria for evaluating the straw man fallacy that can be applied in 
detailed case-by-case assessments of argumentative discourse. Each of these criteria will be discussed 
below. First, however, attention will be paid to the fact that Lewiński considers only particular contexts 
of argumentative discourse to be suitable for “a well-justified evaluation of a given critical reaction” (p. 
483) by stipulating both necessary and sufficient conditions for straw man fallacy identification.  
 
 
2.4.1 Lewiński’s (2011) necessary and sufficient conditions for identifying the straw man fallacy 
For being able to identify a straw man fallacy, Lewiński contends, one needs to have access to the 
‘‘detailed, more localized record of what the [original] speaker actually said as he developed his point 
of view’’ (Walton 1996, p. 127 as quoted by Lewiński 2011.  p, 481) as well as information about the 
context in which the discussion takes place. This condition connects to what is discussed above about 
how one should not only take into account the standpoint or argument that is being represented for 
being able to draw any conclusions on how a particular contribution to discussion should be 
understood. Rather, attention should be paid as well to what has been said in the discussion before and 
what context the discussion takes place in. This condition is most usually met if discourse has been 
written down or recorded in some other way. Discourse that has not been recorded, on the other hand, 
which is the case in most cases of spoken conversation, would pose too many difficulties for an 
argumentation analyst to be able to clearly identify representations of arguments as 
misrepresentations.10  
 Lewiński’s second condition for the identification of the straw man fallacy requires for an 
argumentation analyst to only take into account discussions in which a discussants can directly 
respond to each other’s contributions and hence, are able to “point out an attempted 
misrepresentation on-the-spot” (2011, p. 481). Lewiński too considers this condition to be a necessary 
one as one would not be able to (justifiably) identify a straw man before an interpretation has been 
further specified by the opponent under attack. Cases in which arguers are not able to correct any 
                                                                 
10 The idea of this being a necessary condition for identifying the straw man fallacy is shared by Walton (1996). 
Govier (1992), on the other hand, draws the conclusion that a straw man fallacy is most easy to identify indeed 
when the conversation is documented, but she also argues how it can be detected in another way. More 
specif ically, she notes how a straw man fallacy can be identified in those cases where positions being discussed are 
“general ones, not identified with the stated ideas of any single specific person, such as the environmentalist 
position on DNA research, feminism, evolutionary theory [...]” (Ibid., p. 157). What we see here, is how Govier  
discusses an example of the hollow man variety; in cases like these, Govier argues, one has to depend one’s own 
background knowledge in order to determine “the real context of the position” (Ibid.). Lewiński does not seem to 
take this (or any other variant of the fallacy different from the standard form) into consideration in formulating 
his conditions. 
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distortion ‘on-the-spot’ – which are manifold – thus cannot be taken into consideration.11 This may 
seem a bit striking if we take into consideration the pragma-dialectical tools for reconstructing 
argumentative discourse discussed in the previous section as these are designed indeed for an 
argumentation analyst to be able to detect any fallacy without needing some sort of confirmation from 
the arguer being prone to one. Moreover, if an arguer tries to refute an attack by claiming that his 
standpoint or argument has been misrepresented, this does not necessarily mean this is the case. 12 As a  
matter of fact, an arguer may commit a fallacy as well by accusing another party of having 
misrepresented some standpoint or argument if he in fact has not. As van Eemeren and Grootendorst 
(1992) note in their discussion of the technique of distorting the opponent’s standpoint by means of 
the replacement of quantifiers, an arguer who advances a standpoint like “men are oversensitive” with 
an ‘all’ interpretation, may decide to fall back on the ‘some’ interpretation if he finds out the former is 
too difficult to defend. In doing so, an arguer can be found guilty of (purposefully) using unclear or 
ambiguous formulations in expressing his point of view. Furthermore, he runs the risk of evading the 
burden of proof of its original point of view.  
 The third and final condition for the identification of a straw man fallacy Lewiński discusses is 
a sufficient (instead of necessary) condition and concerns the fact that both the original and the 
reformulated position need to be carefully reconstructed before an accurate evaluation of a critical 
reaction can be given. This condition too connects to what is discussed in section 2.4 of this thesis, i.e.  
how it is often difficult to accurately reconstruct the actual standpoints or arguments when studying 
natural language. In the next section it will be shown how Lewiński aims to overcome this problem in 
his formulation for criteria for the evaluation of the straw man fallacy by taking into account context -
specific norms or conventions on interpretation and commitment attribution. 
 
 
2.4.2 Lewiński’s (2011) criteria for the evaluation of the straw man fallacy 
Two key notions in Lewiński’s (2011) formulation of criteria for the evaluation of the straw man fallacy 
are plausibility and charity. As discussed earlier, Lewiński considers these notions to be two separate 
variables that determine the way in which an arguer chooses to interpret his opponent’s utterances. 
This decision, in turn, depends on the argumentative strategy an arguer wishes to employ. An arguer 
                                                                 
11 Indeed, situations in which an arguer is  not able to pose a direct reaction to a misrepresentation seem most 
convenient for a straw man fallacy to be committed. Lewiński seems to acknowledge this too, pointing out how 
Walton notes that “[r]hetorica lly speaking, as long as the attacked arguer is not immediately capable of correcting 
the abuse, the antagonist’s  straw man attack may be powerfully persuasive to the members of  a third party 
audience who may simply uncritically consider the attack a faithful representation of the original position”  
(Walton 1996, pp. 126–127; as quoted in Lewiński 2011, p. 482). A written polemic therefore renders arguers a 
somewhat underprivileged position as their  re-reaction in which they may try to refute the straw man attack may 
not successfully reach the audience. 
12 In discussing the third condition for identifying a straw man fallacy, Lewiński also acknowledges this: “Arguers 
(in their role of protagonists) may be mistaken, vague or even dishonest in referring to and interpreting their  
own past expressions and thus, deliberately or not, they may deny previously incurred commitments. Moreover, 
they can reproach others  for fallacies which in fact have not been committed (clearly, not every straw man 
accusation is justified). Therefore, the interpretation of the original arguments proposed by the original arguers  
themselves should not be taken as an ultimate authority and hence as a sufficient condition in deciding whether 
the straw man has been committed or not.” (2011, p. 484) 
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who prefers winning a dispute in his own favor over resolving it on the merits may choose to attack his 
opponent(s) in some uncharitable way if that will mean bring him closer to his goal. An arguer aimed 
at resolving a difference of opinion on the merits, on the other hand, may be expected to display a 
more charitable approach to interpreting his opponent’s contributions as this may facilitate the 
resolution-finding process. 
 Another notion that is least as important in Lewiński’s formulation of criteria, is the notion of 
argumentative activity type. In the above, it was already touched upon how different types of 
communicative activity may give rise to different expectations and norms about the use of language 
and the way in which it should be interpreted, some of which may be more strict or binding than 
others. In the more formal, institutionalized types of activity like academic discussions or legal trials, 
for instance, arguers may be expected to express themselves more explicitly and directly than, say, in an 
informal chat; accordingly, utterances of people communicating in the more formal, institutionalized 
activity types may be expected to be subject of more thorough scrutiny than utterances made in the 
situation of an informal chat. Returning to the factors of plausibility and charity, Lewiński also explains 
how these can be found to apply to some varying extent to different types of argumentative activity: 
Plausibility (or: precision) of interpretation, so to say, is very narrow in those activity types on the 
formal end of the spectrum, whereas informal types of discourse allow for a more loose interpretation 
(i.e. broad plausibility). Regarding the notion of charity, some activity types are characterized by a 
highly critical (i.e. uncharitable) interpretation of discourse, whereas others are typically associated 
with a more constructive (i.e. charitable) interpretation.  
 According to Lewiński, depending on the argumentative activity type, “these criteria apply 
differently to generate different fallacy judgements” (2011, p. 492). In other words, what may be 
considered a fallacy in the one context may be an infallacious (yet uncharitable) discussion move in 
another, depending on the role plausibility and charity can be found to play in the activity type under 
consideration. In the table below, taken from Lewiński (Ibid.), some examples are given of 
characterizations of argumentative activity types in terms of the variables of plausibility and charity:  
 
 Precise interpretation  
(narrow plausibility) 
Loose interpretation  
(broad plausibility) 
Highly critical 
(uncharitable) 
Criminal trial, blind academic 
review 
Much of political discourse, 
especially informal public sphere 
(incl. online discussion forums) 
Constructive (charitable) Doctor-patient consultation, 
conference presentation, 
classroom discussion 
Chat in a pub, dinner table 
 
Table 1. Precision and charity of interpretation in various activity types (Lewiński 2011, p. 492) 
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The example of the blind academic review, for instance, shows how interpretation of language in this 
type of argumentative activity can be expected to be highly critical and precise. In Chapter 5 of this 
thesis it will be shown how these criteria can be used to determine whether a straw man fallacy is 
committed in the argumentative activity type under consideration. 
 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter it has been discussed how the literature on the straw man fallacy brings to the fore a 
number of practical and theoretical concerns, some of which have been taken up by recent studies and 
some of which would be benefit from further research. First, it was discussed how different authors 
distinguish different variants of the straw man fallacy by taking into consideration its central vice, i.e. 
representing another party as weaker than it actually is. It was shown how most distinctions between 
the different variants of the fallacy being made in the literature show considerable overlap as the 
different techniques for committing a straw man fallacy recognized by van Eemeren and Grootendorst 
(1992) for a large part match (or can be placed within) the three categories distinguished by Aikin and 
Casey (2011). Subsequently, it was noted how in these studies on the different variants of the fallacy 
little attention has been paid to the question of how one is to actually decide when (a particular variant 
of) the fallacy is committed. It was discussed how the reconstruction of the actual meaning of a 
proposition strongly depends on an approach that does not only take semantic but also pragmatic 
aspects of argumentative language into account. Pragma-dialectical argumentation theory showed to 
offer an apt context-sensitive approach to the reconstruction of argumentative discourse by making 
use of the notion of argumentative activity type to account for the fact that argumentation takes place 
in concrete situations and under specific (contextual) conditions.  As it does not, however, provide 
practical, workable tools for the evaluation of the straw man fallacy, Lewiński (2011) formulated (on 
the basis of pragma-dialectical theory) a number of workable criteria for the evaluation of the straw 
man fallacy. It was also discussed how he set up a list of necessary and sufficient conditions for straw 
man fallacy identification.  
 Lewiński’s (2011) second condition for the identification of the straw man fallacy, requiring an 
argumentation analyst to take into account only discussions in which arguers respond to (and refute) 
attacks that involve a misrepresentation of their own case, was found to raise some important 
questions on exactly why one would not be able to pin down a straw man fallacy in those situations in 
which arguers do not have the possibility to respond to and correct a distortion. In the remainder of 
this thesis it will be argued how this may be possible indeed, most notably if the argumentative activity 
type in which the (alleged) straw man is put forward is characterized by formal, explicit norms and 
conventions regarding the interpretation of language. More specifically, it will be argued how in 
argumentative activity types in which the interpretation of language can be expected to be highly 
critical and precise and arguers may be expected to express themselves clearly and effectively, one may 
make use of these norms and expectations in evaluating whether a representation of a proposition does 
right to the proposition that has actually been put forward. 
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3. The international debate on climate change 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter will give an illustration of the broader (historical) context in which the scientific 
assessment reports of the IPCC and the NIPCC can be placed, i.e. the international debate on climate 
change. In the first section, a short overview will be given of the emergence of this debate in the second 
half of the twentieth century and some of the main obstacles that have been blocking the establishment 
of a (concerted) international effort to combat climate change since the very start. In section 3.3 it will 
be explained in more detail how the implementation of international action on climate change is most 
particularly hampered by the fact that the international debate on the matter is to be located on the 
boundaries between the scientific and political domain, causing different interests to be at play 
regarding the exact settlement of the debate. Section 3.4, then, will illustrate how in the past couple of 
decades scepticism has arisen towards not only the anthropogenic causes of climate change and the 
negative impacts it would have on the environment.  Lastly, it will be argued why the NIPCC’s report 
on climate change forms a particularly interesting object of analysis. 
 
3.2 Scientific concern on climate change and the development of a global climate regime  
During the second half of the twentieth century scientific concern regarding unnatural changes of the 
earth’s climate started to emerge. In the 1950s, first systematic measurements of carbon dioxide levels 
were conducted and over the next decades scientists started on working to understand the effects of the 
atmospheric change caused by changes in the air’s CO2 concentration. Due to technological 
advancements scientists were able to build computer models of the atmosphere which allowed them to 
draw increasingly reliable predictions on the earth’s future climate (Bodansky 2001, p. 24). By 1979, a 
review of prediction models led researchers of the U.S. National Research Council to conclude that if 
the atmosphere’s CO2 concentration would continue to rise, there would be “no reason to doubt that 
climate change will result and no reason to believe that these changes will be negligible” (National 
Research Council 1979, p. viii). It was also recognized that other greenhouse gases like methane and 
nitrous oxide also showed an effect on the earth’s temperature, further stressing the need for the 
implementation of measures to counter these effects.  
 By the late 1980s, public and political interest in the matter gradually started to emerge 
(Bodansky 2001; Orkeskes 2010). A number of international meetings on environmental issues had 
been held the decade before, including the first United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment in Stockholm in 1972 and the 1979 Geneva meeting on the Protection of the 
Environment, but none of these had resulted in any large-scale political agreements to fight the causes 
and effects of CO2. The discovery of the so-called Antarctic ozone hole in 1987 and the North 
American heat wave and drought in the summer of 1988, however, caused governmental interest in the 
matter to expand significantly (Bodansky 2001, p. 27, Ungar 2003, p. 263). As a result, subsequent 
international meetings started to make more headway. In 1988, for instance, the Toronto Conference 
on the Changing Atmosphere attracted more than 340 participants from 46 countries, all of which 
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agreed on the need for articulating policy responses. In 1988 too, the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) was established, a scientific and intergovernmental body initiated by 
the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)  and the World Meteorological Organization 
(WMO) set up in order to provide policy makers with an overview of the latest state of knowledge on 
climate change as well as its potential environmental and socio-economic impacts (IPCC 2007-I, p. i). 
More specifically, it was meant to publish scientific assessment reports of the state of knowledge on 
climate change at regularly intervals. Its first official report (AR1), published in 1990, stressed the 
importance of international cooperation to stop climate change, spurring further negotiations about 
policy responses (Bodansky 2001, p. 27).  
 From about 1990, more non-western countries started to get involved in the matter as well.13 
At the Second World Climate Conference (SWCC) convened in Geneva in late 1990, a special 
“Consultation Group on Special Needs of Developing Countries”  (UNFCCC website14) was established 
in order to discuss, among other things, how the implementation of measures to combat climate 
change would affect developing countries. From the very outset a division, the so-called “North-South 
Divide”, became apparent between developing countries on the one hand and developed countries on 
the other. This divide mostly centred on the agreement of future obligations (Boisson de Chazournes 
2008, p. 1). More specifically, developing countries wished for climate change to “be viewed not simply 
as an environmental issue but as a development issue as well” (Bodansky 2001, p. 30),  asking for the 
implementation of a climate change regime to not obstruct their (economic) development. Among 
these countries significant differences could be found regarding the exact implementation of this idea. 
As Bodansky points out, at the one extreme of the continuum the small island developing states could 
be found, “fearing inundation from sealevel rise, strongly [supporting the establishment of] targets and 
timetables for developed countries”; at the other were the oil-producing states, questioning “the 
science of climate change and [arguing] for a ‘go slow’ approach” (Ibid.). Furthermore, countries like 
Brazil, India and China, located at the relative middle of the continuum, exhibited the tendency to try 
to protect their sovereignty and their right to develop economically in particular.  
 Among the developed countries, on the other hand, dissension was present as well. In general, 
a split existed between most European countries on the one hand, joined (to some degree) by the so -
called CANZ group (Canada, Australia and New Zealand), and the United States (partially joined by 
Japan and the former Soviet Union) on the other. This split had become apparent first at the 1989 
Noordwijk Ministrial Conference, at which only the former group agreed on the establishment of 
limitations on emission levels of greenhouse gases on a national level – a course of action the latter did 
not want to accept. Instead, particularly the United States wished for more scientific research on the 
climate change issue as well  as the development of national strategies and programs rather than 
                                                                 
13  Up until then, the governments  partaking in international meetings were primarily those of Western 
industria lized countries as these had produced the greater majority of scientif ic research on climate change; Bert 
Bolin, the incoming head of the IPCC in 1988, explained how at that time “many countries, especially  developing 
countries, s imply do not trust assessments in which their scientists and policymakers have not participated”  
(Siebenhüner 2003, p. 113). The IPCC, it is argued, was established too to overcome this matter, by “designing 
and organising international assessments that allow for broad participation by representatives of national 
governments and influence domestic and international policy making” (Ibid.).  
14 http://unfccc.int/resource/ccsites/senegal/fact/fs221.htm [accessed 8 June 2015]  
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international ones (Bodansky 2001, pp. 28-9). This difference of opinion would appear to remain 
unsolved and even deepened at later international meetings (Ibid.).  
 According to Bodansky, different explanations can be found for the dissimilar interests of the 
governments partaking in the negotiations on the establishment of a climate change regime. Factors 
playing a role in this matter are, among other things, disparities in perceived costs of abatement and 
domestic politics. The former would include, for instance, the fact that the United States had large 
reserves of (cheap) coal, the incineration of which would lead to a substantial increase of the air’s 
concentration of CO2, whereas Germany would benefit from switching from coal to natural gas (2001, 
p. 29). In the future it would appear how dissimilar interests like these would time and again hamper 
the implementation of instruments for large-scale, (legally binding) international action on the 
reduction of climate change and its perceived and socioeconomic impacts.15  
 
 
3.3 The entanglement of politics and science and the role of the IPCC  
Governmental concerns on climate change ignited as scientific understanding of the greenhouse 
problem improved. That is to say, being a scientific issue only at first, climate change gradually turned 
into a topic of political interest as scientific consensus on its causes and impacts started to emerge. The 
period between 1988 and 1990 in particular can be considered a transitional period in this matter 
(Bodansky 2001, p. 28). During these years, governments started to become increasingly involved in 
the issue, acknowledging the need for political action to limit the potential negative environmental and 
socio-economic impacts of climate change. In response to this, the IPCC was established in order to 
help policy makers understand the present-day state of knowledge in the field of climate science.  
The establishment of institutions like the IPCC in 1988 was not uncommon within the 
scientific field as the scientific developments that had been taking place in the twentieth century had 
led to the proliferation of several other intermediaries making a connection between science and social 
sectors (Vasileiadou et al. 2011; Vasileiadou & Van den Besselaar 2006; Van der Meulen & Rip 1998). 
Nonetheless, the IPCC was quite unique as it was set up to synthesize scientific knowledge on the entire 
field of climate change, a span of research broader than that of other intermediary institutions. 
Furthermore, despite the fact that its reports know some geographical biases regarding the regions are 
reflected upon most in the studies summarized by the IPCC, the IPCC was set up to summarize the 
scientific findings on a global scale (Vasileiadou et al. 2011).16 Both factors contributed to the fact that 
                                                                 
15 At the 1992 Rio de Janeiro  United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), for 
instance, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was signed by 154 states  
and the European Commission. This treaty, which entered into force in 1994, stated that its signatories  
committed to curta il atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases on a voluntary basis with the aim of 
preventing “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (UNFCCC 1992, p. 9), recognizing 
“common but differentiated respons ibilities” according to the countries’ or states’ extent of industrialization 
(Ibid., p. 2). No binding limits were set, however, on the actual emission of greenhouse gases. At the 1997 Kyoto 
conference, its follow-up, a protocol was adopted to actually commit industrialized countries to stabilize the 
emission of greenhouse gases; this  protocol, however, has not been ratified by all its  signatories, including the 
United States. Furthermore, Canada withdrew from the protocol in 2011 (UNFCCC webs ite unfccc.int [accessed 
8 June 2015]). 
16 Overall, the reports are found to be biased towards developed countries as most of the research in the f ield of 
climate science is conducted by these countries (Haas 2005; Kiparsky et al. 2006).  
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the IPCC, in order to meet its goals, has been attracting thousands of scientists from all over the world 
to contribute to the publication of each assessment report (IPCC website17). In addition, as it has a 
formal intergovernmental status, the IPCC has been inviting government representatives for all 
member countries of the UN and WMO to take part in activities concerning the adoption and 
approval of the IPCC work programme (Ibid; Agrawala 1999).  
Precisely its size as a scientific and intergovernmental organization is what the IPCC often has 
been criticized for. More specifically, according to Agrawala, it would have been frequently argued that 
“a smaller size and better insulation from political actors could have made science advising more 
innovative, and ultimately more effective in the global climate regime” (1999, p. 157). 
“[S]imultaneously [straddling] the demands for scientific credibility and international political 
legitimacy” (Ibid.), the IPCC would be troubled by all sorts of (formal) procedures and – as a result – 
time delays in providing advisory inputs. It should be noted, however, that the IPCC does not consider 
itself to be an advisory body in any sense. It was established indeed to “provide the world with a clear 
scientific view on the current state of knowledge in climate change and its potential environmental and 
socio-economic impacts” (IPCC website18), but it explicitly refrains from formulating advice on the 
matter. That is to say, the IPCC considers its work to be “policy-relevant and yet policy-neutral, never 
policy-prescriptive” (Ibid.) and aims to do so by synthesizing the most recent scientific research 
findings relevant to the understanding of climate change in the Assessment Reports it publishes at 
regular intervals. These reports do include a Summary for Policy Makers (next to a Technical 
Summary) written in a non-technical style, “[addressing] a broad-range of policy-relevant but policy-
neutral questions” (Ibid.).  
It could be argued, however, that the character of the IPCC’s work is advisory  or prescriptive in 
some sense.  Indeed, as Vasileiadou et al. point out: “What IPCC reports filter as relevant science is a 
selection of scientific results on climate change which in turn is presented to policymakers, and feeds 
into policy decisions” (2011, p. 1059). This is linked to the idea of co-evolution of systems. Co-
evolution between science and policy needs, it is explained, “means that both systems exercise selection 
pressure upon each other; this selection pressure stimulates changes in diversity in the two systems, 
which means the systems co-evolve” (Ibid.; see also van den Bergh et al. 2007). When applied to the 
debate on climate change, it shows how policy needs in fact “create a selection mechanism for climate 
science through science programming and funding of specific research projects on climate science” 
(Vasileiadou et al. 2011, p. 1053). Most particularly climate modelling, which is used to make 
predictions about future climate change, appears to be dependent on policy decisions because of its 
high expenses. Furthermore, Vasileiadou et al. note, policy presumably also creates a selection 
mechanism for what scientific findings are included in the IPCC’s repport. The fact that the IPCC as a 
formal intergovernmental body allows government representatives to take part in activities like the 
review procedures of the reports, substantiates this. Simultaneously, specific policy needs are also 
brought about by selection mechanisms within science. That is to say, policy responses are shaped 
according to scientific outcomes: specific targets of reducing CO2 emissions, for instance, are based on 
                                                                 
17 http://ipcc.ch/organization/organization.shtml [accessed 16 June 2015]  
18 http://ipcc.ch/organization/organization.shtml [accessed 16 June 2015]  
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scientific predictions on what amount of rise in atmospheric CO2 would lead to dangerous amounts of 
warming (Ibid.).  
In a similar way, Siebenhüner describes the relationship between science and policy in the 
debate on climate change as “a circular influence from science to policy making and from the political 
sphere back to towards science and the assessments” (2003, p. 113). More specifically, he notes how 
scientific assessments like the ones conducted by the IPCC may help translate scientific (‘expert’) 
knowledge into policy-related forms of knowledge. At the same time, however, these scientific 
assessments are simultaneously influenced by political actors like the government representatives 
involved in the publication of the assessments (Ibid.). Siebenhüner explains how these political actors 
have a function that is twofold. On the one hand, they are “part of a scientific process which is 
dedicated to informing policy makers on the basis of the latest research findings”. On the other hand, 
they are representatives of governments having particular political interests. Sometimes these functions 
do not coincide with each other, often confronting a government representative with conflicting 
interests (Ibid., p. 114).   
Consequently, one may argue, the establishment of environmental policy faces two problems. 
A first matter of concern is the question of how one is to ensure that scientific knowledge is used to 
inform policy without being distorted or misused; secondly, one may ask how governments are to 
respond to this knowledge considering their own interests, perceptions and commitments (Boehmer-
Christiansen 1994, p. 140). Regarding the first, the IPCC has indeed more than once been accused of 
having omitted or misrepresented findings of scientific research19 (Vasileiadou et al. 2011; Crok 2010; 
PBL 2010). According to Vasileiadou et al., as a result of these ‘mistakes’, “the IPCC’s policy 
orientation became evident” (Ibid., p. 1053). It is nonetheless debatable, however, whether these 
mistakes were a case of misperception or sloppiness or because the IPCC would be undertaking a 
deliberate effort to paint a skewed image. What is certain, one the other hand, is that it has fed distrust 
or scepticism, not only towards the credibility of the IPCC but also towards the veracity of the 
conclusions it draws. As a matter of fact, during the last decade, the issue of climate change has become 
highly controversial, most notably in the United States (i.a. Lahsen 2013; Dunlap & McCright 2011, 
2010; Oreskes & Conway 2010). As will be dealt with in more detail in the next section, organised 
efforts can be recognized questioning both the causes of climate change and its status as a problem 
deserving amelioration.  20 The Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change (NIPCC), 
founded in 2003 in reaction to initial drafts of the Fourth Assessment Report which would be released 
by the IPCC in 2007, is the largest and most well-known organization questioning the science reflected 
upon in the IPCC reports (Oreskes & Conway 2010). In Chapter 5 of this thesis it will be argued how 
the NIPCC does in fact principally makes use of flaws or errors in IPCC reports to prove its own main 
points. More specifically, the NIPCC aims to demonstrate indeed how scientific findings would have 
                                                                 
19 In the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report published in 2007, for instance, positive impacts climate change 
would have been underplayed. In addition, the IPCC was accused for not having made a distinction between 
future negative impacts  of climate change and future negative impacts of other changes. The number of  heat -
related deaths in Australia, for example, was suggested to be due to an increase in temperature alone whilst in fact 
changes in population size and age distribution played a role as well (Vasileiadou 2011, p. 1053; PBL 2010).  
20 I.e. some sceptics can be found to question the fact that the earth would be warming as  well. The NIPCC, on 
the other hand, does contend the earth’s temperatures are rising.   
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been distorted or (purposefully) omitted by the IPCC for political reasons.21 As will be discussed in the 
next section, however, the NIPCC is often accused for distorting scientific data as well for it would be 
predisposed towards drawing conclusions that there is no need for any (international) environmental 
policy to be established (i.a. MccRight, Dunlap & Xiao 2013; Oreskes & Conway 2010).  
Returning to the problem of how one is to ensure that scientific knowledge is used to inform policy 
without being distorted or altered, it may be clear that an answer to this problem may be difficult to 
find, most notably for policy makers who want to formulate their policy on the basis of the most 
reliable scientific evidence available. This problem of uncertainty can be linked to the second question 
hampering the establishment of environmental policy mentioned above, i.e. how governments are to 
respond to scientific knowledge considering their own interests,  perceptions and commitments. That is 
to say, the very fact that uncertainties on the reliability of the scientific predictions (seem to) exist 
contributes to governments adopting a more hesitant attitude regarding the formulation of measures 
to combat climate change as there is a possibility they would be of no avail. As a result, global warming 
has lost some of its significance on the international political agenda as policy makers wish for 
scientific findings on climate change to be established with more certainty before any large-scale action 
will be undertaken (Oreskes & Conway 2010; Boehmer-Christiansen 1994). 
As is argued by Boehmer-Christiansen (1994), however, it is deceptive to think that the moment 
science is able to accurately predict the earth’s future climate as well as the influence of anthropogenic 
activities on it, a particular policy could be implemented that would alter any possible negative 
scenario. Instead, she argues, one should ask whether “more scientific knowledge as such (that is the 
more precise diagnosis of the problem) in fact and virtually automatically generate better policy” 
(1994a, p. 141). Potential change, “even if correctly predicted by models, does not come marked as 
good or bad with clear policy implications” (Ibid.). Agrawala explains this by noting how questions in 
the debate on climate change fall under the realm of what Alvin Weinberg once called ‘ trans-scientific 
issues’, issues “which hang on to questions which can be asked of science and yet cannot be answered 
by science” (Agrawala 1999; Weinberg 1972, p. 209).  Or, as Oreskes (2010) explains, in the trans-
scientific issue of climate change, science does give an answer to the question of what might happen in 
the future but in no way dictates what one should do about it; new scientific outcomes will not alter 
this, even if they are more reliable than previous ones. In other words, as a result of the complex 
interconnectedness of being a scientific issue as well as an issue of policy making, the international 
debate on climate change seems to have reached an impasse. This impasse seems unlikely to be 
overcome unless parties agree either on undertaking international political action to combat climat e 
change, i.e. despite the fact that uncertainties remain about both the anthropogenic cause of global 
warming and its potential (negative) effects, or on refraining from implementing any measures to stop 
the earth from warming any further, whilst acknowledging the risks that might follow. In the next 
section, it will be explained how the NIPCC aims for the debate to be settled in another way, i.e. by 
                                                                 
21 In order to get a short impression of why the NIPCC thinks the IPCC is biased, a short look on the NIPCC’s 
webpage ‘About the IPCC’ may suffice. Among other things, it is noted how “[t]he IPCC was created in 1988 
largely due to the efforts of Maurice Strong, a billionaire and self-confessed socialist, as part of  a larger campaign 
to justify giving the UN the authority to  tax businesses in developed countries  and redistribute trillions of dollars 
a year to developing nations” (NIPCC website climatechangereconsidered.org/abouttheipcc [accessed 8 June 
2015]). 
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endorsing the conclusion that it is not anthropogenic but natural causes that are making the climate 
change. As this natural change of climate would by no means be harmful to the earth’s environment, 
there would be no need for an implementation of measures to stop it.  
 
 
3.4 Scepticism, public opinion and the role of the NIPCC 
As was already touched upon above, scepticism towards the anthropogenic cause of climate change as 
well as the negative consequences it would have on our environment has grown over the last decades. 
In a way it can be argued that scepticism towards scientific findings on climate change and, equally 
important, the assessments based on it by the IPCC, is by no means a bad thing. Indeed, scientists need 
to exert a sound scepticism in interpreting scientific findings for being able to detect flaws, errors or 
poorly supported ideas both in their own work and work of others. As a result, scientific understanding 
of the matter at issue may improve (cf. Mercier & Heinz 2013; Ferreira 2008; Kutrovátz 2008). It is the 
two-tieredness of the climate change debate again, however, that causes the matter to be somewhat 
more complex.  
 Among the so-called ‘climate sceptics’, organized efforts can be recognized questioning both 
the reality and significance of global warming as well its potential effects and the need for action to stop 
these. Also referred to as being parts of a ‘denial machine’ (Begley 2007; Oreskes & Conway 2010; 
Dunlap & McCright 2011), sceptics are often accused of purposefully (i.e. against better judgement) 
denying the climate change problem because of an opposition to greater government regulation, be it 
due to economic, ideological or other reasons (Dunlap & McCright 2011).22 The NIPCC is the largest 
organization taking part in this. One of its main feats, now, would be the dissemination of doubt and 
uncertainty regarding a scientific consensus on climate change (Oreskes & Conway 2010).23 Indeed, as 
we saw above, uncertainty on the issue causes governments to become more hesitant in adopting a 
policy to fight climate change; if uncertainty does not cease to exist or becomes even greater, chances 
are that an (international) environmental policy becomes unattainable.   
 In 2009, two years after the publication of the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report, the NIPCC 
published a scientific assessment report called Climate Change Reconsidered (CCR). A direct reaction 
to AR4, it aims to demonstrate how the IPCC’s conclusions in AR4 are wrong as scientific findings 
would have been distorted or omitted by the IPCC in order to make its conclusions match with its 
                                                                 
22 As Crok (2010) notes, allegations like these have the effect that all people questioning (the science behind) 
climate change are cons idered immoral or selfish for preferring to pursue free market ideals over  saving the earth 
for future generations. As a result, some ‘s ceptics’ explicitly dissociate themselves from conservative think tanks  
or the fossil fuels industry.  
23 Allegations regarding the NIPCC’s cause are manifold. More generally, the American s ceptics movement is 
linked to conservative think tanks in the United States that have been set up to promote the core values of  
conservatism (e.g. free market capitalism, little governmental influence and dergulation) and to fund research 
that may help achieve this goal (Bodker & Neverla 2013; Oreskes 2010; Oreskes & Conway 2010; Lakoff 1996). 
The NIPCC itself is a product of the Heartland Institute, a “Chicago based think tank promoting public policy 
based on individual liberty, limited government, and free markets” (Heartland Institute website 
https://www.heartland.org/ [accessed 8 June 2015]); because of its ties with American conservatism, the NIPCC is  
often accused of being predisposed in drawing any conclusions on climate change as well for they would rather 
wish for scientif ic outcomes to demonstrate that no governmental action would be needed to stop or mitigate 
any negative effects of global climate change. A further inquiry into these allegations, however, is beyond the 
concern of this thesis. 
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political interests. The NIPCC, on the other hand, would be “wholly independent of political pressures 
and influences” and “therefore [...] not predisposed to produce politically motivated conclusions or 
policy recommendations” (NIPCC website24), thereby presenting itself as a ‘team B’, that is “not biased 
toward the assumption that greater government activity is necessary” (NIPCC 2009, p. vi). In other 
words, by claiming to be a more transparent scientific intermediary than the IPCC, the NIPCC initiates 
a tug-of-war for ‘the scientific truth’.  
The consequences of the NIPCC’s initiative to discredit the IPCC and its scientific assessments 
are manifold. Most importantly, by accusing the NIPCC of being driven by political rather than purely 
scientific interests, the debate takes on an ad-hominem character. Most notably laymen, i.e. non-
scientists, who need to resort to opinions of experts (scientists, in this case) in order to be able to grasp 
the state of affairs in climate change science and to base their opinion on it, are likely to be influenced 
by this. If there appears to be no consensus among experts, or worse, if there appear s to be a clear 
dissensus, laymen may lose faith in the ability of experts to draw reliable conclusions on issues within 
their fields of expertise.  
As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5 of this thesis, the IPCC has not posed any 
reaction to the NIPCC’s allegations that the IPCC is biased and predisposed to drawing any 
conclusions in favour of political preferences; if it would have, it will be argued, it could have done the 
IPCC as well as the trustworthiness of climate science as a whole more harm than good. Indeed, 
“skirmishing over who is and is not an authority is well known to diminish the credibility of entire 
disciplines” (Jackson 2008, p. 228; see also Ezrahi 1971). Again we see if this were to cause uncertainty 
on (the validity of scientific evidence on) the potential causes and impacts of climate change, this 
would by no means be detrimental to the NIPCC’s own cause. The NIPCC’s standpoint that no 
governmental activity should be undertaken to stop the current climate change may in fact benefit 
from a situation in which uncertainty exists on the science behind climate change. Indeed, distrust in 
scientific outcomes feeds (further) restraint regarding the establishment of any environmental policy. 
On the other hand, the mere fact that the NIPCC accuses the IPCC of (purposefully) drawing false 
conclusions on climate change already changes the picture of the debate. Whether the IPCC chooses to 
respond to these allegations or not, does, in fact, not prevent it from losing credibility amongst part of 
the audience at least – i.e. being questioned alone is sufficient for the IPCC to see its position eroding. 
Consequently, the question whether the NIPCC’s allegations actually hold water or not, is easily passed 
over as it is difficult if not impossible for laymen in the field of climate change to judge the validity of 
the arguments put forward in this matter (Dunlap & McCright 2011).  
Recent studies on public belief in global warming show how global warming is increasingly 
contested in both the political arena and wider society indeed (i.a. Dunlap & McCright 2011; 
Leiserowitz et al. 2010). An important role in this is played by the media, acting as the ‘key mediator’ 
between science and the public sphere (Brüggemann & Engesser 2014, p. 399). Indeed, as the majority 
of the people holding an opinion on climate change does, as a rule, not read the scientific assessment 
reports of either the IPCC or the NIPCC, it receives most information on the issue via the media. A 
number of studies on the influences the media may exert on public opinion make note of the fact that 
                                                                 
24 http://climatechangereconsidered.org/about-nipcc/ [accessed 9 June 2015]  
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media coverage of the issue often leads to a misperception of the scientific debate (i.a. Boykoff & Smith 
2010, p. 215; Oreskes & Conway 2010, p. 184; Brüggemann & Engesser 2014, p. 400). More specifically, 
media treatments of climate change would “frequently result in illusory, misleading and 
counterproductive debates” (Boykoff & Smith 2010, p. 215) by giving space to climate sceptics who 
contend that there is no such thing as a scientific consensus on climate change. Also referred to as 
‘balance as bias’ (Boykoff & Boykoff 2014), journalists would adhere to a norm of balanced reporting, 
meaning that equal space is given to ‘believers’ on the one hand (i.e. people holding the opinion that 
the current climate change is due to human activities and detrimental to the earth’s environment) and 
sceptics on the other. As the former group (in reality) would be significantly greater (and hence more 
important) than the latter, this would be a case of skewed reporting leading people to think the group 
of sceptics is greater than it actually is.  
Lastly, it should be noted that political orientation has been found to have a significant 
influence on the public’s perception of (the existence of a) scientific agreement, its belief in the 
anthropogenic cause of the current climate change, and its support for political action to diminish its 
causes (McCright, Dunlap & Xiao 2013, p. 511). Other studies also found that scepticism regarding 
anthropogenic global warming is prevalent among American conservatives (McCright & Dunlap 2011a; 
2011b). 
 In short, from being a scientific concern at first, the issue of climate change has turned not 
only into a subject of political interest but into a matter of public interest as well. Because of the 
complexity of the topic, opinions of non-scientists are formed on the basis of facts and opinions on the 
matter brought to its notice by the media, i.e. most notably the ones the public deems most probable to 
be true or the public tends to believe to be true due to its political orientation.25 This may pose some 
significant difficulties for scientists who do not pursue political ends in their work but nonetheless “feel 
compelled to speak for the science itself” (Jackson 2008, p. 215) . Indeed, due to the many discordant 
voices circulating on the issue outside the realm of science, scientists’ exact arguments for their points 
of view runs a high risk of falling on deaf ears.  
 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
In the above it was discussed how climate change has moved from being predominantly a scientific 
issue to being a matter of political and public interest as well. If the current warming of the earth is in 
fact due to human activities and having a negative impact on the earth’s environment, this spread of 
interest, it can be argued, is both a good and a bad thing. That is to say, for action to be undertaken to 
combat climate change, it needs to be brought under the attention of both policy makers and the wider 
public. On the other hand we saw how the opinion of both is being influenced by climate change 
sceptics as well. Especially the NIPCC, contending “[i]t is a time-honored tradition in science to set up 
a “Team B,” which examines the same original evidence but may reach a different conclusion” (NIPCC 
                                                                 
25 A study conducted by McCright, Dunlap & Xiao (2013) shows that political orientation has a significant 
influence on both perceived scientif ic agreement, belief in anthropogenic global warming, as well as support for 
government action to reduce emissions. 
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2009, p. iii), plays a major role in discrediting the scientific consensus on climate change conveyed by 
the IPCC. Consequently, policy makers as well as the wider audience who both need expert opinion on 
climate change to base their own viewpoints on are being influenced by messages on the credibility of 
either side, in which political preferences or personal ideals play a role too. As argued above, this, in 
turn, derives away the attention from the arguments scientists put forward in order to substantiate 
their findings on whether global warming is caused by human activities or not and whether this change 
of climate would cause a threat to the earth’s environment.   
As mentioned before, in Chapter 5 of this thesis a number of arguments put forward in the 
NIPCC’s report Climate Change Reconsidered will be taken a look at in more detail. This report is apt 
for an analysis on the straw man fallacy as it comprises a large number of arguments in which the 
NIPCC explicitly refers to (and thereby represents) claims that have been made by the IPCC or that are 
ascribed to the IPCC on the basis of its general line of argument. First, however, in the next chapter of 
this thesis, it will be explained in more detail how pragma-dialectical argumentation theory and the 
concept of argumentative activity type in particular can be efficiently used for identifying and 
evaluating misrepresentations.  
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4. Method: Pragma-Dialectical argumentation theory 
4.1 Introduction:  
In this chapter it will be explained in more detail how pragma-dialectical argumentation theory and its 
concept of the argumentative activity type in particular offers useful instruments for analysing what 
conditions a particular type of communicative activity may offer for the straw man fallacy to be 
successfully committed. First, in section 4.2, a general introduction will be given of the field of 
argumentation theory and the division between descriptive and normative approaches to 
argumentation. Section 4.3, then, provides an overview of the central tenets of pragma-dialectical 
argumentation, offering insight in why the theory is apt for the analysis and evaluation of the straw 
man fallacy occurring in actual argumentative discourse. In this section, it will also be explained in 
more detail how the pragma-dialectical notion of argumentative activity type can be employed to study 
context-specific restrictions and opportunities for committing particular (types of) fallacies. Lastly, in 
section 4.4 the most important findings of this chapter will be summarized. 
 
 
4.2 Argumentation theory: an umbrella term  
The label argumentation theory is used to refer to the study of argumentation “in all its manifestations 
and varieties, irrespective of the intellectual backgrounds of the theorists, their primary research 
interests, and their angles of approach” (van Eemeren et al. 2014, p. 7). Depend ing on the theoretical 
perspective that is taken as a starting point, different outlines of paradigms can be distinguished, 
including Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrecht-Tyteca’s new rhetoric (e.g. Perlman & Olbrechts-
Tyteca 1969), Stephen Toulmin’s analytic framework (e.g. Toulmin 1958), Anthony Blair and Ralph 
Johnson’s informal logic (e.g. Johnson & Blair 1983) and Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst’s 
pragma-dialectics (e.g. van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992).26 Each theoretical perspective is shaped by 
the disciplinary backgrounds of the argumentation theorists and the philosophies of reasonableness 
underlying their approach, be it the field of philosophy, formal or informal logic, discourse or 
conversation analysis, communication studies or some other discipline (van Eemeren et al. 2014, p. 40). 
Depending on these backgrounds, different objectives are addressed. Indeed, as the scope of 
argumentation theory is very broad, it has its core several interrelated concerns. Characteristically, 
objectives are to gain a better understanding of argumentation as it is used in actual argumentative 
practice, or to develop means for argumentation assessment (van Eemeren et al. 1993).  
 The particular objectives of the different approaches towards argumentation mark a division in 
contemporary argumentation research. On the one side of the spectrum are those approaches that aim 
to give a (principally) prescriptive account of argumentation, on the other side are the ones that study 
argumentation from a (predominantly) normative perspective (van Eemeren et al.  1993, p. vii). 
Theorists approaching argumentation from a descriptive point of view are interested, for instance, in 
                                                                 
26 Pragma-dialectical argumentation theory was set up by Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst; in later 
years, Frans van Eemeren and Peter Houtlosser  extended the theory by, among other things, incorporating the 
concept of strategic maneuvering which will be discussed in more detail below.  
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describing how discussants try to convince or persuade others by making use of certain linguistic 
devices. As Van Eemeren and Houtlosser argue, it is mostly contemporary linguists (characteristically 
conversation and discourse analysts) who restrict themselves to “pure and ‘unbiased’ observation” 
(1992, p. 5). Approaches that are more oriented towards the reasonableness underlying argumentation 
processes are often inspired by logic, philosophy, or insights from law. Studying argumentation 
principally for normative purposes, they restrict themselves to non-empirical regimentation (Ibid.). 
Examples of theorists who approach argumentation from a purely normative or prescriptive point of 
view, are Biro and Siegel (1992) and Willard (1983, 1989), respectively (van Eemeren et al. 1996). 
 Even though extremes of these lines of research are indeed represented in argumentation 
theory, most argumentation theorists seem to recognize that a comprehensive theory of argumentation 
takes a combined perspective (van Eemeren et al. 2014). Indeed, while it is possible to pursue a strictly 
descriptive or normative approach to argumentation, theorists who are interested in the different ways 
argumentation is or can be used to justify or refute a standpoint in a rational way will need to resort to 
an approach that allows for both analysing and evaluating (ordinary) argumentative discussions. 
 A number of approaches to argumentative discourse show a line of development from a more 
one-sided perspective on a particular aspect of argumentation towards one that is more encompassing.  
Walton and Krabbe’s (1995) approach to the contextuality of argumentation, for instance “start[ed] 
from a normative theorising about various ‘systems of dialogue rules’ and then [sought] to integrate it 
with the descriptive study of ‘conventionalized conversational settings’ in their conception of dialogue 
types” (Lewiński 2010, p. 47). Similarly, Jackson and Jacobs’ (i.a. 1980; 1989) context-sensitive 
approach to argumentation started out with a focus on pragmatic discourse analysis but was later 
supplemented by normative concerns. An approach to argumentation that has not experienced a 
process of integrating a normative and descriptive perspective on argumentation but rather takes it as 
its point of departure, is pragma-dialectics (Lewiński 2010, p. 47). In section 4.3, it will be explained 
how the normative perspective is based on its dialectical basis whilst the descriptive aspect is reflected 
in its pragmatic orientation and how this approach to argumentative discourse may be particularly 
useful for analysing the straw man fallacy.   
 
 
4.3 Pragma-dialectical argumentation theory 
The pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation perceives argumentation as a means to resolve a 
difference of opinion by critically testing the acceptability of the standpoint(s) at issue. That is, “in case 
of a difference of opinion the protagonist and the antagonist of a standpoint should attempt to find out 
by means of a critical discussion whether the protagonist’s standpoint is capable of withstanding the 
antagonist’s criticism” (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2003, p. 365). This very definition captures the 
normative perspective that is reflected in the dialectical basis of the theory: Inspired by Karl Popper 
and Hans Albert’s critical rationalism and the principle of falsificationism in particular, it adheres to the 
basic assumption that “rationality of theses is measured in an ongoing exchange of ‘conjectures and 
refutations,’ rather than in a finite process of justification through unshakeable facts and proofs” 
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(Lewiński 2010, p. 48; van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1988). This philosophical idea is embodied in the 
pragma-dialectical model of an ideal critical discussion, a normative model that specifies the various 
stages that can be distinguished in a critical discussion aimed at resolving a difference of opinion as 
well as the verbal moves constituting ‘integral parts’ of each of these stages (van Eemeren & 
Grootendorst 1995).  27 This pragma-dialectical model of an ideal critical discussion sets out to provide 
the best possible circumstances for the externalisation of criticism and, in this way, the systematically 
testing of the propositions put forward in the discussion (Lewiński 2010, p. 48).28 As Van Eemeren et al. 
(2014) note, it is “a theoretically motivated idealization” rather than a utopia. Ideally, the resolution of 
a dispute goes through all four stages of the model, but actual argumentative discussions will always 
deviate from this ideal. Nonetheless, actual argumentative discussions can always be reconstructed in 
terms of the discussion stages, making the model a heuristic instrument for a dialectical analysis of 
argumentative discourse (Van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992, p. 36).  
 As Lewiński notes, the applicability of the pragma-dialectical model of a critical discussion to 
the analysis and evaluation of actual argumentative discourse is “significantly enhanced thanks to the 
rules of the model being formulated in the terminology of linguistic pragmatics, i.e., in terms of rights 
and obligations pertaining to the performance of conventionally recognisable speech acts (Austin, 1975; 
Searle, 1969)” (2010, p. 50). Examples of such speech acts pertaining to specific discussion stages are 
advancing a standpoint (in the confrontation stage) challenging the protagonist to defend a standpoint 
(in the opening stage), arguing29 (in the argumentation stage), and agreeing on the outcome of the 
discussion (in the concluding stage). In addition, there are speech acts such as requesting for 
clarification and defining, which may occur in any of the four stages. By analysing all utterances made 
in an argumentative discussion in terms of speech acts like the ones mentioned above, an 
argumentation analyst is able to select (only) those utterances with a (potential) argumentative 
function as relevant objects of close argumentative analysis (Lewiński 2010, pp. 50-51). The principles 
authorising the distribution of the various verbal moves belonging to the different discussion stages are 
accounted for in a set of rules regarding the performance of speech acts. Taken together, these rules not 
only constitute a theoretical definition of a critical discussion, but also provide a means to detect any 
unreasonable, or rather fallacious, argumentative moves made (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1995). 
That is to say, any violation of a discussion rule is considered a possible threat to the resolution of a 
difference of opinion and is therefore regarded as fallacious. The first discussion rule, for instance, 
                                                                 
27 In the pragma-dialectical model of an ideal discussion, four stages are recognized: In the confrontation stage, a 
difference of opinion is externalized. In the opening stage, discussants agree on the discussion roles each of the 
discussants will adopt and the points of departure of the discussion. The argumentation stage is the stage in 
which discussants put forward argumentation, cast doubt on arguments and put forward counter -
argumentation. In the concluding stage, the parties establish the outcome of the discussion (van Eemeren & 
Grootendorst 1995, p. 135). 
28 Pragma-dialectics approaches the study of argumentation by means of four basic metatheoretical premises: 
externalisation, socia lisation, functionalisation and dialectification (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1995). The 
premise of externalisation refers to the fact that pragma-dialectics deals with externalised acts of communication.  
29 According to pragma-dialectical theory, argumentation in itself is to be viewed as a complex speech act. More 
specif ically, van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984) define argumentation as a speech act that cons ists of several 
elementary, communicative (illocutionary) speech acts, or elementary illocutions. These elementary illocutions  
composing the “constellation of statements designed to justify or refute an expressed opinion” (Ibid., p. 18), then, 
are considered to perform an argumentation at a higher, above the sentence level.  
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states that “parties must not prevent each other from advancing standpoints or casting doubt on 
standpoints” (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1995, p. 135). This rule, pertaining to the confrontation 
stage, can be violated in various ways by both the protagonist and the protagonist. If a protagonist, for 
instance, prohibits the antagonist from casting doubt on or criticizing a standpoint advanced, he may 
try to do so by threatening him, appealing to the antagonist’s feeling of pity or guilt or by discrediting 
the antagonist’s expertise, impartiality, integrity, or credibility (Ibid., p. 139). Each of these violations 
can be connected to a particular type of fallacy, in this case the argumentum ad baculum, argumentum 
ad misericordiam, argumentum ad hominem, respectively.  
 Acknowledging the fact that arguers often aim to resolve a difference of opinion in their own 
favour rather than to resolve a discussion on the merits, the theoretical tools of pragma -dialectics have 
been extended by the incorporation of a rhetorical dimension. More specifically, pragma-dialectics 
adopted the notion of strategic maneuvering to account for the fact that arguers may try to pursue 
rhetorical aims whilst still trying to adhere to standards of reasonableness. Strategic maneuvering, then, 
refers to the continual efforts made by arguers to reconcile their aims of winning a dispute and 
resolving the difference of opinion in a reasonable way. If arguers succeed to obtain rhetorical success 
whilst still meeting the standards of reasonableness, they achieve a ‘delicate balance’ between their 
rhetorical opportunities and dialectical constraints (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2002). A derailment 
of strategic maneuvering occurs, however, when the arguer’s rhetorical and dialectical goals diverge in 
such a way that one or more rules for a critical discussion are harmed in the process of striving for 
persuasive success. Then, a fallacy is committed.  
Lastly, pragma-dialectics distinguishes three aspects of strategic maneuvering that are 
associated with types of choices an arguer may make in giving shape to his argument. First, it is 
recognized how an arguer can make a choice from the available topical potential, “the (not always 
clearly delineated) repertoire of options for making an argumentative move that are at the arguer’s 
disposal in a certain case and at a particular point in the discourse” (van Eemeren 2010, p. 93-94). In 
each discussion move, an arguer can make a specific selection of topics from those that are available in 
the given discussion stage. An example of such a selection may concern the choice of a  particular 
argument scheme in the argumentation stage. In some cases, for instance, argumentation based on 
causality may be more convincing than argumentation based on comparison. Second, an arguer may 
choose to shape a discussion move in such a way that it is most convincing to a particular audience, 
most notably the audience he aims to convince (i.e. meeting audience demand). Distinctive audiences 
may agree to different procedural and material starting points, for instance, urging an arguer to adapt 
his argumentative moves accordingly. The third aspect of shaping a strategic maneuver that is 
recognized within pragma-dialectics concerns the exploitation of presentational devices, referring to the 
fact that an arguer can present his standpoint or argument in such a manner that it is most likely to get 
accepted. In presenting a standpoint, for example, it can be advantageous for  an arguer to keep a 
discussion single and non-mixed. In order to achieve this, he may choose to formulate his standpoint 
in such a way that it is less likely to provoke any counter-standpoints (Ibid., p. 94). It should be noted 
that these three aspects are by no means unrelated but pertain to different qualities of the maneuvering. 
That is to say, each argumentative move inherently consists of qualities that relate to both the topical 
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potential and audience demand as well as presentational aspects. Carrying out a complete check of all 
three aspects may provide more insight in the effect a particular discussion move may have (Ibid., p. 
93).  
 
The pragma-dialectical concept of argumentative activity type 
In Chapter 2 of this thesis it was explained how pragma-dialectics accounts for the fact that 
argumentative discourse occurs in concrete situations, many of which occur regularly and are socially 
identifiable, by studying strategic maneuvering in relation to the argumentative activity type in which it 
occurs. More specifically, a comprehensive pragma-dialectical analysis of argumentation takes into 
consideration how types of communicative activity can be recognized by certain norms or expectations, 
bringing along both constraints regarding particular modes of strategic maneuvering that are allowed 
or deemed acceptable as well as certain context-specific opportunities for strategic maneuvering (van 
Eemeren & Houtlosser 2009, pp. 7-8).  
 As van Eemeren and Houtlosser note, in contrast to a theoretical construct like the pragma-
dialectical ideal model of a critical discussion that is based only on analytic considerations, 
argumentative activity types are “empirical concepts that can be identified and characterized on the 
basis of a careful study of a certain domain of practice” (2009, pp. 7-8). A domain of practice, it is 
explained, is the broader sphere of communicative practice which is primarily defined by the rationale 
or ‘institutional point’ the various activities that fall within the domain pursue (Lewiński 2010, p. 56). 
Examples of these are the legal, political, medical, and scientific or scholarly domain.30 Within these 
domains of practice, various ‘genres of communicative activity’ or clusters of activity types are 
distinguished that can be considered typical argumentative practices in the particular kind of domain. 
Prototypically employed in the legal domain is the genre of adjudication, whereas the political domain, 
the problem-solving domain and the scientific domain can be characterized by the genres of 
deliberation, mediation and disputation, respectively (van Eemeren 2011).31 In the following table (an 
excerpt from van Eemeren 2011, p. 143) an overview is given of the different constructs: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
30 In the literature, the terms ‘scientif ic’ and ‘scholarly’ are used interchangeably. In this  thes is, I will make use of 
the term ‘scientif ic’ as it is most applicable to the domain of the argumentative activity type that is subject of 
analysis in Chapter 5.  
31 As will be discussed in Chapter  5 of this thesis, in pragma-dialectics  up until now little attention seems to have 
been paid yet to why some communicative genres are prototypically linked to particular domains of  
communicative activity and what role other genres may play within one domain. Neither seems a  full account to 
have been given yet of (the interpretation of) all different genres that are distinguished.     
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Domains of 
communicative 
activity 
Genres of 
communicative 
activity 
Communicative 
activity types 
Concrete speech 
events  
Political 
communication 
Deliberation - Presidential debate 
- General debate in 
parliament 
- Prime Minister’s 
Question Time 
(presidential debate) 
1960 Nixon–Kennedy 
television 
debate 
Scholarly/scientific 
communication 
Disputation  - Book review 
- Scientific paper 
- Conference 
presentation  
(book review)  
Dr. Apt’s critique of the 
Controversy and 
Confrontation volume 
Commercial 
communication  
Promotion - Advertorial 
- Sales talk 
- Classified ad 
(advertorial) 
Shell’s newspaper 
message about its role in 
Nigeria  
... [etcetera]    
 
Table 2.  Examples of communicative activity types implementing certain genres of communicative activity 
in particular speech events in various domains of communicative activity (Excerpt from van Eemeren 2011, 
p. 143) 
 
What is not included in the table are the various institutions in which communicative activity types 
may take place. Within pragma-dialectical theory, institutions are understood as “systems of socially 
constructed rules with their associated sanctions” (Lewiński 2010, p. 56). This notion is used to refer to 
all kinds of communicative activity that are associated with certain expectations of their participants, 
which would include any activity from a legal trial to an informal pub conversation. In terms of a 
continuum of institutionalization, the former would be an example of an institution in the stronger 
sense as it is characterized by formal, explicitly stated and enforced rules. A pub conversation, on the 
other hand, can be considered an example of an institution in the weaker sense as it is loosely 
connected to informal, mostly unwritten expectations (Ibid.). As Lewiński notes, the pragma-
dialectical conception of institutions ensures that communicative activity types that are informal yet 
can be recognized by certain norms of communication “are not excluded from systematic analysis” 
(Ibid.). Indeed, as discussed earlier in this thesis, norms and conventions pertaining to a particular type 
of argumentative activity can be of useful value in determining the (context-specific) criteria for 
evaluating a straw man fallacy. These same norms and conventions, now, can be used for identifying 
context-specific restrictions on and opportunities for strategic maneuvering as well.  
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The way in which context-specific restrictions on and opportunities for strategic maneuvering 
can be uncovered, can be illustrated most clearly by an example of a highly institutionalised activity 
type (Lewiński 2010). Mohammed (2008, 2009), who studied the conditions for strategic maneuvering 
in the Prime Minister’s Question Time in the British House of Commons found how particular 
conventions pertaining to this activity type affect possibilities for strategic maneuvering in a number of 
ways. One of these concerned the topical potential of argumentation. During Prime Minister’s 
Question Time, members of parliament have the opportunity to ask the prime minister questions but 
they are restricted in the topics they are allowed to address as these need to fall under the responsibility 
of the government (2008, p. 387). An example of an opportunity for strategic maneuvering that is 
created by a particular convention of the activity type concerns the use of presentational devices of the 
members of parliament: During Prime Minister’s Question Time, members of parliament are allowed 
to ask questions only. This particular convention of the activity type of Prime Minister’s Question  
Time is found to be exploited by members of parliament wishing to steer the discussion towards a 
preferred outcome. It is shown, for example, how criticism on the prime minister’s conduct can be 
veiled in the form of a seemingly innocent yes/no question: 
 
“From the range of types of questions allowed to Mr. Vara , he chooses to imply his argument 
in a yes/no question concerning whether or not the Prime Minister believes that an 
inconsistency is acceptable. The choice furthers the case of the Member of Parliament since 
whatever straightforward answer the Prime Minister gives he will be bound to admit the 
alleged inconsistency.” (Ibid., p. 390) 
 
In these examples it is illustrated how context-specific starting points determine what means of 
argumentation or criticism are allowed. In terms of the pragma-dialectical ideal model of a critical 
discussion, it can be said that decisions that have been made in the opening stage of the discussion 
affect what kinds of contributions are allowed in the argumentation stage.   
Characterisations of the activity type in terms of the four stages of a critical discussion, now, 
may provide more insight in opportunities for and restrictions on strategic maneuvering of an 
argumentative activity type, unveiling specific conditions for strategic maneuvering that might remain 
unnoticed when only the domain, institutional point, rationale, genre and institutional norms and 
conventions of the argumentative activity type are taken into account (Lewiński 2010; Mohammed 
2008; van Eemeren & Garssen 2008). 32 More specifically, four parameters “which mirror the division 
of a critical discussion into four stages” (Lewiński 2010, p. 58) can be used in order to reveal the ‘key 
                                                                 
32 From the literature it is not entirely clear how one is to understand what exactly restrictions on strategic 
maneuvering are. On the one hand, one may argue that restrictions on strategic maneuvering stipulate which 
(kind of) strategic maneuvers cannot be committed (i.e. without blatantly violating any norms or conventions on 
reasonableness). On the other hand, it seems that (argumentative activity type specific) norms and conventions  
that determine what argumentative means are deemed acceptable or reasonable - restrictions on argumentation, 
so to say - offer opportunities for strategic maneuvering. In the example of Prime M inister ’s Question Time, for  
instance, it is argued how a particular convention of the activity type is found to be exploited by members of 
parliament wishing to steer the discussion towards a preferred outcome. In the remainder of this thesis, I will take  
the latter  interpretation as a starting point when addressing context-specif ic restrictions in relation to strategic 
maneuvering.   
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argumentative features’ (Ibid.) of a specific argumentative activity type. These parameters are the initial 
situation of the discussion, the starting points that are agreed upon, the means of argumentation and 
criticism that are used, and the outcome of the discussion. Relating to the confrontational stage, the 
opening stage, the argumentation stage and the concluding stage of the ideal model respectively, t hese 
four parameters may help pin down the specific strategic maneuvers occurring in a given 
argumentative activity type. 
  
4.4 Conclusion  
This chapter started with a general introduction of the field of argumentation theory and the division 
between descriptive and normative approaches to argumentation.  Furthermore, it was discussed how 
pragma-dialectical argumentation theory and the notion of argumentative activity type in particular 
offers useful instruments for analysing context-specific conditions for strategic maneuvering. It was 
explained how an argumentative activity type can be established by taking into account the domain of 
activity in which it occurs, the rationale or institutional point of this domain, the communicative genre 
of the activity type, its institutional norms and conventions, and its format. In addition, it was 
explained how an analysis of four parameters reflecting the pragma-dialectical discussion stages may 
provide more insight in specific strategic maneuvers occurring in a given argumentative activity type. 
In Chapter 5 of this thesis it will be demonstrated how a characterisation of the NIPCC’s scientific 
assessment report as an argumentative activity type and an examination of the four parameters 
belonging to the pragma-dialectical discussion stages may uncover its specific conditions for strategic 
maneuvering with the straw man fallacy.  
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5. Analysis: ‘Climate Change Reconsidered’ 
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter will provide an analysis of the straw man fallacy in the NIPCC’s scientific assessment 
report Climate Change Reconsidered (2009). More specifically, by examining parts of the NIPCC’s 
report in which it poses critical reactions towards claims made in the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment 
Report (2007), an answer will be sought to the two main research questions of the thesis. The first 
relates to the different variants of the straw man fallacy that are distinguished in the literature. As we 
saw in Chapter 2 of this thesis, three main forms for committing the straw man fallacy were found to 
be commonly recognized. In section 5.3 it will be examined to what extent the representations by the 
NIPCC can be placed in either one of these categories or coincide with the different variants in some 
other way. The second research question that will be addressed concerns the conditions for strategic 
maneuvering with the straw man fallacy that are offered by the argumentative activity type of the 
report. In section 5.4 it will be studied what aspects of the report provide conditions for committing 
the straw man fallacy without it running the risk of immediate detection. The main findings of this 
chapter will be summarized in section 5.5. First, in section 5.2, an overview will be given of the main 
standpoints and the general lines of argumentation put forward by the NIPCC.  
  
 
5.2 Two main argumentation techniques deployed in Climate Change Reconsidered  
Starting with the rhetorical question “Before facing major surgery, wouldn’t you want a second 
opinion?” (NIPCC 2009, p. iii), the preface of the NIPCC’s report Climate Change Reconsidered (CCR) 
leaves no question about the fact that the report is a reaction to the Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) 
of the IPPC released in 2007.33 More specifically, the NIPCC says to question the validity of the claims 
made in the IPCC’s AR4, arguing that it finds the material that is used to substantiate the IPCC’s main 
findings “to be highly selective and controversial with regard to making future projections of climate 
change and discerning a significant human-induced influence on current and past climatic trends” 
(Ibid.). In providing support for this thesis, the NIPCC sets out to do two things: Firstly, to prove that 
scientific facts and studies are not correctly displayed in AR4, and secondly, to demonstrate that 
scientific studies have been disregarded that should have been included. By doing so, it aims to attack 
two central claims of AR4 in particular, namely that “most of the observed increase in global average 
temperatures since the mid-twentieth century is very likely 34  due to the observed increase in 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations” and that global warming will “increase the number of 
people suffering from death, disease and injury from heatwaves, floods, storms, fires and droughts” 
                                                                 
33 The NIPCC’s arguments in CCR principally deal with the first and second volume of AR4. AR4 consists of 
three volumes in total: The first volume is called ‘The phys ical science basis’ (2007-I) and summarizes scientif ic 
findings on the physical science of climate change as well as the earth’s sensitivity to greenhouse gas emissions. 
The second volume (‘Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability’, 2007-II) considers possible impacts  of climate 
change, vulnerabilities and adaptation options, and the third volume (‘Mitigation of Climate Change’, 2007-III)  
assesses options for the mitigation of climate change. 
34 In AR4, the IPCC makes use of uncertainty ranges for the results it discusses. The ranges are as follows: 
Virtually certa in > 99% probability of occurrence, Extremely likely > 95%, Very likely > 90%, Likely > 66%, 
More likely than not > 50%, Unlikely < 33%, Very unlikely < 10%, Extremely unlikely < 5% (IPCC 2007-I, p. 3).  
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(IPCC 2007, as quoted by NIPCC 2009, p. iii; italics in original).35 Summarizing thousands of scientific 
findings that would contradict these claims, the NIPCC aims to demonstrate that the very opposite 
standpoints are true, i.e. that CO2 is not playing a substantial role in the current rise of the earth’s 
mean temperature and that global warming will have beneficial rather than catastrophic consequences.  
 When looking at the ‘Key Findings by Chapter’ listed at the end of the report’s executive 
summary, it appears that the first half of the report (i.e. chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4) deals with refuting the 
claim that the current global warming would be caused by a rise of the air’s CO2 concentration, 
whereas the second half of the report (i.e. chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9) discuss how global warming is (and 
will be) by no means catastrophic to humans, animals and plants alike. Chapter 5, then, proposes an 
alternative theory for the current warming of the climate. In this chapter it is argued how non-
anthropogenic (rather than anthropogenic) mechanisms are causing the earth’s climate to change and 
how humans cannot (and should not bother to) stop this process. The ‘Key Findings by Chapter’ 
demonstrate too how two main refutation techniques seem to be deployed throughout the report. One 
part of the key findings shows how the NIPCC attempts to discredit the scientific data upon which the 
IPCC bases its conclusions by demonstrating how the methodologies and models used in the research 
cited by the IPCC are unconventional or right out inadequate for drawing conclusions about past, 
current and future climate change. The NIPCC states, for instance, that  
 “[t]he IPCC does not apply generally accepted methodologies to determine what fraction of 
 current warming is natural, or how much is caused by the rise in greenhouse gases (GHG). A 
 comparison of “fingerprints” from best available observations with the results of state-of-the-
  art GHG models leads to the conclusion that the (human-caused) GHG contribution is 
 minor.” (NIPCC 2009, p. 1) 
A second means of refutation deployed by the NIPCC is to demonstrate that the IPCC has distorted, 
not taken into account or even purposely ignored data that might contradict their conclusions. The 
IPCC is accused, for instance, for not having considered 
“important scientific issues, several of which would upset its major conclusion— [i.e.] that 
‘most of the observed increase in global average temperatures since the mid-20th century is 
very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations’.” 
(Ibid.; emphasis in the original) 
 
By listing research findings that contradict matters discussed in AR4, the NIPCC tries to demonstrate 
how the main conclusions drawn by the IPCC are wrong. The fact that some of this research has been 
published before the publication of AR4 is used to substantiate the claim that the IPCC has disregarded 
                                                                 
35 Even though the NIPCC puts  these claims  between quotation marks, it is not indicated where these are quoted 
from. The f irst seems to be a paraphrase of a cla im made on page 60 of the IPCC report (“It is very likely that 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas increases caused most of the observed increase in global average temperatures  
since the mid-20th century”). The second, however, cannot be (directly) traced back to AR4.  
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particular scientific findings on purpose. In short, the two main lines of refutation can be 
reconstructed as follows:  36 37 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Principal means of refutation deployed by the NIPCC  
 
As arguments 1.2a-c explicitly aim to refute specific conclusions the IPCC draws from the research it 
assesses, these form an interesting starting point for an analysis on how the conclusions and lines of 
argumentation of AR4 are represented by the NIPCC. As will be argued below, a more detailed study of 
actual arguments put forward by the NIPCC shows how in these arguments the IPCC’s case is not 
correctly nor fully rendered, enhancing the risk for a straw man fallacy to occur.  
 
 
                                                                 
36 For this reconstruction and the ones that will follow in the remainder of this chapter the standard pragma -
dialectical method of reconstruction is used. In these reconstructions a single number is used to refer to the 
(main) standpoint and multiple arguments substantiating this standpoint are indicated by (different) numbers at 
the decimal level. Coordinative arguments share the same numbers but are followed by different letters. Premises  
that have been left implicit are followed by an apostrophe and put between parentheses. In the remainder of  this  
chapter, argumentation structures that do not fit one portrait-orientated page are displayed in the appendices. 
37 The standpoint and arguments listed below are reconstructed on the basis of and cited (directly or indirectly) 
from the NIPCC (2009). 
1.1.1 The models and 
methodologies used in 
the studies cited by the 
IPCC are inaccurate 
 
1.2b.1 Scientific 
findings can be found 
that upset the IPCC’s 
major conclusions 
 
1 The IPCC’s main 
conclusions are false 
1.1 The scientific data 
on the basis of which 
these conclusions are 
drawn are inaccurate 
 
1.2a Important 
scientific issues that 
contradict the main 
conclusions of the 
report have been 
distorted by the IPCC 
 
1.1.1.1 Research 
findings show how 
models and 
methodologies used in 
studies cited by the 
IPCC are inaccurate   
1.2b Important 
scientific issues that 
contradict the main 
conclusions of the 
report have been 
omitted the IPCC 
 
1.2c Important 
scientific issues that 
contradict the main 
conclusions of the 
report have been 
purposefully ignored 
by the IPCC 
 
… 
… … … 
1.2c.1 Contradicting 
research findings can 
be found that have 
been published before 
the deadline of AR4 
1.2a.1 Scientific 
findings cited by the 
IPCC should be 
interpreted differently 
 
46 
 
5.3 Analysis of representations 
In this section, an analysis will be given of two arguments put forward by the NIPCC that explicitly 
refer to a number of claims the IPCC (is argued to have) made in its AR4. Both examples are taken 
from the third chapter of the NIPCC’s report CCR which is  principally aimed at providing 
counterevidence for the IPCC’s claim on how climatologic data from the past support the conclusion 
that the earth’s climate would be warming due to a rise of atmospheric CO2. This chapter is apt for an 
analysis of representations not only because it contains a number of arguments involving an 
explanation by the NIPCC on how arguments put forward by the IPCC are to be understood, but also 
because of the relative incomplexity of the chapter in terms of the (non-specialist) language used.38  
 
 
5.3.1 Case 1: representations by the NIPCC in section 3.1 Paeloclimatic [sic] Data  
Chapter 3 of CCR, called Observations: Temperature Records, starts with a direct reference to two claims 
allegedly put forward in the IPCC’s AR4:   
  
“The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) claims to have found evidence in 
paeloclimatic [sic] data that higher levels of atmospheric CO2 can cause or amplify an increase 
in global temperatures (IPCC, 2007-I, Chapter 6). The IPCC further claims to have evidence of 
an anthropogenic effect on climate in the earth’s temperature history during the past century 
(Chapters 3, 9), in the pattern (or “fingerprint”) of more recent warming (Chapter 9, Section 
9.4.1.4), in data from land-based temperature stations and satellites (Chapter 3), and in the 
temperature records of the Artic region and Antarctica where models predict anthropogenic 
global warming should be detected first (Chapter 11, Section 8).” (NIPCC 2009, p. 63)  
 
The NIPCC sets out to “critically examine the data used to support each of these claims” (Ibid.), and 
starts with the first in section 3.1. In this section, research findings are summarized that are argued to 
refute the proposition that (palaeoclimatic data demonstrate that) higher levels of atmospheric CO2 
can cause or amplify an increase in global temperatures.39 In Appendix 1 of this thesis a reconstruction 
can be found of the argumentation structure of this rebuttal. In Appendix 2 an overview is given of the 
NIPCC’s main lines of argumentation. In these reconstructions it shows how the majority of the 
studies cited by the NIPCC fall into two main categories.40 On the one hand, studies are discussed that 
argue for a decoupling between global climate and CO2, suggesting that there has been no relation 
whatsoever between the earth’s atmospheric CO2 concentration and the inducement of past climate 
                                                                 
38 That is to say, compared to other chapters in the report relatively little technical language is used, admitting for 
laymen in the field of climate science to grasp the general line of argumentation too. 
39 Palaeoclimatic data (misspelled in CCR) are data acquired from natural sources including tree rings, ice cores, 
corals, and ocean and lake sediments. On the basis of these data, weather and climate information from hundreds  
to millions of years ago can be derived (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) website  
http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/data-access/paleoclimatology-data [accessed 15 June 2015]). 
40 A small number of  other arguments not included in the appendix substantiate another standpoint that is  
elaborated on more extensively in CCR’s section 3.2; in the next section of this thesis, these arguments will be 
studied in more detail. 
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changes (see arguments 1.1.1a.1 and further). On the other hand, studies are discussed that do 
conclude there may have been a relation between CO2 and climate changes in the past, but it is most 
likely it is a relation opposite to what the IPCC’s claim on global warming predicts (see arguments 
1.1.1a.2 and further). That is, past CO2 perturbations would have been caused by the changes in 
climate rather than vice versa. At the end of section 3.1, the conclusion is drawn that  
  
“[t]hese observations seem to undermine the IPCC’s claims that the CO2 produced by the 
burning of fossil fuels will lead to catastrophic global warming [...] There is no way these real -
world observations can be construed to suggest that a significant increase in atmospheric CO2 
would necessarily lead to any global warming, much less the catastrophic type that is predicted 
by the IPCC.” (NIPCC 2009, p. 65)41 
 
Here, the NIPCC concludes that a rise in the air’s CO2 concentration has never caused any warming 
and therefore cannot be the cause of the current change of climate, contrary to what the IPCC would 
contend. It is suggested that the IPCC has not taken these studies into account and if it would have, its 
conclusions would have been different. When looking at the arguments put forward in AR4, however, 
it turns out the IPCC’s standpoint and line of argumentation are somewhat more complicated than the 
NIPCC suggests.  
 In Chapter 6 of AR4, called Palaeoclimate, the IPCC explains how climate has changed on all 
time scales throughout the earth’s history, including those periods humans did not yet exist. According 
to the IPCC, the principal drivers of past climate changes were changes in the earth’s radiation balance. 
This radiation balance is said to be able to influence the climate in three fundamental ways: Firstly, by 
changes in the incoming solar radiation (for instance, by changes in the earth’s orbit); secondly, by 
changes in the  fraction of solar radiation that is reflected (this fraction, i.e. the albedo, can be changed 
by changes in cloud cover, aerosols or land cover); and lastly, by altering the long-wave energy radiated 
back to space (by changes in greenhouse gas concentrations, for instance). In addition, local climate 
can be influenced by the distribution of heat due to winds and ocean currents. As the IPCC notes, all of 
these factors have played a role in past changes of the earth’s climate (2007-I, p. 449). The IPCC 
contends, for instance, that there is strong evidence that the ice ages that have occurred in regular 
cycles during the past three million years are linked to regular variations in the earth’s orbit around the 
sun, the so-called Milankovitch cycles.42 After explaining how these Milankovitch cycles may have 
started and ended ice ages, the IPCC notes that “although it is not their primary cause, atmospheric 
carbon dioxide (CO2) also plays an important role in the ice ages” (Ibid.). Data retrieved from 
Antarctic ice core show that cold, glacial times knew low CO2 concentrations (~190 ppm) whereas 
warm, interglacial periods knew higher concentrations of CO2 (~280 ppm). Elsewhere, the IPCC 
explains that it is very likely (i.e. more than ninety per cent certain) that glacial-interglacial CO2 
                                                                 
41 The burning of fossil fuels refers to the IPCC’s cla im that the climate change the earth is currently experiencing 
is due to human activities causing a rise in in carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases in the atmosphere (the 
most harmful being the burning of fossil fuels) (see IPCC 2007-I, p. 702). 
42 The IPCC also notes how variations in the energy output of the sun is another likely cause of past climatic 
changes (2007-I, p. 450).  
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variations strongly amplified climate variations whereas it is considered unlikely (i.e. a likelihood of 
less than 33 per cent) that variations in CO2 have triggered the end of glacial periods (Ibid., p. 435).  
The IPCC thus argues there has been a relation between CO2 and past climate.  The IPCC 
nowhere contends, however, that CO2 has been a principal driver of past climate changes, as is 
suggested in the NIPPC’s claim that “[t]he Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) claims 
to have found evidence in paeloclimatic data that higher levels of atmospheric CO2 can cause or 
amplify an increase in global temperatures” (NIPCC 2009, p. 63). The IPCC does say past climate 
changes may have been amplified by atmospheric CO2, but it does not argue it caused any. In fact, the 
IPCC’s point of view on (the causes of) past climate changes very much resembles another remark 
made by the NIPCC at the end of section 3.1: 
  
 “When temperature is found to lead CO2 by thousands of years, during both glacial terminations 
and inceptions (Genthon et al., 1987; Fischer et al., 1999; Petit et al., 1999; Indermuhle et al., 
2000; Monnin et  al., 2001; Mudelsee, 2001; Caillon et al., 2003), it is extremely likely that CO2 
plays only a minor role in enhancing temperature changes that are induced by something else.” 
(NIPCC 2009, p. 65; italics added DW) 
 
The part of the sentence italicized refers to the fact that part of the second group of studies cited by the 
NIPCC (arguments 1.1.1a.2.1a; 1.1.1a.2.1b; 1.1.1a.2.1c; 1.1.1a.2.1g; 1.1.1a.2.1h in Appendix 1) 
indicates that past changes in CO2 have lagged behind (rather than anticipated) changes in 
temperature, sometimes by hundreds or even thousands of years. Even though it is not made explicit 
how the NIPCC exactly arrives at this conclusion, these findings are explained to mean that CO2 may 
have played a minor role in enhancing temperature changes that have been induced by something else 
(Ibid.).  
 In the IPCC’s AR4, now, a clarification is given on how this lagging behind can be explained. 
As discussed above, the IPCC takes changes in the earth’s radiation to have driven past climate changes; 
CO2, then, would have enhanced this process as a so-called ‘feedback factor’:43 
 
“Because the climate changes at the beginning and end of ice ages take several thousands of 
years, most of these changes are affected by a positive CO2 feedback; that is, a small initial 
cooling due to the Milankovitch cycles is subsequently amplified as the CO2 concentration 
falls. Model simulations of ice age climate (see discussion in Section 6.4.1) yield realistic  results 
only if the role of CO2 is accounted for.” (IPCC 2007-I, p. 449) 
 
This feedback effect of CO2, it is explained, can lag behind the climate changes that occur at the 
beginning and end of ice ages with some hundreds of years. In other words, changes in atmospheric 
CO2 may have amplified climate changes but sometimes only hundreds of years after these climate 
                                                                 
43 The term climate feedback is used to refer to an interaction mechanism between processes  in the climate 
system “when the result of an initial process triggers changes in a second process that in turn influences the initial 
one” (IPCC 2007-I, p. 943). Positive feedback factors intensify the original process whereas negative feedback 
factors reduce it. 
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change had been induced. Here we see how the very fact that the IPCC considers CO2 to have acted as 
a feedback factor means that in past climate changes a change in the amount of CO2 in the atmosphere 
must have been triggered due to a change in temperatures. Returning to the NIPCC’s arguments put 
forward in this matter – most notably 1.1.1a.2 and 1.1.1b in Appendix 1 – we see that the IPCC and the 
NIPCC are in fact on the same line with regards to what scientific findings on palaeoclimatic data tell 
us about the role of CO2 in pas climate changes, even though the NIPCC may make it appear they are 
not.  
Despite drawing the same conclusions on what palaeoclimatic data say about past climate 
changes, the IPCC’s and the NIPCC’s main standpoints on the role of CO2 in the current climate 
change differ. The cause of this, now, can be found in the inferential link left implicit between the 
NIPCC’s arguments 1.1.1a and 1.1.1b on the one hand and argument 1.1 on the other. Taking into 
account the fact that the former are formulated in the past tense and the latter is formulated in the 
present tense, we see how the NIPCC implicitly draws the conclusion that if CO2 turns out  to not have 
caused (but only amplified) past climate changes that have been induced by something else, this 
automatically means that a rise in CO2 cannot be the (main) cause of the climate change the earth is 
currently experiencing. As fair as this argument from analogy may seem, there is one important caveat: 
The NIPCC fails to address the main point of the IPCC’s discussion on paleoclimatic data, which is 
that paleoclimatic information supports the interpretation that the current climate change is inherently 
different from climate changes in the past. 
According to the NIPCC, the current climate change differs from previous ones in one 
significant respect: It is the unprecedented rate of increase of the air’s CO2 concentration that is 
currently causing an unnatural change of temperature. Indeed, as is argued throughout AR4, CO2 
concentrations have varied considerably over the earth’s history; these variations may have been caused 
by various factors and may indeed have played an amplifying role during the great climate changes of 
the ice ages. The current rate of the rise of CO2, however, as well as the rise of two other greenhouse 
gases (CH4 and N2O), is unusual in geological terms.44 The IPCC contends that  
  
“[t]he main reason for the current concern about climate change is the rise in atmospheric 
carbon dioxide (CO2) concentration (and some other greenhouse gases), which is very 
unusual for the Quaternary (about the last two million years). The concentration of CO2 is 
now known accurately for the past 650,000 years from Antarctic ice cores. During this time, 
CO2 concentration varied between a low of 180 ppm during cold glacial times and a high of 
300 ppm during warm interglacials. Over the past century, it rapidly increased well out of this 
range, and is now 379 ppm.” (IPCC 2007-I, p. 465)  
 
The explanation given for this unusual rate of increase is the anthropogenic effect on the amount of 
greenhouse gases in the air: Human activities such as the burning of fossil fuels and land use changes 
(e.g. deforestation) contribute to an increase of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere. This, 
                                                                 
44  Returning to the NIPCC’s argument from analogy, we see how the IPCC covers for this by explaining 
metaphorically how “the fact that forest fires have long been caused naturally by lightning strikes does not mean 
that fires cannot also be caused by a careless camper” (2007-I, p. 449).  
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in turn, affects the earth’s climate as the incoming solar radiation and outgoing infrared (thermal) 
radiation that are part of the earth’s energy balance are altered (IPCC 2007-I, p. 135). The altering of 
incoming solar radiation and outgoing infrared (thermal) radiation can, in principle, have a warming 
or cooling effect. According to the IPCC, studies show how human activities since the start of the 
industrial era have had an overall effect of warming. Changes in natural processes such as solar changes 
and volcanic eruptions, on the other hand, appear to have a considerably smaller effect  on this era’s 
climate when compared to changes caused by humans. Furthermore, climate simulations show that the 
global mean warming since 1970 cannot be reproduced when no external forcings such as the ones 
caused by humans are taken into account.  
In short, the IPCC’s main conclusion is that the additional burden of CO2 added to the 
atmosphere by human activities causes a natural range-exceeding rise in greenhouse gases; this 
‘perturbed’ global carbon cycle, in turn, causes the current rapid warming of the earth’s climate (IPCC 
2007-I, p. 514). Consequently, the main arguments of the IPCC on how climatologic data from the 
past support the conclusion that the earth’s climate would be warming due to a rise of atmospheric 
CO2 can be constructed as follows:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The IPCC’s standpoint and main arguments regarding the causes of the current warming of the 
earth 
1.1b(b).1 Palaeoclimatic 
data show how the 
current rate of increase 
exceeds its natural range, 
leading to a ‘perturbed’ 
global carbon cycle 
which confuses other 
natural processes. 
1.1b(a) Past climate 
changes have had 
different (natural) 
causes in which CO2 
may have played an 
amplifying role  
1.1a The concentration 
of atmospheric CO2 
affects the earth’s 
climate as the incoming 
solar radiation and 
outgoing infrared 
(thermal) radiation that 
are part of the earth’s 
energy balance are 
altered. 
1 The current warming of the 
earth is caused by a rapid rise 
of atmospheric CO2. 
1.1a.1 Human activities 
such as the burning of 
fossil fuels and land use 
changes (e.g. 
deforestation) are 
causing a more rapid 
increase of the air’s 
concentration of CO2.  
 
… 
1.1b(b) The current rise 
of the concentration of 
CO2, however, is 
different.  
… … … 
1.1b(b).2 Climate 
simulations are 
consistent in showing 
that the global mean 
warming observed since 
1970 can only be 
reproduced when models 
are forced with 
combinations of external 
forcings that include 
anthropogenic forcings. 
1.1b(a).1 Palaeoclimatic 
data show that the 
principal drivers of past 
climate changes were 
changes in the earth’s 
radiation balance; these 
principal drivers may 
have been amplified by 
CO2 acting as a positive 
feedback factor. 
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When comparing the arguments of the IPCC discussed above to the arguments put forward by the 
NIPCC in support of its accusation that “observations [based on palaeoclimatic data] seem to 
undermine the IPCC’s claims that the CO2 produced by the burning of fossil  fuels will lead to 
catastrophic global warming”  (NIPCC 2009, p. 65), it becomes clear how the NIPCC does not do right 
to the full case of the IPCC. Instead, the IPCC’s statements on the role of CO2 in climate changes of 
the past are taken out of context. Just like the NIPCC, it contends that past climate changes may have 
been amplified (rather than caused) by changes in atmospheric CO2 concentrations but it also argues 
that the current rise in CO2 is different in a number of aspects and hence should be evaluated 
differently.  
 To sum up, a detailed analysis of the various arguments put forward by the IPCC and the 
NIPCC shows how the more complex (or more extensive) case of the IPCC has not been fully taken 
into account in the NIPCC’s rebuttal. Consequently, the case of the IPCC is represented as weaker than 
it actually is, resulting in the critique of the NIPCC missing the actual point at issue. The NIPCC 
nonetheless claims to have refuted a major argument of climate change theory, a claim that may find 
resonance with those readers of CCR unfamiliar with the arguments originally put forward by the 
IPCC. 
  
 
5.3.2 Case 2: representations by the NIPCC in section 3.2 Past 1,000 Years 
A rebuttal similar to the one described above can be found in the next section of the third chapter of 
CCR dealing with more recent changes of the earth’s climate. One of the main claims of the NIPCC 
put forward in this part of its report concerns the fact that the IPCC would have claimed to have found 
evidence in temperature records that “the warming of the twentieth century was ‘unprecedented’ and 
more rapid than during any previous period in the past 1,300 years” (NIPCC 2009, p. 4). When 
looking at the Key Findings of CCR’s Chapter 3, it appears that the NIPCC aims to refute this claim by 
providing arguments that fall into the two categories discussed earlier in this chapter: First, arguments 
are put forward on how research findings show that data used in AR4 are biased due to imperfections 
of the climate models used; secondly, evidence is cited on how other, “highly accurate” (Ibid.) data 
lead to outcomes that would be different from the ones discussed by the IPCC. More specifically, it is 
argued that data deployed by the NIPCC show how the warming trend of the last two decades of the 
twentieth century was “much more modest” (i.e. compared to the warming trend as described by the 
IPCC) and how there has been “a dramatic decline in the warming trend in the first decade of the 
twenty-first century” (Ibid.). The actual evidence cited in sections 3.2, however, appears to be 
principally aimed at proving how the current climate change is ‘not unprecedented’ as the data 
reflected upon demonstrate how the earth has experienced even warmer periods in the past than it is 
experiencing today.   
 By means of illustration it can be shown how the section starts with the following list of 
references to claims made by the IPCC on differences between the current global temperature and 
temperatures of the past: 
 
52 
 
“The IPCC claims “average Northern Hemisphere temperatures during the second half of the 
20th century were very likely higher than during any other 50-year period in the past 500 years 
and likely the highest in at least the past 1,300 years” (IPCC, 2007-I, p. 9; italics in original). 
Later in that report, the IPCC says “the warming observed after 1980 is unprecedented 
compared to the levels measured in the previous 280 years” (p. 466) and “it is likely that the 
20th century was the warmest in at least the past 1.3 kyr. Considering the recent instrumental 
and longer proxy evidence together, it is very likely that average NH [Northern Hemisphere] 
temperatures during the second half of the 20th century were higher than for any other 50-year 
period in the last 500 years” (p. 474).”  (NIPCC 2009, p. 66)   
 
Throughout section 3.2, the NIPCC aims to refute these claims by listing findings that show how 
warmer periods have existed in the earth’s history. One of the main arguments put forward by the 
NIPCC is that approximately seven hundred to twelve hundred years ago, a so-called Medieval Warm 
Period prevailed in which temperatures have been found to have been as high or even higher than 
today’s global mean temperature.45 According to the NIPCC, the IPCC denies the existence of such a  
period (NIPCC 2009, p. 67). When looking at AR4, this accusation by the NIPCC does not seem 
entirely correct: In its chapter on palaeoclimate, the IPCC argues that temperatures in medieval times 
may have been as high or even higher than they are today.46 It adds, however, that it is uncertain 
whether this warmth was a global phenomenon as there is no (conclusive) evidence that all of the 
earth’s regions instead of only northern hemisphere regions experienced this warmth. As the IPCC 
notes elsewhere in AR4, local climate variations in temperature differ from global ones as the former 
are often considerably larger than the latter because of local factors (changes in atmospheric or oceanic 
circulation, for example can shift both the delivery of heat and moisture); large changes in global mean 
temperature, on the other hand, need a global forcing to occur (an example of which would be a 
change in solar activity (2007-I, p. 465)). In short, both the IPCC and the NIPCC agree that during 
medieval times the earth’s temperatures may have been as high or higher than they are today.  The 
IPCC and the NIPCC disagree, however, on the (global) scope of this period as the IPCC questions its 
occurrence in southern hemisphere regions.  
 Be that as it may, as mentioned above, the IPCC contends it is the current rate of increase of 
the air’s CO2 concentration that is causing the current, unnatural change of temperature. This rate of 
increase, which would be due to human activities, would have harmful effects on the environment. The 
IPCC does not argue that the earth has not known a global mean temperature that was as high as or 
even higher than the current. 47  Yet this is taken as the starting point of the NIPCC’s rebuttal, 
                                                                 
45 Another main argument (discussed in section 3.2) concerns the IPCC’s use of the so-called ‘hockey stick graph’ 
of Michael Mann and colleagues (Mann et al., 1998; Mann et al., 1999; Mann and Jones, 2003). This graph has 
been subject of several critical studies in the past and these are discussed in both AR4 and CCR. As the matter is  
quite complex and the exact arguments used by both parties are difficult to construct, it will be left unaddressed 
here. This does not, however, affect the analysis of the other main argument discussed here.   
46 The IPCC uses the notion ‘medieval times’ to refer to the ‘Medieval Warm Period’ (2007-I, p. 468). 
47 Cf.: “much warmer times have also occurred in climate history” (IPCC 2007-I, p. 449) and “current warmth 
appears unusual in the context of the past millennia, but not unusual on longer time scales for  which changes in 
tectonic activity (which can drive natural, slow variations  in greenhouse gas concentration) become relevant [...]  
A different matter is the current rate of warming” (IPCC 2007-I, p. 465).  
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contending “there is nothing unusual, unnatural, or unprecedented about the current level of earth’s 
warmth” (NIPCC (2009, p. 76). As a matter of fact, when considering the quote from CCR mentioned 
above, arguing that the IPCC would have claimed to have found evidence in temperature records that 
“the warming of the twentieth century was ‘unprecedented’ and more rapid than during any previous 
period in the past 1,300 years” (Ibid.), one may say that the addition of the word ‘and’ already indicates 
an erroneous interpretation (or representation) of the IPCC’s main point. Indeed, the IPCC contends 
that the current rise of the earth’s mean temperature is unprecedented because of the fact that no past 
climate changes have occurred this rapidly. 
 What is most important, now, is that the conclusions drawn by the NIPCC on the existence of 
a global Medieval Warm period are used to refute the IPCC’s claim that the current climate change is 
being caused by a rise in atmospheric CO2. In section 3.2.5.1, for instance, research findings on “a 
period of exceptional warmth throughout China between AD 800 and 1100” (NIPCC 2009, p. 80) are 
used to conclude that “whatever was responsible [for this period of exceptional warmth] could be 
responsible for the warmth of today” (Ibid., p. 82). Or, in section 3.2.4, data from temperature 
measurements in the Arctic showing that there has been a Medieval Warm Period with temperatures 
1C warmer than at present whereas there was less CO2 and methane in the air than there is today, are 
taken to indicate that “the planet’s more modest current warmth need not be the result of historical 
increases in these two greenhouse gases” (Ibid., p. 79).  
Eventually, at the end of 3.2, the NIPCC argues that the strong synchronicity of the century-
long climate change of the Medieval Period makes it likely that it was part of a greater, millennium-
scale oscillation of the climate; the current change in climate, therefore, could have been caused by 
“something other than high atmospheric CO2” (Ibid. 82) too. Even though this may be a legitimate 
counterargument on its own, one of the IPCC’s most important line of argument seems to be 
neglected again, i.e. that the current climate change would be essentially different from past ones, the 
reason of which would lie in the fact that the rate of the rise in CO2 (caused by human activities) 
exceeds its natural range, leading to a ‘perturbed’ global carbon cycle which puts other natural 
processes out of balance. (IPCC 2007-I, p. 514).   
 
 
5.4 Analysing the two patterns of rebuttal as possible instantiations of the straw man fallacy 
In the above it was shown how findings discussed in AR4 are only partially rendered by the NIPCC, 
making it easier for the latter to sum up evidence refuting the IPCC’s (misrepresented) case. Taking 
into consideration the gist of the straw man fallacy, i.e. opportunistically misrepresenting a dialectical 
situation by making the opponent appear weaker than he actually is (Talisse & Aikin 2006, p. 346), one 
may argue these examples come close to being one. Following pragma-dialectical theory, however, the 
evaluation of its potential fallacious status depends on the context in which it occurs.48 Indeed, certain 
norms and conventions pertaining to a specific communicative activity type may result in a 
representation of another party’s case being acceptable; how this applies to the examples discussed 
                                                                 
48 Other theories or authors (i.a. Walton 1998, Jacobs 2002) can be found to adhere to the idea that fallaciousness 
is dependent of the context in which an argumentative move occurs as well (see also Lewiński 2010, pp. 14-15). 
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above will be dealt with in the next section. Irrespective of their exact (fallacious or reasonable) nature, 
however, it can be examined how the misrepresentations in sections 3.1 and 3.2 of CCR would fit in 
with the categories of the straw man fallacy as distinguished in the literature.  
 In Chapter 2 of this thesis it was demonstrated how distinctions between the different variants 
of the fallacy to a large extend coincided with one another. On the whole, three main categories 
appeared to be prevalent: (a) the category of linguistically distorting the protagonist’s standpoint or 
arguments originally advanced in a different way (i.e. the representational form); (b) the category of 
attacking a proposition that is phrased faithfully, but nonetheless distorted by an opportune selection 
of only the weakest argument(s) as objects of attack (i.e. the selectional form); and (c) the category o f 
imputing an (altogether) fictitious standpoint or arguments to a protagonist, either the actual 
protagonist taking part in the discussion or some fictitious one (i.e. the less extreme and the extreme 
variety of the hollow man variant, respectively). 49 Returning to the two examples above, it appears that 
some of these variants can be found to occur indeed. It  also turns out, however, that there seems to be 
some kind of interplay between different (characteristics of the) variants, making the two 
misrepresentations somewhat more difficult to grasp than one would expect on the basis of the 
literature.   
 In the first example discussed in section 5.3.1 of this thesis we saw how according to the 
NIPCC, the IPCC would have claimed that CO2 can cause or amplify a global change in temperature. 
In response to this, the NIPCC set out to refute this claim by demonstrating how global climate 
changes in the past were only amplified (rather than caused) by a rise of atmospheric CO2 
concentrations. As discussed above, however, the IPCC has not put forward such a claim in its AR4 
and, in fact, turned out to agree with the NIPCC in this matter, explaining in quite some detail how 
CO2 may have functioned to enhance past climate changes that were induced by something else than 
CO2. Returning to Figure 1 on page 45 of this thesis, we see how the IPCC’s argument 1.1b(a) (“Past 
climate changes have had different (natural) causes in which CO2 may have played an amplifying role”) 
is linguistically distorted. Consequently, of all straw man variants discussed above, the representational 
form seems to be committed here.  
 The distortion of the IPCC’s explanation on the role of CO2 in past climate changes, however, 
is not the only distortion taking place. As argued above, what damages the IPCC’s position most is that 
from this point it is presupposed or rather suggested by the NIPCC that if CO2 has played only a 
minor role in past climate changes, the current climate change can also not be the mere result of a rise 
in the earth’s CO2 concentration.50 We saw how this presupposition lies in the inferential link left  
implicit between the NIPCC’s arguments 1.1.1a and 1.1.1b on the one hand and argument 1.1 on the 
other (see Appendices 1-2). In drawing this link, the NIPCC neglects one of the main arguments put 
forward by the IPCC, i.e. that the current rise in temperature is different from past ones (cf. argument 
                                                                 
49 As argued in Chapter 2, for the sake of convenience, Aikin and Casey’s (2011) terms for their three m ain 
categories will be used as these for a large part match the different categories for committing a straw man fallacy 
distinguished by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992).  
50 This, in fact, is already apparent from the fact that the present tense is used in the NIPCC’s remark that  “The 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) claims to have found evidence in paeloclimatic data that 
higher levels of atmospheric CO2 can cause or amplify an increase in global temperatures” (NIPCC 2009, p. 63; 
italics added DW). 
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1.1b(b) in Figure 2 on page 50) due to an unnatural, rapid rise in CO2. By disregarding this main 
argument, the NIPCC makes the IPCC’s case look significantly less strong than it actually is. Returning 
to the categories of straw man variants, one may argue that the selectional form of the straw man 
fallacy may be at play here. 
 To sum up, different things seem to be at hand in the first example as two distortions of the 
IPCC’s case are taking place. First, the NIPCC distorts one of the IPCC’s arguments on the role of CO2 
in past climate changes. It does so by (falsely) claiming how the IPCC argues that past climate changes 
have been caused by changes in atmospheric CO2. This seems to be the basis the NIPCC aims to build 
its rebuttal on as it wishes to substantiate its standpoint that the current climate change cannot caused 
by a rise in CO2. It can only pursue this line of argument, however, if it neglects one of the IPCC’s 
main arguments in this matter. In other words, the IPCC’s overall case is misrepresented in two ways, 
displaying characteristics of two different variants of the straw man that are distinguished in the 
literature. 
 Something similar, now, appears to be the case in the  second example. First, some kind of 
linguistic distortion occurs. Contending that the IPCC argues that the current global mean 
temperature is ‘unprecedented’ in terms of being warmer than any other period during (at least) the 
past 1,300 years, the NIPCC misinterprets the fact that the IPCC calls the current rise of the global 
mean temperature ‘unprecedented’ because of the rate at which it occurs. More specifically, the NIPCC 
distorts the IPCCs argument 1.1b(b).1 (Figure 2, page 50) on why the current rate of increase of 
atmospheric CO2 is unnatural and hence unprecedented. Again, the representational form of the straw 
man fallacy appears to be committed. On the basis of this distortion, the NIPCC builds its second line 
of rebuttal regarding the cause of the current climate change. By discussing scientific data that 
demonstrate how during the so-called Medieval Period the earth’s temperature could have been as 
high or even higher than it is today, the NIPCC sets out to show that the current climate change is not 
unprecedented according to what it takes this term to mean. Eventually, the NIPCC draws the 
conclusion that the fact that there has been a (global) warmer period in the past 1,300 years that is 
unlikely to have been caused by a rise in CO2 means that the current change in climate could have 
been caused by something other than CO2 too. In other words, just like in the previous example, a 
connection is drawn between the cause of past climate changes and the question of which cause would 
pertain to the current one. Here it is suggested that the current warming could be due to the same 
cause as the warming taking place during Medieval Times whilst again no mention is made of the 
IPCC’s point of view that the current climate change appears to be different from past ones in a 
number of ways. Again, the NIPCC seems to be guilty of selectively picking arguments to its own 
advantage.  
 To conclude, in both examples a linguistic distortion of what the IPCC puts forward in relation 
to a certain topic by the IPCC seems to form the basis of the NIPCC’s misrepresentations. In both 
cases, however, this is not enough for the NIPCC’s refutations to hold water. In order for this to be the 
case, one of the IPCC’s arguments need to be disregarded that forms an essential substantiation of its 
claim that the current climate change is caused by a change in atmospheric CO2. The examples 
presented here thus seem to be a bit more multifaceted and complex than the ones illustrated or 
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circumscribed in the literature. This may be partially due to the complexity of the topic as well as the 
scope of both reports. What role these and other characteristics of the reports may play in the 
evaluation of the representations discussed above will be dealt with in the next section.  
 
 
5.5 Argumentative activity type specific conditions for maneuvering strategically with the straw 
man fallacy in the NIPCC’s scientific assessment report 
In Chapter 4 of this thesis it was discussed how a detailed analysis of an argumentative activity type 
may give insight in the conditions it offers for strategic maneuvering. In this section, such an analysis 
will be given of the NIPCC’s scientific assessment report.  Taking the fours characteristics defining the 
activity type from the perspective of a critical discussion as a point of departure, it will be discussed 
what conditions for maneuvering strategically with the straw man fallacy are offered by the initial 
situation, the starting points, the means of argumentation and criticism and the (possible) outcome of 
the discussion initiated by the NIPCC. In order to gain a better understanding of these parameters, 
characteristics of the argumentative activity type of the NIPCC’s report (i.e. in terms of its domain of 
activity, rationale, communicative genre and institutional norms and conventions), will be taken into 
account as well. Attention will be paid to how some of these characteristics report may be used to apply 
Lewiński’s (2011) straw man fallacy evaluation criteria to the examples discussed in section 5.3 of this 
thesis. At the end of the section, it will be argued that other characteristics of the discussion initiated by 
the NIPCC that fall beyond the concept of argumentative activity type may provide an insight in the 
conditions for maneuvering strategically with the straw man fallacy in the NIPCC’s report as well.   
 
 
5.5.1 Initial situation and starting points 
Considering the NIPCC’s report from the perspective of the pragma-dialectical ideal model of a critical 
discussion, one may say that by posing critical reactions to the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report the 
NIPCC initiates a discussion. The fact that the NIPCC does not simply question the validity of the 
claims put forward by the IPCC but rather takes the very opposite standpoints to be true, makes it a 
(multiple) mixed dispute that is being initiated. Even though the IPCC has never posed a reaction to 
the NIPCC’s report and no starting points of a discussion between the two have been explicitly agreed 
upon, these can be established in some way indeed. As Lewiński (2010, p. 93) points out, in actual 
argumentative discourse the opening stage is hardly ever explicitly or completely performed, but 
participants partaking in a particular activity type may be expected to be acquainted with the rules and 
conventions of this particular type of activity upon entering it. This especially seems to hold true for 
the more institutionalized types of activity (Ibid.). In order to find a question to what norms and 
conventions the IPCC commits itself by publishing its critique in a scientific assessment report, the 
domain of activity and the institutional goal of the report need to be taken into account.  
 As discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis, both the IPCC and NIPCC present themselves as 
scientific organizations free of bias, aiming to summarize and assess the most recent findings in the 
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field of climate change in order for policy makers to base their decisions on. On the other hand, we saw 
how political factors may have played a role in the making of the reports too.  Within pragma-dialectics 
up until today no attention seems to have been paid to the possibility of two domains of 
communication being applicable to one argumentative activity type. Van Eemeren and Garssen do 
note how “in argumentative practice, the one argumentative activity type sometimes may change over 
to the other, or be interrupted by the other” (2008, p. 23). It remains unclear, however, how this (and 
more specifically, the possibility of one argumentative activity type belonging to or displaying 
characteristics of two different domains) should be dealt with in determining the norms and 
conventions pertaining to this activity type. Nonetheless, in deciding what norms and conventions the 
IPCC and NIPCC can be taken to commit themselves to, it can be argued that the fact that the IPCC 
and the NIPCC explicitly present themselves as scientific organizations entails that those pertaining to 
the scientific domain should be taken as the decisive measure. In other words, as they both explicitly 
place themselves in the scientific domain, they (implicitly) indicate to comply with the norms and 
conventions pertaining to this domain. The fact that the reports might be affected by political factors 
too, on the other hand, might provide interesting insights in the possibilities for strategic maneuvering 
offered by the very fact that the activity type is presented as a scientific activity type. This will be 
discussed below; first, however, the norms pertaining to scientific domain will be explicated. 
 In terms of institutionalization, the scientific domain can be located at the more 
institutionalized end of the spectrum, where communicative activities are characterized by formal rules 
connected to the functioning of the institutional point of the domain (Lewiński 2010). Yet, rules seem 
to be rarely made explicit within science itself (Weingart 2015, p. 10720). The field of sociology of 
science studies patterns of behaviour and implicit norms among scientists in order to expose the so-
called scientific ethos, “a set of rules that are supposed to establish trust in, and guarantee the reliability 
of, the knowledge created in the process” (Ibid.).  The groundwork in this matter is laid by the 
American sociologist of science Robert K. Merton. Published as early as 1942, his Sociology of Science 
still is recognized as the standard reference for an understanding of the interaction between the 
different mechanisms that are at play in the production and communication of scientific knowledge 
(Weingart 2015). In short, Merton distinguishes four basic norms scientists should act upon in 
realizing the institutional point of science, i.e. building a reliable body of knowledge about the worl d: 
universalism, communism (also: communality), disinterestedness, and organized scepticism. The first, 
universalism, refers to the idea that truth claims are “subjected to pre-established impersonal criteria” 
(Merton 1957, p. 553). In other words, scientists have a shared goal of establishing a reliable body of 
knowledge about the world; therefore, scientists should not be interested in the people producing these 
claims (Weingart 2015, p. 10720). The second norm, communism or communality, denotes the idea 
that scientific knowledge is and is to be shared by the whole community of science. More specifically, it 
means that scientific findings are a product of joint effort which after publication becomes a public 
good that can be used by scientists to build additional knowledge (Merton 1973a, p. 273). The third 
norm, disinterestedness, refers to the idea that scientists are not striving for recognition or other 
personal advantages. In line with this idea, they should not make use of fraudulent means in 
conducting science as this would interfere with their aim to contribute to building a reliable body of 
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knowledge about the world (Ibid., p. 276). The fourth and last norm, organized scepticism, denotes the 
idea that any knowledge claim put forward in the field of science must have been exposed to critical 
scrutiny before receiving a place in the shared body of knowledge (Ibid., p. 277-278). As Weingart 
notes, this norm is institutionalized in peer review systems and funding agencies (2015, p. 10720.).   
 Even though Merton formulated his norms more than half a decade ago, they are still generally 
accepted as prevailing standards within the field of science. Some critics (i.a. Ezrahi 1990; Forman 1997; 
Panofsky 2010) seem to rightly point out that science has undergone many changes in the last few 
decades, thereby questioning whether “the ethos that is basically geared to an individualist concept of 
gentlemanly science” (Weingart 2015, p. 10722) is still applicable today.  Forman, for instance, notes 
how postmodern values on science affect the production of science. He gives the example of how the 
instrumentalisation of knowledge would have led to “an ethos of production as an end in itself”  (1997; 
quoted from Weingart 2015, p. 10722). In modern times, cuts on research fundings would have put a 
strong emphasis on ‘scientific productivity’ whereby financial incentives are leading to a system of 
academia in which publicizing for the sake of producing more publications in one’s name has 
overtaken the intrinsic value of doing research for the sake of knowledge. Thirty years after his 
publication of the Sociology of Science, Merton (1973b) himself also acknowledges the fact that time 
can and will bring about changes in scientists’ conduct.  However, Merton also argues that scientists’ 
main goal (or, the institutional point of science) remains the same and the fact that the norms are 
based on (actual) patterns of behaviour among scientists does not mean that these norms need to 
change when scientists’ behaviour changes. As Allchin puts it, Merton’s norms “specify foundational 
conditions or proximate values that contribute to the development and certification of knowledge in a 
community” (2001, p. 186), emphasizing the fact that there is a foundational common ground on what 
conduct is deemed acceptable. In addition, Merton notes how public reactions to violations of the 
scientific ethos expose an “instructive paradox”, meaning that the “customs governing the public 
demeanor of scientists and the public evaluation of contemporaries have become more exacting rather 
than less” (1973b, p. 338).  
 Returning to the scientific assessment reports of the IPCC and the NIPCC, we see how the 
NIPCC in fact makes use of some of the norms formulated by Merton in order to accuse the IPCC of 
drawing false conclusions. First, we saw how the NIPCC explicitly argues how the IPCC would pursue 
other interests than publishing ‘the truth’ about climate change – because of its work for governments, 
it would be “biased toward the assumption that greater government activity is necessary” (NIPCC 2009, 
p. vi). Thereby, the IPCC would violate the norm of disinterestedness. The NIPCC also accuses the 
IPCC of having unreliable peer-review procedures (cf. NIPCC 2009, p. v), which would be in conflict 
with the norm of organized scepticism. Lastly, in a way it can be argued too that the NIPCC implicitly 
accuses the IPCC of violating the norm of communism or communality as the latter would have 
purposefully omitted research findings that would contradict its claim.  
 The other way around, now, it can be analysed how the NIPCC’s own arguments comply with 
the scientific norms discussed above. In view of the NIPCC’s critical reactions to AR4 discussed in 
section 5.3 of this thesis, Merton’s norm of organized scepticism seems of particular interest here. In 
line with this norm, scientists should thoroughly scrutinize scientific claims in order to see if they really 
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hold up. Keeping in mind the institutional goal of science, they do so to contribute to building a 
reliable body of knowledge. In terms of Lewiński’s (2010, 2011) criteria for deciding on the 
reasonableness of representations one may say that when it comes to interpretation of other scientists’ 
findings or conclusions, scientists are expected to adopt a highly critical (or uncharitable) perspective, 
conducting a precise interpretation (narrow plausibility) of all utterances made in scientific discourse. 
Indeed, it would be detrimental to the institutional goal if scientists would not do so.  
  A complicating factor in analysing scientific communication is the fact that it is often aimed at 
informing fellow scientists in the same field. Publications in scientific journals, for instance, are 
principally aimed at informing scientists who may (to some varying extent) be expected to be 
acquainted with the topic under discussion. Explanations on the current state of affairs or earlier 
contributions to the field may be supposed to be known and, hence, only briefly touched upon. If 
scientific publications are meant to reach a wider audience, however, things may need to be formulated 
in another, more extensive way.51 This seems particularly important in the context of the debate on 
climate change. Indeed, as complex scientific issues are at stake, laymen (non-scientists) will need to 
resort to explanations of experts in order to be able to grasp the matter at hand. If there appears to be 
no consensus among experts, people not well-acquainted with the scientific issues at stake may look 
into the argumentation put forward by each of the parties for being able to draw a conclusion on the 
matter. Whilst expecting rebuttals to be objective or unbiased attempts at falsification, readers may 
expect all parties to be highly critical and to conduct a precise interpretation of their own propositions 
as well as the ones put forward by other scientists holding other points of view. Taking this into 
consideration, it can be argued that there seems to be no legitimate reason to consider the examples 
analysed in section 5.3 of this thesis to concern reasonable representations of the IPCC’s case. Indeed, 
the analysis showed how the NIPCC’s representations of claims put forward by the IPCC were by  no 
means precise. Even if the NIPCC may be taken to have expected the readers of CCR to be fully 
acquainted with the exact standpoints and arguments of the IPCC, the NIPCC’s arguments analysed in 
section 5.3 of this thesis can still be considered fallacious misrepresentations because they do in fact not 
respond to the IPCC’s actual standpoints or arguments, resulting in rebuttals missing the point. 52      
 
                                                                 
51 Just like complex issues, for instance, may be explained in language that is less technical than the language 
usually used in scientific publications aimed at informing colleagues. The IPCC and NIPCC, which do not 
conduct new research and are principally aimed at informing policy makers on the latest state of knowledge on 
climate change, take their  audience into account by including sections in their reports that provide extra (and less 
technical) explanations  on the issues  at hand. In AR4, for instance, these are the FAQ’s  answered throughout the 
report. In CCR, each chapter starts with an explanation on the relevance of the topic being discussed in that 
particular part of the report. 
52 Here we see how straw men can be identified (and evaluated) indeed without (necessarily) having a critical 
reaction of the discussant under attack at one’s disposal. As  discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, Lewiński (2011) 
contends that an argumentation analyst, for identifying a straw man fallacy, can only take into account 
discussions in which a discussant being attacked by a straw man fallacy actually responds to this by contending 
his words have been misrepresented. If the argumentative activity type in which the (alleged) straw man is put 
forward is characterized by formal, explicit norms and conventions regarding the interpretation of language, 
however, which is the case in the examples discussed in this chapter, arguers may be expected to express 
themselves clearly and effectively and the interpretation of language can be expected to be highly critical and 
precise. Consequently, one may make use of these norms and expectations in evaluating whether a representation 
of a proposition does right to the proposition that has actually been put forward. This is more difficult indeed in 
informal types of discourse which allow for a more loose and charitable interpretation.  
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At this point one may ask how the NIPCC would be able to maneuver strategically with the straw man, 
i.e. without it blatantly violating the norms discussed above. An answer to this may be found in the 
very fact that the NIPCC’s report is presented as a scientific assessment report and hence brings along 
certain expectations among its readers. That is to say, norms and conventions pertaining to the domain 
of science may be expected to be known among non-scientists as well, even if only the convention or 
norm that scientists, having a shared goal of establishing a reliable body of knowledge about the world, 
strive to be objective and precise. Consequently, being unable to judge the validity of (the content of) 
the arguments put forward by the NIPCC, readers may expect the NIPCC’s representations of 
arguments or viewpoints put forward by the IPCC to be in agreement with these norms. In other 
words, audience expectations can, in fact, be misused in this situation, meaning that the domain to 
which the report belongs and its institutional goals, norms and conventions offer a possibility for 
maneuvering strategically with representations. 
 In the above it was determined that the fact that both the IPCC and NIPCC claim to be 
“policy-neutral” (IPCC website 53) or “[not driven] by any political motivation” (NIPCC 2009, p. vi) 
would make it illegitimate to derive the norms the IPCC and NIPCC commit themselves to from the 
political domain, i.e. despite the fact both organizations may know political influences indeed. 
According to Jackson (2008), however, the very fact that the NIPCC accuses the IPCC of being 
politically predisposed in communicating scientific findings makes the discussion a predicament of 
politicization. More specifically, Jackson argues that “when a scientist reacts to conduct framed as 
politicization of science, the scientist’s own conduct may be taken up as nothing more than a political 
move” (Ibid., p. 216).54 The fact that she uses the word ‘predicament’ refers to the rhetorical challenge 
that is created due to the blending of political and scientific interests. That is to say, a rhetorical 
challenge is created most notably for scientists who do not pursue political ends in their work but 
nonetheless “feel compelled to speak for the science itself” (Ibid., p. 215). They are lured in a 
discussion which seems to resolve around scientific issues but which is in fact a political act not aimed 
at coming to any mutually acceptable resolution. The risk discussions of this kind bring along, is that a 
disagreement space is opened which can be misused by the initiator of the predicament. This may have 
a number of consequences on the way a third party audience perceives the difference of opinion. 
Jackson notes, for instance, that 
 
“[f]rom the perspective of nontechnical participants [in the debate], expert testimony and 
other appeals to authority are package deals consisting of the substantive claims made (e.g. the 
testimony content), the credibility of the source (e.g. the expert witness) and the prestige of the 
                                                                 
53 http://ipcc.ch/organization/organization.shtml [accessed 9 June 2015] 
54 The term politicization of science to refer to the idea that science is influenced by politica l factors in two 
respects: On the one hand, there is the fact that the scientif ic community is mobilised around political protest; on 
the other, there would be a “growing tendency of politicians of all kinds to treat scientific conclusions as mere 
instruments of politica l express ions (rather than as a neutral fact base from which all advocates  can draw equally 
in support of their views” (2008, p. 215). As result of the latter, Jackson argues, scientif ic results  are vie wed as 
political expressions, “‘belonging’ to one side or another” (Ibid.). According to Jackson, politicization of science 
occurs in many different fields, not uncommonly leading to protest among scientists. In her (2008) article, she 
discusses a case study on the controversy over abstinence-only sex education in the United States, showing how 
science is (mis)used by the Bush presidency to execute its conservative agenda.  
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expert field (see Walton 1989, 1997). So long as the field’s membership is easy to recognize and 
the members all agree among themselves on a conclusion, the package may be very strong,  but 
when experts disagree or when it is not clear who is and who is not an expert the package 
presented by each purported expert is degraded by loss of confidence in the field as a source of 
reliable judgment.” (2008, p. 228) 
 
Returning to the dispute between the IPCC and NIPCC initiated by the NIPCC, one may argue how 
the mere fact that the NIPCC accuses the IPCC of being politically predisposed creates a difficult 
situation for the latter. Indeed, the idea that there would be a scientific consensus on climate change is 
being attacked – if the IPCC were to react to the NIPCC’s allegations, however, saying for instance how 
its arguments are misrepresented by the NIPCC and the NIPCC’s rebuttals in fact do not hold up, this 
would actually turn the matter into a dispute. Furthermore, it would mean that the IPCC agrees on 
taking a side in the debate, an action which would subvert any claims to neutrality and objectivity 
(Ibid., p. 228). Lastly, if the IPCC were to react to the NIPCC’s ‘personal’ attacks, i.e. the allegations 
saying that the IPCC is biased and predisposed to drawing any conclusions in favour of the assumption 
that greater government activity is necessary (NIPCC 2009, p. vi), it could do the IPCC as well as the 
trustworthiness of climate science as a whole more harm than good. Indeed, “skirmishing over who is 
and is not an authority is well known to diminish the credibility of entire disciplines” (Jackson 2008, p. 
228; see also Ezrahi 1971).  
It can be argued, now, how it would be by no means detrimental to the NIPCC if the field of 
science (and the field of climate science in particular) would lose credibility. Indeed, as discussed in 
Chapter 3 of this thesis, scientific uncertainty on the topic of climate change causes governments to 
adopt a more hesitant position in the implementation of measures to stop it or prevent it from getting 
worse. If we take a closer look at the means of argumentation and criticism deployed by the NIPCC as 
well as the outcome it wishes to reach, we see how the fact that it only needs (to create) uncertainty 
regarding the IPCC’s claims in order  to reach its preferred outcome is reflected in its argumentative 
strategy. 
 
 
5.5.2 Means of argumentation and criticism and the possible outcome of the discussion 
The analysis of the general lines of argument in CCR discussed earlier in this chapter shows how the 
NIPCC seems to principally deploy a strategy of rebuttal, aiming first and foremost to refute claims 
made by the IPCC. That is to say, CCR is explicitly aimed at presenting support for the thesis that 
“[a]lthough the IPCC claims to […] have based AR4 on the best available science” (NIPCC 2009, p. iii), 
its conclusions on the causes and potential consequences of climate change are wrong. What has only 
been briefly touched upon in Chapter 3 of this thesis is the fact that by demonstrating that the IPCC’s 
conclusions are wrong the NIPCC hopes to “save the peoples of the world from the burden of paying 
for wasteful, unnecessary energy and environmental policies” (Ibid., p. vii). That is to say , it does not 
only want to demonstrate that there is no anthropogenic global warming that would have catastrophic 
consequences, it also explicitly wants to pass on to the readers of the report that it is unnecessary  and 
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therefore highly undesirable for government activity to be undertaken to stop the (all-natural and 
harmless) change in climate. The latter is of great importance for an understanding of the 
argumentative means the NIPCC needs to deploy in order to reach this ultimate goal.  
 In reacting critically to the IPCC’s point of view that humans are causing the climate to change 
and this will have negative consequences for the earth’s environment, the NIPCC seems to make use of 
the critical question Tindale (2007) connects to the argument scheme of argument from consequences, 
i.e.: (1) How likely is it that the consequence will follow?; (2) What evidence is provided for believing 
the consequence will follow?; and (3) Are there consequences of the opposite value that should be 
considered? (2007, p. 184). 55 The NIPCC seems to focus most on question 2, trying to demonstrate 
that the evidence the IPCC uses to base its conclusions on, is wrong (i.e. either because the scientific 
data on the basis of which these conclusions are drawn are inaccurate (argument 1.1 in Figure 1 on 
page 45) or because important scientific issues that contradict the main conclusions of AR4 have been 
distorted, omitted or purposefully ignored (argument 1.2a-c in Figure 45). In doing so, the NIPCC 
automatically makes the IPCC’s answer to the first question (i.e. ‘How likely is it that the consequences 
will follow?’) loose (some of its) credibility. Regarding question 3, the NIPCC provides 
counterevidence to the IPCC’s claim that the current climate change would have negative 
consequences by reacting critically to the IPCC’s conclusion on the negative effects of global warming 
(see, for example, Chapter 7 of CCR, ‘Biological Effects of Carbon Dioxide Enrichment’).   
The critical questions connected to the argument scheme of argument from consequence are 
of great importance in the debate as both the cause of the current change of climate (reflected in 
questions 1 and 2) and the (un)desirability of its consequences (reflected in question 3) are the main 
questions that need to be answered for policy makers to base their decisions on. If doubt is raised on an 
affirmative answer to any of these question, there is a chance policy makers may decide to not err on 
the side of caution and refrain from taking action to combat climate change. As a consequence, the 
NIPCC already has a fair chance of achieving its argumentative goal if the audience starts to call into 
question the validity of the IPCC’s claims. Employing a strategy of rebuttal then seems an effective one.  
Here, it is the wider context of the debate that enables the NIPCC to focus on discrediting the 
IPCC’s conclusions rather than, for instance, proposing one all-encompassing alternative theory that 
explains what exactly is in fact causing the earth’s climate to change today. Even though it may not be a 
direct opportunity for maneuvering strategically with the straw man fallacy, the context of the debate 
and the NIPCC’s position in it make it easy for the NIPCC to react critically towards the IPCC’s claims. 
In doing so, it may choose to represent the claims opportunistically.   
  
 
 
 
                                                                 
55The notion ‘argument scheme’ is used to denote the manner in which a standpoint an argument are linked to 
one another (Hitchcock & Wagemans 2011 , p. 185). This link may be based, for example, on causality or a 
comparison. The argument from consequences is based on causal reasoning and draws a link between a 
consequence (or the consequences) of some (refrain of) action and the preferred or dispreferred outcome that 
will likely follow when this action is or is not undertaken (Tindale 2007, p. 183). 
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5.5.3 Conditions for maneuvering strategically beyond the argumentative activity type  
Having discussed the four parameters reflecting the pragma-dialectical discussion stages in relation to 
some characteristics of the argumentative activity type), one clear opportunity for maneuvering 
strategically with the straw man fallacy was found. This related to the fact that the NIPCC presents 
itself as a scientific organisation that aims to give an unbiased assessment of the current state-of-
knowledge in the field of climate change, which creates expectations on the ways in which it would 
represent other scientists’ arguments or points of view. Such expectations can (and were found to) be 
exploited, which in the case of the examples discussed in this chapter resulted in a derailment of 
strategic maneuvering with the straw man fallacy. A factor that is not included in the concept of 
argumentative activity type may provide another advantageous condition for maneuvering strategically 
with the straw man fallacy.  
 What is not included in the concept of argumentative activity type, is the medium in which the 
discussion is held. The fact that the NIPCC initiates a discussion in a written report in which no 
opportunity is afforded for the IPCC to pose any direct reaction, has considerable consequences for the 
success of a straw man fallacy. This is most notably due to the fact that the NIPCC wishes to convince a 
third party audience of the validity of its arguments rather than the IPCC.  As was touched upon a 
number of times throughout Chapter 2 of this thesis, generally speaking, if an intended audience can 
be ‘fooled’ it may be of less importance whether the discussant under attack also believes his (actual) 
standpoint or argument has been successfully refuted, even if it in fact has been not. If a  protagonist 
cannot pose a direct reaction to a straw man fallacy, it may be the case that the third-party audience 
will not be informed on the actual fallaciousness of the rebuttal. The chances that the fallacy will 
actually go unnoticed may be greatest in those cases in which the audience is  unacquainted with the 
original standpoint or argument put forward by the protagonist or the subject of the discussion. If a 
discussion is highly complex, for instance, either because of the number of issues being discussed or 
because of the nature of the topic, chances are that outsiders or laymen in particular will have 
difficulties grasping each of the various discussion moves made. A false refutation like a straw man 
fallacy then can only be reversed if a protagonist is able to make clear to the audience that his original 
standpoint or argument has not been accurately represented and therefore has not been successfully 
refuted. In order for that to happen, the protagonist must be able to reach the readers of antagonist’s 
attack.56 Whether this is attainable, depends, among other things, on the medium in which the 
discussion is being held and the people using this medium. A written correspondence in a newspaper 
or journal, for instance, may be followed (from beginning to end) by its subscribers, but people 
reading this newspaper or journal occasionally may not be aware of earlier (i.e. the original) 
contributions being represented and may not come across any rectifications. 57 
                                                                 
56 As argued in chapter  2 of  this thes is, as long as the rebuttal is ‘out there’ there will be people who will take it to 
be true, even if it does not address any issues that are subject of debate because standpoints or arguments have 
been distorted or falsely attributed, which is the case when a straw man fallacy is committed. 
57 In the 301s t (2003) volume of Science, for example, a peer-review academic journal of the American Association 
for the Advancement of Science, we see how its editor- in-chief  Donald Kennedy refutes a misrepresentation by 
Fred. S. Singer (the founder of  the NIPCC) of three of  his cla ims put forward in earlier  volumes of the magazine. 
Singer accused Kennedy in a (published) letter to the journal of using “his Editorials inappropriately to advocate 
politically derived goals—undermining the proper role of Science and endangering credibility with the public”  
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 In case of the IPCC and NIPCC reports, now, chances are that not all readers of the NIPCC 
report (or the parts of it which will be covered by the media) will be acquainted with (all) arguments 
originally put forward by the IPCC in AR4, which was published two years before CCR. As a 
consequence, any misrepresentation – purposely committed or not – may well benefit from this 
situation. The fact that the IPCC was not able to pose a direct reaction to CCR (that would have 
reached all the readers of CCR) may also have created an advantageous situation for the straw man 
fallacy to be committed. In sum, the concept of argumentative activity type does not cover all (possible) 
conditions for maneuvering strategically with the straw man fallacy as the medium in which the 
discussion is held is not included.  
 Another complication regarding the concept of argumentative activity type is the fact that 
instantiations that appear to belong to the same argumentative activity type may, in fact, be different. 
In this section, the analysis of the argumentative activity type of the NIPCC’s scientific assessment 
report focused on particulars of the NIPCC’s report. The IPCC’s report,  however, being a scientific 
assessment report as well, seems to be different from the NIPCC’s in a few respects.  
In the above we saw how particulars of the (wider) debate on climate change and the position 
of the NIPCC enable it to deploy a strategy of rebuttal focusing on refuting claims made by the IPCC. 
Within the field of science, critical review pay an essential contribution to the institutional goal of 
building a reliable knowledge of knowledge (cf. Merton’s norm of organized scepticism).  Furthermore, 
pragma-dialectics considers disputation to be the prototypical communicative genre of the scientific 
genre. 58 In this respect, there seems to be nothing odd about the NIPCC’s focus on reacting critically 
towards the IPCC’s claims. The main aim of the IPCC’s report, however, seems to be inherently 
different from that of the NIPCC: Despite the fact that the IPCC has not reacted to (the allegations in) 
the NIPCC’s report and thereby, one may say, indicates to refrain itself from entering the discussion, 
AR4 in itself was not meant in itself to create a discussion nor to be part of it.59 It can be argued that this 
is inherent to the fact that it is a scientific assessment report. A communicative activity type that is used 
in other fields of science (e.g. biology, pharmacology) as well, the scientific assessment report is meant 
to summarize and assess the (most recent) state of knowledge in a particular field of science. If one is 
to compare it to other communicative activity types used within the scientific domain, it demonstrates 
similarities with the scientific meta-analysis. If we return to the NIPCC’s CCR, now, it can be said that 
this report is inherently polemic – in other words, the NIPCC uses its scientific assessment report for 
another purpose as well, making it, so to say, a (critical) ‘meta-meta-analysis’.60 I.e. it does not only (or 
primarily) summarize and assess the (most recent) state of knowledge in the field of climate science 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
Singer (2003) and advanced three reasons – three representations of arguments put forward by Kennedy – for  
why this  would be the case. Kennedy responded to this by noting how “he has misread each one of them” 
(Kennedy 2003) and explaining how the claims he made were, in fact, different.  
58 In pragma-dia lectics, up until now little attention seems to have been paid yet to  why some communicative 
genres  are prototypica lly linked to particular domains of communicative activity and what role other genres may 
play within one domain. 
59 As discussed earlier, the IPCC may indeed have good reasons for not responding to the NIPCC’s allegations. 
The fact that it is not meant to create (or rather initiate) a discussion, on the other hand, of course does not mean 
it cannot receive any critical reactions. 
60 Considering van Eemeren and Garssen’s remark on how “in argumentative practice, the one argumentative 
activity type sometimes may change over to the other, or be interrupted by the other” (2008, p. 23) it can be 
argued this may be the case indeed.   
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but principally and explicitly argues why the IPCC’s assessments are wrong. This may not be a 
prototypical feature of a scientific assessment report, but it serves the main purpose of the NIPCC: 
discrediting the IPCC’s conclusions as well as its credibility as a scientific organization.  
In short, even though both reports are (called) scientific assessment reports – they in fact look 
similar as well – 61 and hence can be taken to belong to the same argumentative activity type, there are 
inherent differences between the two. Even though in the preface of both reports it is explicitly stated 
how each of the organizations sets out to provide policy-makers with an overview of the present-day 
state of knowledge in the field of climate science, the NIPCC seems to focus more on providing policy-
makers with evidence of why the IPCC’s assessments are wrong.  The fact that it uses the format of a 
scientific assessment reports to address its criticism, now, might be part of its strategy too. Indeed, 
publishing its critique in the form of a scientific assessment reports brings its conclusions (or rather 
assessments) on par with those of the IPCC. This may enhance its credibility.  
Whether the NIPCC has intentionally chosen to publish a scientific assessment report in order 
to stand out as a serious opponent to the IPCC or not, it is important to realize that pragma -dialectical 
theory on the argumentative activity type does not yet account for the fact that argumentative activities 
that (on first appearance) may look to belong to the same activity type, may display dissimilarities in 
some respects. This would mean that conditions for maneuvering strategically can in fact be different 
among instantiations of (what seems) the same argumentative activity type.  
 
 
5.6 Conclusion  
In this chapter an analysis has been given of the straw man fallacy within the context of the NIPCC’s 
scientific assessment report Climate Change Reconsidered. First, the report’s main standpoints and the 
general lines of argumentation were discussed. Subsequently, two examples taken from the third 
chapter of the report were analysed, showing how rebuttals by the NIPCC of claims made in the 
IPCC’s AR4 represented the case of the IPCC as weaker than it actually is. It was explained how the 
examples discussed appeared to be a bit more multifaceted and complex than the examples of 
(different variants of) the straw man fallacy presented or circumscribed in the literature.  
In this section it was discussed as well how the (mis)representations analysed can in fact be 
considered fallacious straw men if we take into consideration some characteristics of the argumentative 
activity type of the NIPCC’s report. Other features of the argumentative activity type of the NIPCC’s 
scientific assessment report discussed above have been used to explain what conditions for 
maneuvering strategically with the straw man fallacy are created by the activity type of the NIPCC’s 
report. Firstly, it was argued, that the fact that the NIPCC’s report is a scientific assessment report 
brings along certain expectations among its readers. Being unable to judge the validity of (the content 
of) the arguments put forward by the NIPCC, readers may assume or expect the NIPCC’s 
representations of arguments or viewpoints put forward by the IPCC to be in agreement with norms 
                                                                 
61 In terms of the document design and the topics addressed in the different chapters, for example.  
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and conventions within the scientific domain. The fact that the audience may hold these expectations 
may be (mis)used for maneuvering strategically with the straw man fallacy.   
Secondly, it was discussed how a factor that is not included in the concept of argumentative 
activity type may also may provide opportunities for strategic maneuvering with misrepresentations in 
the NIPCC’s scientific assessment report. More specifically,  it was argued that the medium in which 
the NIPCC initiates a discussion provides excellent conditions for (successfully) committing a straw 
man fallacy if we take into account the fact that the NIPCC does not (principally) wish to convince its 
opponent, the IPCC, of the validity of its rebuttals, but a third party audience instead. Indeed, 
discussion situations in which discussants are not able to respond to each other’s contributions directly 
– i.e. when the discussion situation or format requires there is some considerable time delay between 
the one arguer’s contribution and the other’s reaction to it – it may be the case that (at least a part of) a 
third-party audience may not come across a refutation of a misrepresentation and hence may not be 
informed on the fallaciousness of what it might had taken as a sound argument at first.  
Lastly, it was noted how differences between the NIPCC’s scientific assessment report and that 
of the NIPCC in terms of their main aims raise the question what consequences this has for the theory 
behind the concept of argumentative activity type. Indeed, if instantiations of the same argumentative 
activity type can be found to offer  different conditions for strategic maneuvering, it would be 
impossible in those cases to make any generalizations regarding these conditions. In case of the NIPCC 
report, it could be that it was intentionally named a scientific assessment report as this would place its 
conclusions on par with those of the IPCC. As this could enhance its credibility, it may be part of the 
NIPCC’s strategy to stress its scientific (and unbiased) nature as an organization.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
67 
 
6. Conclusion 
This thesis sought to provide more insight in the ways the straw man fallacy can be committed in 
actual argumentative discourse by examining whether the different variants of the fallacy as they are 
distinguished in the literature can in fact be found to occur. In addition, this thesis aimed to contribute 
to a better understanding of what contextual factors may influence the success of the straw man fallacy 
by analysing (unreasonable) representations in the Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate 
Change’s scientific assessment report Climate Change Reconsidered (2009). A direct reaction to 
another scientific assessment report, i.e. the Fourth Assessment Report published by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007), the NIPCC’s report predominantly consist of 
critical reactions towards the claims put forward by the IPCC and the evidence it uses to substantiate 
these claims. These reports therefore make for an interesting object of analysis on the straw man fallacy.  
The present work started with a literature review on the straw man fallacy in Chapter 2. In this 
chapter it was discussed how different authors distinguish different variants of the straw man fallacy by 
taking into consideration its central vice, i.e. representing another party as weaker than it actually is. It 
was demonstrated that most categories of the different variants of the fallacy in the literature for a large 
part coincide. Overall, three main variants of the fallacy were recognized: (a) the category of 
linguistically distorting the protagonist’s standpoint or arguments originally advanced in a different 
way (also called the representational form); (b) the category of attacking a proposition that is phrased 
faithfully, but nonetheless distorted by an opportune selection of only the weakest argument(s) as 
object(s) of attack (i.e. the selectional form); and (c) the category of imputing an (altogether) fictitious 
standpoint or arguments to a protagonist, either the actual protagonist taking part in the discussion or 
some fictitious one (i.e. the less extreme and the extreme variety of the hollow man variant, 
respectively).  
 A second issue addressed in Chapter 2 concerned the solutions suggested in the literature 
regarding the often difficult task of deciding between (sound) reformulations of propositions on the 
one hand and misrepresentations – straw man fallacies – on the other hand. It was discussed how 
pragma-dialectical argumentation, forming the theoretical framework of the analysis in Chapter 5 of 
this thesis, offers an appropriate context-sensitive approach to the reconstruction of argumentative 
discourse by making use of the notion of argumentative activity type to account for the fact that 
argumentation always takes place in concrete situations and under specific (contextual) conditions.  As 
the theory does not, however, provide practical, workable tools for the evaluation of the straw man 
fallacy, Lewiński (2011) formulated a number of specific criteria for the evaluation of the straw man 
fallacy. In relation to these criteria it was discussed how Lewiński stipulates a list of necessary and 
sufficient conditions Lewiński for straw man fallacy identification. One of the necessary conditions, 
which demands from an argumentation analyst to take into account only discussions in which arguers 
respond to (and refute) attacks that involve a misrepresentation of their own case, was found to raise 
some important questions on exactly why one would not be able to pin down a straw man fallacy in 
those situations in which arguers do not have the possibility to respond to and correct a distortion. It 
was argued that most notably in argumentative activity types in which the interpretation of language 
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can be expected to be highly critical and precise and arguers may be expected to express themselves 
clearly and effectively, one would be able to make use of these norms and expectations in evaluating 
whether a representation of a proposition does right to the proposition that has actually been put 
forward. In Chapter 5 of this thesis it was demonstrated how Lewiński’s evaluation criteria indeed lend 
themselves for this.  
 In Chapter 3 of this thesis an illustration was given of the wider (historical) context of the 
international debate on climate change. It was discussed how in the course of the twentieth and 
twenty-first century, climate change has moved from being predominantly a scientific issue to being a 
matter of political (and consequently a broader public) interest as well. Due to the location of the 
debate on the boundaries between the science and politics, different interests are at play regarding the 
exact settlement of the debate. From the onset of the debate, this has been hampering the 
establishment of environmental policy. The fact that sceptic movements have become louder during 
the past few years also exerts an influence on this matter, as uncertainty on the issue causes 
governments to become more hesitant in adopting a policy to fight climate change. It was noted how 
the NIPCC is the largest sceptic organization in the field of climate change, aiming to demonstrate that 
the IPCC’s claims on the cause and potential consequences of the current climate change are wrong. 
The way in which it does so, for a large part consists of  accusing the IPCC of being politically biased 
and predisposed towards the idea that greater government activity is necessary. As a result, it was 
argued, the debate takes on an ad-hominem character which may have an influence on laymen who 
need to resort to explanations of experts in order to be able to grasp the matter at hand. This derives 
away the attention from the actual arguments scientists put forward in order to substantiate their 
findings on whether global warming is caused by human activities or not and whether this change of 
climate would cause a threat to the earth’s environment.  
Chapter 4 provided a more detailed explanation of how pragma-dialectical theory and the 
concept of argumentative activity type can be used to examine context-specific conditions for strategic 
maneuvering with the straw man fallacy. In pragma-dialectics, the notion of argumentative activity 
type is used to account for the fact that argumentation takes place in concrete situations and under 
specific (contextual) conditions. As many of these situations occur regularly and are socially 
identifiable, they can be considered types of communicative activity that can be recognized by certain 
norms or expectations on communication (Lewiński 2010, p. 55). These norms or expectations can be 
used to deduce context-specific rules or conventions of interpretation, which, in turn, may help an 
argumentation analyst to decide whether specific interpretations (or representations) comply with the 
rules or conventions within a particular argumentative activity type or not. It was explained how 
argumentative activity types are empirical concepts, that, as van Eemeren and Houtlosser put it, “can be 
identified and characterized on the basis of a careful study of a certain domain of practice” (2009, pp. 
7-8). The pragma-dialectical method for characterising an argumentative activity type consists of 
taking into account four features of the activity type under consideration, i.e. the domain of activity in 
which it takes place, the associated rationale, its genre of communicative activity and its institutional 
norms and conventions. Once the argumentative activity type has been established, four parameters 
“which mirror the division of a critical discussion into four stages” (Lewiński 2010, p. 58) can be used 
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in order to gain more insight in the argumentative type specific conditions for strategic maneuvering. 
These four parameters are the initial situation of the discussion, the starting points that are agreed upon, 
the means of argumentation and criticism that are used, and the outcome of the discussion which relate 
to the confrontational stage, the opening stage, the argumentation stage and the concluding stage of 
the ideal model respectively. In Chapter 5 of this thesis the NIPCC’s scientific assessment report has 
been analysed according to these four parameters, which were discussed in relation to the report’s 
characteristics in terms of its domain of activity, rationale, genre of communicative activity and 
institutional norms and conventions.  
In Chapter 5 the main standpoints and the general lines of argumentation of the NIPCC’s 
scientific assessment report were discussed first. It was demonstrated that the NIPCC deploys two 
main strategies for discrediting the IPCC’s main conclusions: Firstly, the NIPCC attempts to discredit 
the scientific data upon which the IPCC bases its conclusions by demonstrating how the 
methodologies and models used in the research cited by the IPCC are unconventional or right out 
inadequate for drawing conclusions about past, current and future climate change; secondly, the 
NIPCC aims to demonstrate that the IPCC has distorted, not taken into account or even purposely 
ignored data that might contradict their conclusions. Especially the latter appeared to be an interesting 
starting point for an analysis of representations.  
Subsequently, two sections from the third chapter of the NIPCC’s report were analysed. It was 
demonstrated how these sections comprise counterarguments to claims made by the IPCC that 
represented the case of the IPCC as weaker than it actually is. The examples appeared to be somewhat 
more complex than the examples of (different variants of) the straw man fallacy presented or 
circumscribed in the literature. This was mostly due to the fact that both examples turned out to 
comprise two kinds of distortions. It was found that in both examples, an argument put forward by the 
IPCC is distorted first. In the one case, the NIPCC distorts one of the IPCC’s arguments on the role of 
CO2 in past climate changes; in the other, the NIPCC misrepresents the fact that the IPCC calls the 
current rise of the global mean temperature ‘unprecedented’ because of the rate at which it occurs 
rather than that it would be rising to unprecedented heights. These distortions, however, turned out 
not to be enough for the NIPCC to successfully refute the IPCC’s standpoints. Therefore, in both cases 
it needed to neglect one of the main arguments the IPCC uses to substantiate its claims, i.e. the 
argument that the current rise in temperature is essentially different from past ones due to an 
unnaturally rapid rise in CO2. In sum, the misrepresentations of the IPCC’s case by the NIPCC are less 
straightforward than the variants discussed in the literature. This may be (partially) due to the 
complexity of the topic; further research may provide more insight in the question whether the straw 
men examples analysed in this thesis may be exceptional or whether straw men of this less straight-
forward kind occur more often.    
The second part of the analysis focused on the argumentative activity type specific conditions 
for maneuvering strategically with the straw man fallacy in the NIPCC’s scientific assessment report. 
For this analysis the four characteristics defining the activity type from the perspective of a critical 
discussion were taken as a point of departure. First, the initial situation and starting points were 
discussed; second, the means of argumentation and criticism and the possible outcome of the 
70 
 
discussion. In order to achieve a correct understanding of these parameters,  characteristics of the 
argumentative activity type of the NIPCC’s report in terms of its domain of activity, rationale, 
communicative genre and institutional norms and conventions have been taken into account as well.  
 The first condition for maneuvering strategically with the straw man fallacy that was found 
relates to the starting points of the discussion the NIPCC can be taken to agree upon by publishing its 
criticism towards the NIPCC in a scientific assessment report. It was argued that the fact that the 
NIPCC’s report is a scientific  assessment report brings along certain expectations among its readers 
towards the manner in which the report communicates its (scientific) criticism. More specifically, 
being unable to judge the validity of (the content of) the arguments put forward by the NIPCC, readers 
may assume or expect the NIPCC’s representations of arguments or viewpoints put forward by the 
IPCC to be in agreement with norms and conventions pertaining to the scientific domain. These 
norms and conventions stipulate, among other things, that scientists should conduct a honest and 
accurate interpretation of all utterances made in scientific discourse. Indeed, if they would not, this 
would be detrimental to the institutional goal of science of building a reliable body of knowledge. The 
fact that the audience may hold these expectations, now, could be misused, meaning that the domain to 
which the report belongs and its institutional goals, norms and conventions offer a possibility for 
maneuvering strategically with representations.  
 In relation to the domain of activity, its institutional goals and its norms and conventions, it 
was also noted that the fact that the NIPCC explicitly presents its report as a scientific assessment 
report demands that norms and conventions of the scientific domain should be used to formulate the 
context-specific criteria for evaluating the straw man fallacy. Merton’s (1942) norm of organized 
scepticism, according to which scientists are to thoroughly scrutinize scientific claims for being able to 
build a reliable body of knowledge, was used in particular to conclude that scientists are expected to 
adopt a highly critical (or uncharitable) perspective, conducting a precise interpretation (narrow 
plausibility) of all utterances made in scientific communication. As the representations deployed by the 
NIPCC do not concern precise representations of arguments actually put forward by the IPCC in its 
Fourth Assessment Report, it was concluded that these are cases of derailed strategic maneuvers.   
In relation to the means of argumentation and criticism deployed by the NIPCC it was 
discussed how the wider context of the debate on climate change provides the NIPCC with a rather 
‘easy’ position in the debate. That is to say, due to its standpoints on the matter and its aim to convince 
its audience of the fact that no governmental action on the current climate change should be 
undertaken, the NIPCC only needs to prove why the IPCC would be wrong in order to attain this aim. 
This may not be an opportunity for maneuvering strategically with representations per se, but it may 
imply that of all possible strategic maneuvers, opportunistically representing the opponent’s 
standpoint seems an easy candidate.  
Another factor that lays beyond the concept of argumentative activity type was argued to exert 
a more direct influence on the conditions for strategic maneuvering, namely the medium in which the 
NIPCC initiates a discussion, i.e. a written a report. Indeed, as the IPCC was never able to pose a direct 
reaction to CCR (i.e. a reaction that would have reached all the readers of CCR), the NIPCC may have 
used the benefit from the fact that as long as a rebuttal is ‘out there’ there will be people who will take it 
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to be true, even if it does not address any issues that are subject of debate because standpoints or 
arguments have been distorted or falsely attributed.  
Lastly, it was discussed that even though both the IPCC’s report and the NIPCC’s report are 
(called) scientific assessment reports and hence can be taken to belong to the same argumentative 
activity type, inherent differences between the two can be found. Most particularly, it was noted that 
although both reports explicitly aim to provide policy-makers with an overview of the present-day 
state of knowledge in the field of climate science, the NIPCC seems to focus more on providing policy-
makers with evidence of why the IPCC’s assessments are wrong. The latter may be considered not to be 
a prototypical feature of a scientific assessment report, which raises the question whether it is part of 
the NIPCC’s strategy to present its report as such in order to bring its conclusions on par with those of 
the IPCC. Nonetheless, it brings to the fore a complication regarding the concept of argumentative 
activity type as the theory does not yet account for the fact that argumentative activities that (on fir st 
appearance) may look to belong to the same activity type, may display dissimilarities in some respects.  
 
In conclusion, this thesis hopes to have demonstrated that the straw man fallacy can be found to occur 
in more complex ways than the literature on (the different variants of) the fallacy may suggest. Further 
research on representations in argumentative activity types other than the one analysed in the present 
work may provide more insight in the different ways in which the straw man fallacy is committed in 
actual argumentative discourse. Furthermore, this thesis has sought to uncover some contextual factors 
that may influence the likelihood of a straw man fallacy to be committed. Research on the fallacy in 
different argumentative activity types may enhance our understanding of such factors too.   
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1. The IPCC’s (2007) claim that the CO2 produced by the burning of fossil fuels will lead to catastrophic global warming is false. 
 1.1 It is extremely likely that CO2 plays only a minor role in enhancing temperature changes that are induced by something else. 
  1.1.1a Research findings on paleoclimatic data indicate that past climate changes have not been caused by CO2. 
   (1.1.1a.1) There are research findings on paleoclimatic data that indicate there is no relation between the earth’s atmospher ic CO2 
concentration and the inducement of climatic variations. 
    1.1.1a.1.1a A study conducted by Rothman (2002) shows that the CO2 history “exhibits no systematic correspondence with the 
geologic record of climatic variations at tectonic time scales.”  
     1.1.1a.1.1a.1 Over the last 175 million years the results of Rothmann’s (2002) analysis depict a long-term decline in the air’s 
CO2 content earth’s atmospheric CO2 concentration. 
     1.1.1a.1.1a.2 A visual examination of Rothman’s plot of CO2 and concomitant major cold and warm periods indicates the 
three most striking peaks in the air’s CO2 concentration occur either totally or partially within periods of time when earth’ s 
climate was relatively cool.  
    1.1.1a.1.1b Many observations done by Pagani et al. (2005), who took a more detailed look at the most recent 50 million years of 
earth’s thermal and CO2 history, “argue for a decoupling between global climate and CO2” . 
     1.1.1a.1.1b.1 Pagani et al. found that between 43 and 33 million years ago the air’s CO2 concentration experienced 3 huge 
oscillations. In the first two oscillations, temperature did not appear to respond to the change in CO2, exhibiting an 
uninterrupted slow decline. 
     1.1.1a.1.1b.2 Pagani et al. (2005) also found that from about 33 to 26 Ma BP, the oxygen isotope ratio hovered around a value 
of 2.7 per mil indicating little change in temperature over that period, whilst the corresponding CO2 concentration, on the 
other hand, experienced about a 500 ppm increase around 32 Ma BP, after which it dropped 1,000 ppm over the next two 
million years, only to rise again by a few hundred ppm, refuting – three times – the CO2-induced global warming hypothesis. 
     1.1.1a.1.1b.3 From 24 Ma BP to the end of the record at 5 Ma BP, there were relatively small variations in atmospheric CO2 
content but relatively large variations in oxygen isotope values, both up and down. 
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   (1.1.1a.2) There are research findings on paleoclimatic data that argue that CO2 perturbations have been caused by the changes in 
climate rather than vice versa. 
    1.1.1a.2.1a Fischer et al. (1999), who examined trends of atmospheric CO2 and air temperature derived from Antarctic ice core data 
that extended back in time a quarter of a million years of atmospheric CO2 quarter of million years ago, found that over this 
period, the three most dramatic warming events experienced on earth were the terminations of the last three ice ages and for each 
of these climatic transitions, earth’s air temperature always rose well in advance of the increase in atmospheric CO2.  
    1.1.1a.2.1b Petit et al. (1999), who studied the beginnings rather than the ends of glacial ages, discovered that during all glacial 
inceptions of the past half million years, temperature always dropped well before the decline in the air’s CO2 concentration (“the 
CO2 decrease lags the temperature decrease by several thousand years”).  
    1.1.1a.2.1c Mudelsee (2001) determined that variations in atmospheric CO2 concentration lagged behind variations in air 
temperature by 1,300 to 5,000 years over the past 420,000 years 
    1.1.1a.2.1d Staufer et al. (1998) observed the atmospheric CO2 concentration derived from ice core records typically varied by less 
than 10 ppm during certain climatic transitions characterized by rapid warmings of several degrees Centigrade, which were 
followed by slower coolings that returned the climate to essentially full glacial conditions 
    1.1.1a.2.1e Other studies (e.g., Cheddadi et al., 1998; Gagan et al., 1998; Raymo et al., 1998), have also demonstrated this reverse 
coupling of atmospheric CO2 and temperature where temperature is the independent variable that appears to induce changes in 
CO2. 
    1.1.1a.2.1f Steig (1999) noted cases between 7,000 and 5,000 years ago when atmospheric CO2 concentrations increased by just over 
10 ppm at a time when temperatures in both hemispheres cooled. 
    1.1.1a.2.1g Caillon et al. (2003) conclude “that CO2 is not the forcing that initially drives the climatic system during a deglaciation”  
     1.1.1a.2.1g.1 Results from measurements of the isotopic composition of argon – specifically, δ40Ar, which Caillon et al. (2003) 
argue “can be taken as a climate proxy, thus providing constraints about the timing of CO2 and climate change” – in air 
bubbles in the Vostok ice core over the period that comprises what is called Glacial Termination III, which occurred about 
240,000 years ago, led them to conclude that “the CO2 increase lagged Antarctic deglacial warming by 800 ± 200 years.”  
    1.1.1a.2.1h Indermuhle et al. (1999) also found that past variations in atmospheric CO2 concentration lagged behind variations in 
air temperature 
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62 As discussed in section 5.3.1 of this thesis, this inferential link is not made explicit nor further substantiated by an explanation.  
 1.1.1a.2.1h.1 Indermuhle et al. (1999) determined that after the termination of the last great ice age, the CO2 content of the air 
gradually rose by approximately 25 ppm in almost linear fashion between 8,200 and 1,200 years ago, over  a period of time that 
saw a slow but steady decline in global air temperature. 
1.1.1a.2.1h.1.2 Indermuhle et al. (1999) also found that over the period of 60 to 20 thousand years ago there were four distinct 
periods when temperatures rose by approximately 2°C and CO2 rose by about 20 ppm, but one of the statistical tests they 
performed on the data suggested that the shifts in the air’s CO2 content during these intervals followed the shifts in air 
temperature by approximately 900 years while a second statistical test yielded a mean CO2 lag time of 1,200 years. 
    1.1.1a.2.1i A study from Siegenthaler et al. (2005), who analyzed CO2 and proxy temperature (δD, the ratio of deuterium to 
hydrogen) data derived from an ice core in Antarctica, revealed a coupling of Antarctic temperature and CO2 in which they 
obtained the best correlation between CO2 and temperature “for a lag of CO2 of 1900 years.”  
      1.1.1a.2.1i.1 Specifically, over the course of glacial terminations V to VII, they indicate that “the highest correlation of CO2 
and deuterium, with use of a  20-ky window for each termination, yields a lag of CO2 to deuterium of 800, 1600, and 2800 
years, respectively.” 
    1.1.1a.2.1j Pagani et al. (2005), who found that approximately 43-44 million years ago the air’s CO2 concentration experienced 
three huge oscillations on the order of 1000 ppm from peak to valley, conclude that temperatures seemed to respond to the thi rd 
rise in CO2, but in the direction opposite to what the greenhouse theory of global warming predicts  
     1.1.1a.2.1j.1 The rise in CO2 was followed by the sharpest drop in temperature of the entire record. 
    1.1.1a.2.1k Pagani et al. (2005) also found that around 26 Ma BP, the oxygen isotope ratio dropped to about 1.4 per mil (implying a 
significant rise in temperature), during which time the air’s CO2 content declined.  
  1.1.1b Research findings found that during past climate changes temperature led CO2 by thousands of years.  
  1.1.1b.1 See arguments 1.1.1a.2.1a; 1.1.1a.2.1b; 1.1.1a.2.1c; 1.1.1a.2.1g; 1.1.1a.2.1h.  
    (1.1.1b.1’) If temperature is found to have led CO2 by thousands of years, it is extremely likely that CO2 plays only a minor  role in 
enhancing temperature changes that are induced by something else.62 
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1. The IPCC’s (2007) claim that the current rise of global mean temperature is caused by high atmospheric CO2 concentrations is false. 
 1.1 The current rise of global mean temperature is caused by something other than high atmospheric CO2 concentrations.   
  1.1a Warmer periods have occurred in the past 1,300 years (i.e. the current rise of temperature is not ‘unprecedented’63).   
   1.1a.1a The ‘hockey stick graph’ (which shows nine hundred years of stable global temperatures—until about 1910 when the twentieth 
century’s temperatures seem to rocket upward out of control) used by the IPCC is incorrect.  
    1.1a.1.1 The graph has been frequently and severely criticized in the literature.  
     [...]64  
   1.1a.1b A thorough examination of temperature records shows how there has been a global Medieval Warm Period during which 
temperatures exceeded those of the twentieth century.  
    1.1a.1b.1a Research findings demonstrate that such a Medieval Warm Period did occur over wide reaches of Africa.  
     1.1a.1b.1a.1a Based on the temperature and water needs of the crops that were cultivated by the first agropastoralists of 
southern Africa, Huffman (1996) constructed a climate history of the region based on archaeological evidence acquired from 
various Iron Age settlements. In the course of completing this project, dated relic evidence of the presence of cultivated 
sorghum and millets was considered by Huffman to be so strong as to essentially prove that the climate of the subcontinent-
wide region must have been warmer and wetter than it is today from approximately AD 900-1300.  
      1.1a.1b.1a.1a.1 These crops cannot be grown in this part of southern Africa under current climatic conditions. 
       1.1a.1b.1a.1a.1.1 Current climatic conditions are much too cool and dry. 
                                                                 
63 As discussed in Chapter 5 of this thesis, the NIPCC uses the word ‘unprecedented’ to refer to something else than the IPCC do es: In AR4, the IPCC uses 
‘unprecedented’ to indicate how the current rise of atmospheric CO2 (and hence the global mean temperature) is unusual considering past CO2 fluctuations. The 
NIPCC, however, makes mention of the term ‘unprecedented’ with reference to the global mean temperature, taking it to mean that the IPCC considers the current 
global mean temperature to be exceptionally high.    
64 As mentioned in section 5.3 of the thesis, the so-called ‘hockey stick graph’ has been subject of several critica l studies in the past; as the matter is quite complex and 
the exact arguments used by both parties are difficult to construct, it will be left unaddressed in this thesis.  
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     1.1a.1b.1a.1b Other evidence for this conclusion comes from Tyson et al. (2000). 
      1.1a.1b.1a.1b.1 Tyson et al. (2000) obtained a quasi-decadal record of oxygen and carbon-stable isotope data from a well-
dated stalagmite of Cold Air Cave in the Makapansgat Valley (30 km southwest of Pietersburg, South Africa), which they 
augmented with five-yearresolution temperature data that they reconstructed from color variations in banded growth-
layer laminations of the stalagmite that were derived from a relationship calibrated against actual air temperatures 
obtained from a surrounding 49-station climatological network over the period 1981-1995, which had a correlation of 
+0.78 that was significant at the 99 percent confidence level. This record revealed the existence of a  significantly warmer-
than-present period that began prior to AD 1000 and lasted to about AD 1300.  
     1.1a.1b.1a.1b In a similar study, Holmgren et al. (2001) derived a 3,000-year temperature record for South Africa that revealed 
several multi-century warm and cold periods.  
      1.1a.1b.1a.1b.1 They found a dramatic warming at approximately AD 900, when temperatures reached a level that was 
2.5°C higher than that prevailing at the time of their analysis of the data. 
     [et cetera]  
    1.1a.1b.1b Research findings demonstrate that Antarctica has experienced such a Medieval Warm Period.  
     [...] 
    1.1a.1b.1c Research findings demonstrate that the Arctic has experienced such a Medieval Warm Period.  
     [...] 
    1.1a.1b.1d Research findings demonstrate that parts of Asia, including China, Russia and ‘other Asia locations’, have experienced 
such a Medieval Warm Period.  
     [...] 
    1.1a.1b.1e Research findings demonstrate that Europe has experienced such a Medieval Warm Period.  
 [...] 
1.1a.1b.1f Research findings demonstrate that North America has experienced such a Medieval Warm Period.  
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 [...] 
1.1a.1b.1g Research findings demonstrate that South America has experienced such a Medieval Warm Period.  
     […] 
    1.1b Whatever caused these warmer periods in the past may be the cause of the current warming of the earth  
     1.1b.1a It is realistic to believe the Medieval Warm Period was the result of a millennial-scale oscillation of climate that is 
global in scope and driven by some regularly varying forcing factor rather than a rise in CO2.  
     1.1b.1b It is difficult to believe that the strong synchronicity of the century-long Northern Hemispheric and South American 
temperature changes was due to a mere rise in CO2.65  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
65 Arguments 1.1b.1a and 1.1b.1b are not further substantiated in CCR. 
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1. The IPCC’s (2007) claim that the 
current rise of global mean temperature 
is caused by high atmospheric CO2 
concentrations is false. 
1.1 The current rise of global mean 
temperature is caused by something 
other than high atmospheric CO2 
concentrations.  
1.1a Warmer periods have occurred 
in the past 1,300 years (i.e. the 
current rise of temperature is not 
‘unprecedented’1).  
1.1a.1a The ‘hockey stick graph’ 
(which shows nine hundred years of 
stable global temperatures—until 
about 1910 when the twentieth 
century’s temperatures seem to 
rocket upward out of control) used 
by the IPCC is incorrect.   
1.1a.1b A thorough examination of 
temperature records shows how 
there has been a global Medieval 
Warm Period during which  
temperatures exceeded those of the 
20th century.  
1.1b Whatever caused these warmer 
periods in the past may be the cause 
of the current warming of the earth. 
1.1b.1a It is realistic to believe the 
Medieval Warm Period was the 
result of a millennial-scale 
oscillation of climate that is global 
in scope and driven by some 
regularly varying forcing factor 
rather than a rise in CO2. 
1.1b.1b It is difficult to believe that 
the strong synchronicity of the 
century-long Northern Hemispheric 
and South American temperature 
changes was due to a mere rise in 
CO2.  
1.1a.1.1  […] (see Appendix 3)  1.1a.1b.1a - 1.1a.1b.1g (see 
Appendix 3) 
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